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ABSTRACT 
 
SEA CONTROL AND MARITIME POWER PROJECTION FOR AUSTRALIA:  
Maritime Air Power and Air Warfare 
 
Australia is a maritime nation in one of the most complex open ocean, littoral 
and archipelagic maritime regions in the world. The sea is the defining physical 
characteristic in the region. The overwhelming significance of this is that Australia 
has no land borders. This is a strategic advantage that must be better understood to 
avoid it becoming a strategic liability.  
 
Strategic realities endure. There are many more effective ways to overcome 
Australia other than via a military invasion. However, defence against such an 
invasion is currently the prime force structure determinant in Australian defence 
planning. As an alternative to this, Australia should better appreciate that a mature 
maritime capability would provide the mobility and power projection to deter 
aggressors engaged in operations against Australia’s interests at distance from 
Australia itself.  Such an understanding would lead to the implementation of a 
credible maritime strategy. 
 
Underpinning such a maritime strategy is the strategic concept of sea control. 
Sea control requires control of the air. Without sea control maritime power projection 
cannot occur and forces cannot be operated ashore. Additionally trade to and from 
Australia can be interdicted at will. However, the central role of sea control for 
Australia’s strategic security remains obscured by Australia’s consistent continentalist 
approach.  
 
It is time to bring maritime strategy to the fore, to re-engage the aircraft carrier 
issue and to stress the fundamental imperative for capable surface combatants. This 
would ensure that sea control is the enabler that underpins Australia’s defence policy. 
A mature Australia should relegate the vitriolic single-service oriented debates that 
concluded in 1983 about aircraft carriers to that era. A study should be conducted to 
rigorously review the technology, operational concepts and strategic realities of 2003 
to 2040, with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic circumstances.  
 
As the Australian Defence Force makes decisions on new projects that will 
affect force structure for the next 30 years, a maritime sea control and power 
projection requirement should input significantly to the new aerospace combat 
capability, Project Air 6000, and the project for the maritime air warfare capability, 
Project Sea 4000.  
 
Introduction 
 
Notwithstanding the success of the East Timor operation in 1999, Australia’s 
ability to project national power is limited by a maritime capability that is orientated 
towards self-defence and sea denial operations rather than sea control. This does not 
reflect the fact that in an era of uncertainty Australia may well need to project force 
through the maritime environment. Australia’s national interests are integrated with 
the environment beyond the coast and need to be expressed in terms other than purely 
war or peace but as part of a spectrum of conflict with many overlaps. This is 
something very relevant to maritime forces because they interact constantly with 
various points on the spectrum. One of the central features of a maritime strategy is 
that it has an application throughout the continuum of operations. What this means is 
that benign operations are just as relevant to a comprehensive maritime strategy as 
combat operations and that maritime strategy has a well defined peacetime dimension.  
 
Australia exists in a region of instability and significant military spending. 
Although a western liberal-style democracy, it cannot assume that there is no threat to 
its national survival over the longer term. The German strategist Carl von Clausewitz 
in avoiding what he termed ‘abstruse definitions of war’1 wrote in 1832 that; ‘war is 
…an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’2 However, in 
the chapter that he dedicates to defining what is war, Clausewitz moves from this 
narrow definition to describe war as a political instrument, a continuation of political 
commerce.  The statement that ‘war is a mere continuation of policy by other means’3 
is important if Australia is to properly comprehend diplomatic and international 
realities.   
 
For Australia the different cultural outlooks that determine policy, especially 
in the Asian-Pacific region must be acknowledged for war to be understood.  
Australia must be prepared to employ stratagems that reflect the realities of the Asia-
                                                 
1 Clausewitz, C von, On War, Rapoport, A (ed), Pelican Books Ltd, Hammonsworth, Middlesex, 
England 1968, p.101. 
2 Ibid, p.101. 
Pacific region. This includes the fact that the region is a maritime geo-strategic 
environment. Despite statements in Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force that 
Australia’s strategy is fundamentally maritime,4 which should be expected if the 
correct emphasis was placed on geo-strategic issues, this is not so when maritime 
doctrine is assessed and the term ‘maritime’ is analysed.  
 
 To redress this dichotomy Australia ought to comprehend better that strategic 
force structure development and the drafting of national policy documents such as 
Defence White papers should be built on a rigorous doctrinal base. This paper argues 
that contemporary strategic circumstances, Australia’s maritime environment and 
likely future requirements should drive force structure decisions, rather than the 
current ‘top down’ strategic thinking. The foreseeable strategic situation is 
characterised by uncertainty, operational variety, and potential danger. In short, 
capabilities should be tailored to reflect this variety. The traditional flexibility of 
maritime power revolving around sea control is a most valuable strategic asset in the 
face of uncertainty. This leads to a conclusion in favour of achieving adequate 
surface capability, as well as a balanced, integrated, and interoperable fleet.  
 
 In plain terms Defence 2000 reduces the defence of Australia in its explicit 
sense to ‘the defence of Australia and its direct approaches.’5 Next to this the report, 
Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update 2003 does reflect an increasing 
likelihood for Australia to be affected by events outside the immediate 
neighbourhood, but the report focuses more on niche capabilities for specific and 
limited involvement in coalition operations.6 The maritime nature of Australia’s 
environment is ignored. Maritime strategy, maritime doctrine and strategic realities 
in the Asia-Pacific would indicate that defending Australia’s national interests is 
more problematical than this. 
 
The post Cold War period has been witness to a shift in emphasis for military 
forces from the traditional concepts of the decisive battle, territorial conquest and 
inter-state wars to a more uncertain period. This is not to state that the traditional 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Ibid,,p.119. 
4 Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p XI 
5 Defence 2000, p X 
military role has been made irrelevant, but rather that additional and often more 
complicated and delicate roles have been added.  It is also true that the changes have 
been most pronounced for western liberal democracies. However, statements that 
there is now little identifiable conventional threat to national existence are 
indulgences that at best should be restricted to the North American landmass and 
Western Europe. Nations in the Asia-Pacific region that do not have the historical 
thread of liberal democracy are still establishing national identities and in some cases 
borders, and these nations are still very much rooted in the traditional military outlook 
of survival of the nation state.  
 
The existence of radicalism and terrorism outside of state-on-state conflict is 
not new. In fact state-on-state conflicts are pre-dated in history by terrorism and 
anarchy. Terror against civilian populations was common in the Crusades for 
example, as it was in the Viking raiding parties that attacked Britain and with notable 
historic figures such as Ghenghis Khan and his forces. What is new is its reach and 
impact on civilian populations that are not directly involved. This is due in the most 
part to the immediacy and intimacy of modern media reporting. This fact needs to be 
understood for the era post 11 September 2001 to be seen in perspective.  
 
Issues such as these require analysis not only from an Australian perspective 
but also in the light of other contemporary maritime doctrines and the global 
influences that formulate a national strategy. It is self evident that the maritime 
environment should be the principal factor influencing the nature and attributes of a 
maritime power. Australia, however, displays many attributes of being a maritime 
nation with a continentalist outlook, most notably in the mythology of the bush and 
the ANZAC tradition in its military history. The bush mythology is used as the 
defining characteristic of the true Australian.  The sea is reduced to the beach and its 
immediate vicinity. That this reality is also true of Australia’s military history will 
also be examined. The challenge is to bring the air power, sea power and land power 
necessary to execute a maritime strategy to the area of operations via sea. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, p.24 
These matters necessitate review by taking into account the development of 
maritime strategic thought, highlighting the lessons of history and examining 
contemporary maritime operations and doctrine. The issue of legal jurisdiction and 
how concepts such as innocent passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage and high seas 
permit maritime forces to operate with great flexibility in support of government 
policy need to be considered as well. 
 
Australia cannot conduct a meaningful maritime strategy in the absence of 
organic maritime air power and air warfare. These capabilities would enable Australia 
to achieve sea control, which is required before any power projection operation can 
take place. There is a fortunate juncture in technological development and Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) equipment obsolescence, which provides the opportunity to 
implement a sea control capability whilst acknowledging the reality that Australia can 
only ever be a medium power with a limited ability to project force.  This military 
capability is restrained by the realities of economic power, weak national industrial 
infrastructure and sparse population. In noting these geo-strategic realities, this paper 
will highlight some of the issues, which should leave little doubt that the requirement 
for a credible maritime power projection and sea control capability is entirely 
justifiable. 
 
Australia’s need for a credible maritime strategy7 is greater than the 
requirement to obtain maritime air power and capable surface combatants. Maritime 
strategy also requires a logistic capability, both sea and air, amphibious platforms, an 
effective mobile army, long range maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, industrial 
maritime repair, maintenance and construction infrastructure and a credible merchant 
marine. 
 
To a large extent given Australia’s economic capacity, with the possible 
exception of Australian flagged merchant shipping, these others all exist within 
Australia to a reasonable degree. Therefore, this paper will not address these aspects 
in detail. This does not reduce their importance. However, the emphasis will be on the 
                                                 
7 A credible maritime strategy is one which focuses on sea control as the basis for the defence of 
Australia with an emphasis on manoeuvrist not attrition based warfare and operations across the 
fact that the current force structure has resulted in the absence of critical maritime 
enablers such as in-theatre air power and the powerlessness to ensure sea control in 
anything but a low-level contingency. This means there is an inability to defend sea 
lines of communications and poor power projection capability. The absence of these 
capabilities means in essence that Australia does not have a credible maritime 
strategy. The challenge for Australia is to have the meaningful debate and mature 
strategic development that leads to a truly joint maritime capability. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
continuum of conflict in a location of Australia’s choosing and not on the mainland of Australia or its 
direct approaches. 
 
Aim 
 
 The aim of this paper is to explore the strategic significance to Australia of the 
maritime environment and history and to advocate that Australia grasp the 
requirement for sea control and power projection by moving away from a  
continentalist approach to defence capability planning and the implementation of a 
credible maritime strategy and force structure. 
 
 
 
Australia’s Region – A Maritime Environment 
 
 
FIGURE 1: THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 
Graphic: Australian Maritime Doctrine  
 
Any paper on Australian strategic realities must begin with the understanding 
that Australia is a maritime nation, albeit a flawed one.  A maritime nation could be 
defined as a nation in which the maritime environment impacts extensively in the 
geographic, economic and strategic dimension. Even if these factors are all a reality 
the nation will remain an incomplete nation, a flawed entity in the maritime 
dimension if the psychology of its people is not rooted in the sea. This is the case for 
Australia.  
 
Australia is located in one of the most complex open ocean, littoral and archipelagic 
maritime regions in the world. Australia’s regional neighbours include archipelagic 
states and island groups.  Almost all states in the wider region have long coastlines. In 
and around Indonesia, the Philippines and the South China Sea, are situated the 
greatest cluster of strategically significant straits in the world. The Asia-Pacific region 
is central to Australia’s security, and its geography affects all aspects of Australia’s 
security policy, in the political, legal, military and physical dimensions. Maritime 
boundary delimitation gives one example of the importance of maritime  geographic 
issues to Australia. Australia has already negotiated a number of maritime 
delimitation agreements with other countries, specifically Indonesia, Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and France The other major outstanding delimitation 
that Australia has is with New Zealand.1  Negotiations on the maritime boundary 
between Australia and New Zealand are ongoing.   
 
In both geographical and political terms Australia is unique. This is because 
unlike the other inhabited continents it is an insular landmass, surrounded by seas, for 
the most part empty of islands.2 It is the only continent to be occupied by a single 
State, making Australia by far the largest State in area in the world without a land 
border. By virtue of both these factors, Australia claims one of the largest maritime 
areas of all States,3 with an Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf covering 
an area of 16 million square kilometres, including tropical islands and hazardous 
Antarctic waters.4  This increases to over 20 million square kilometres when the 
features of the extended continental shelf and access to the resources of the seabed 
within this area is included.5 
 
When looking at the geographic features of the globe it is relevant that 70 
percent of the earth’s surface is covered by sea and over two-thirds of the world’s 
population lives within 100 miles of the coast. This population figure is well over 95 
percent for Australia itself, and is even higher for most of Southeast Asia. Australia’s 
region is thus a maritime littoral environment to a greater degree than any other in the 
world.6 Despite the extensive use of aircraft, ships still account for 99.5 percent of 
                                                 
1 - France in relation to New Caledonia and Kurguelen Island. Additionally, with the separation of East 
Timor from Indonesia, it was necessary to negotiate a new agreement with East Timor. The Timor Sea 
Treaty, which was signed in 2002,  relates to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the 
Timor Gap. This treaty provides a temporary settlement, pending the negotiation of a permanent 
maritime boundary. See Campbell, B. ‘The Australia – New Zealand Maritime Boundary’ in Heath, R 
& Snushall, B (eds) Protecting Maritime Resources, Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conflicts and 
Constabulary Responsibilities, Paper in Australian Maritime Affairs, Sea Power Centre Australia, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p. 19 
2Kaye, S. Australia’s Maritime Boundaries, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No.12 (2nd 
edition), University of Wollongong, 2001, p.1. 
3 Ibid, p. 1 
4 Australia’s Navy for the 21st Century, Navy Plan Blue (Unclassified) 30 Aug 02, p.7 
5 Symonds, P. Australia’s Extended Continental Shelf, Sea Power Centre’s Maritime Study Period 
(MSP) 7/8 Nov 02. 
6 Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000,  p. 13 
trans-oceanic trade (by volume not value), the volume of which has increased by a 
factor of eight since 1945.7 Oceans provide access to nearly all parts of the globe, 
with 85 percent of states having a coastline. Professor Geoffrey Till notes that the 
increase in the world’s population and living standards will increase the need for 
global movement of bulk cargoes. He also notes that the World Bank’s current 
forecast is that by 2012 world seaborne trade will have doubled in terms of ton-miles 
and this trend will continue.8 Importantly the World Bank notes that this trend is 
partly fuelled by the growth in the economies of Southeast Asia, China and India. 
 
This then is of direct relevance to Australia’s maritime environment.  Noting 
that Australia is a net exporter of energy, especially coal and raw materials such as 
iron ore, it is of vital importance that a true understanding of the role of maritime 
strategy for Australia is pursued. The Australian economy is absolutely dependent on 
shipping. Globalisation has meant that Australia’s economy is more integrated with 
other nations and less self-sufficient. 99 percent of this trade by bulk and 73.5 percent 
by value is carried by ship,9 with about 95 percent of that in foreign flagged vessels. 
The percentage of trade carried by foreign flagged vessels is increasing as the number 
of significant merchant ships registered in Australia and crewed by Australians is 
decreasing.  The Sydney Morning Herald of 31 July 2002 reported in its editorial that 
in the previous six years Australia’s fleet of major trading ships has shrunk from 78 to 
45 and that more would go this year.10  
 
Australia is the fifth largest user of shipping in the world11 in terms of tonnage 
carried and distance travelled.  In 2000-2001 there were approximately 13000 
overseas shipping arrivals and departures with 550 million tonnes of international 
trade moved by sea. In concentrating on the relationship between Australia and 
                                                 
7 BR 806, British Maritime Doctrine, The Stationary Office, 2nd Edition, 1999,  p. 14. 
8 Till, G. ‘Maritime Trade Introduction,’ Till, G. (ed), Seapower at the Millenium,, Sutton Publishing 
Limited, UK, 2001, p.177. 
9 Bureau of Transport & Regional Economics (BTRE), Australian Transport Statistics – 2002, 
www.btre.gov.au/docs/trnstats02/trnstats.htm. This BTRE report indicates that in 2000-2001 550 
million tonnes of international trade and 101  million tonnes (1999-2000) of domestic cargo was 
carried by sea as compared to 644,000 tonnes and 148,300 tonnes (1999-2000) respectively by air. This 
amounts to 99% of international trade being carried by ships. Additionally international trade in 
A$billion for 2000-2001 was A$248billion with A$182.3billion by sea and A$65.7billion by air or 
73.5% by sea by value. 
10 Revell, A, Sea Battle Not All It Seems, Sydney Morning Herald, Fairfax Press, Sydney, 31 July 2002, 
p. 12 
international trade the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE) figures 
indicate that the total value of Australian merchandise exports in 2000-2001 was 
AUD$124.4 Billion, and the total value of Australian merchandise imports was 
AUD$124.1 Billion. In 1999-2000 Australian domestic coastal shipping cargo alone 
totalled 50.3 million tonnes. By comparison, scheduled international airline traffic 
carried a total of 644,000 tonnes of freight to and from Australia by air routes over the 
sea.’12 Australian registered vessels carried approximately 2.2% of the total 
international trade.13  
 
In acknowledging the vital role that air transport plays in supplementing sea 
borne trade the role of the maritime environment is still relevant. This is because all 
trade which goes by air flies over the sea and is just as influenced by Australia’s 
ability to control the sea, as is the overriding proportion which goes by sea. This point 
needs to be considered as part of the strategic development process within Australia. 
Sea lines of communications within the Australian context also includes the air travel 
over the sea of people and trade. Without control of the maritime environment air 
services to Australia can also effectively be interdicted and as a result Australia could 
be virtually isolated.  
 
The 2002 paper, Strategic Trades To and From Australia notes;  
 
‘Australia's prosperity depends upon commercial engagement with 
other nations. The country, along with other regional nations, is 
vulnerable to disruption of seaborne trade. A number of regional nations 
(e.g. Japan, South Korea, SW Pacific islands) are highly vulnerable to 
any disruption of sea transport. Sea transport follows recognised trade 
routes, or sea lines of communications, that have been established over 
many years of use, dictated by geography, port location, navigational 
hazards and weather. In the Asia Pacific region straits through 
archipelagos and island chains confine these trade routes. The open ocean 
trade routes are vulnerable to interdiction, while straits and associated 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Australia’s Navy for the 21st Century, Navy Plan Blue, p.7 
12 Bureau of Transport & Regional Economics (BTRE), Australian Transport Statistics – 2002, 
choke points are vulnerable to closure. The protection of these sea lines 
of communications is vital for the safe movement of sea transport. 
Seaborne trade may be subjected to a range of threats, varying in 
intensity from open warfare between nations to piracy (on the high seas) 
and armed robbery (in territorial waters). This threat spectrum is wide 
and significantly increases the difficulties in ensuring the unhindered 
passage of sea transport. The passage of merchant shipping, free from 
threat or hindrance requires a close relationship between the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) and the maritime industry.’14 
FIGURE 2: AUSTRALIAN REPORTING POSITIONS – MERCHANT SHIPPING    Graphic: 
Australian Maritime Doctrine p. 42 
 
 When considering sea lines of communications in the Australian context it 
becomes apparent that Australia’s sea communications have two important 
vulnerabilities. The first is that shipping moving to and from trading partners in East 
Asia must pass through many archipelagic choke points to reach its destinations. The 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Naval Control & Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) draft paper Strategic Trades To and From 
Australia, June 2002, p. 4 
14 Strategic Trades To and From Australia, June 2002, p.8 
only alternative is to divert through much longer, time and fuel consuming deep ocean 
routes. The second vulnerability is that shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans can 
be identified from some distance away as being bound only for Australia or New 
Zealand.15 This fact is also true of much air travel operating to and from Australia.  
 
Trade is not the only issue that makes Australia a maritime nation. Other 
important areas that could be targeted by any adversary include tourism, employment 
and resources, especially offshore oil and gas installations and infrastructure. 
Employment and trade are intrinsically linked. One in five jobs in the city and one in 
four jobs in the country are directly related to the export of goods.16. Targeting 
Australia effectively is not merely a matter of a conventional invasion through the 
north.  
 
When considering the littoral nature17 of Southeast Asia, it is also often 
forgotten that Australia, despite its vast inland areas, is as littoral in nature as any of 
the other nations of the region. Not only is most of the population within the coastal 
margin but so is most of the strategically essential industry and infrastructure. This 
coastal margin is not located solely in the north of the country. It is sometimes 
overlooked that, unlike land with its mountains, deserts and forests, the sea removes 
much of the impact of geography from the equation. Distance is not removed, but then 
again the characteristics of maritime power, such as flexibility, reach, poise and 
persistence, mean that distance impacts less in the maritime domain then it does on 
land or in the air. As such the route by which an attack to Australia can occur is as 
multi-faceted as is the sea itself. 
 
                                                 
15 This effect is referred to as that of the Sandison Line and was defined by J.M. Sandison J.M. 
Sandison, Article in the Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1986, p.4. cited in Australian Maritime 
Doctrine, p. 42 
16 Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT) Fact Sheet: Why Trade Matters, 22 Dec 02. 
17 The definition of littoral is subject to debate. Littoral involves the influence of the sea over the 
adjacent landmass and the landmass over the adjacent seas.  In the Asia-Pacific region such influence 
could extend 100 nautical miles plus, both at sea and over the land. It is dependent on the technology in 
use by the coastal state and the maritime power. Ranges of up to 12 nautical miles are typical for a 
nation such as Australia, due to the limited range of sea-based munitions, lack of sea-based precision 
guided munitions and poor communications with elements ashore. Nations such as the United States 
utilise ranges in excess of 100 nautical miles due to sea-based air power, precision guided weapons, 
data burst digital communications and data links. 
 Thus both Australia’s strategic environment and sovereignty is maritime in 
nature. Within this context there are at least five major ways in which future strategic 
issues are uncertain. First, Australia exists in an uncertain landscape of political and 
economic development within the region. Second, Australia faces a spectrum of 
possible conflict and threat environments ranging from peace to high intensity conflict, 
which may involve the ADF in diplomatic, policing, peacekeeping and enforcement, 
and war fighting roles. Third, Australia’s maritime forces may have to conduct various 
combinations of littoral and blue water operations. Fourth, these operations may 
involve various combinations of coalition, allied, and self-reliant operations. Finally, 
Australia needs to understand that these operations may be either within the Asia-
Pacific region or out of area. The last point is predicated on Australia’s responsibilities 
in Antarctica, and on the economic and strategic importance of Indian Ocean issues 
which is likely to increase. Influencing these five issues is the increasing legal 
complexity of maritime jurisdictions in the region. 
 
The Asia-Pacific is a maritime region, Southeast Asia particularly so, as the 
population lives close to the sea and the nations are heavily dependent on trade. Sea 
lines of communication are, therefore, very important, and nations are dependent on 
living and mineral resources from the sea. At the same time, regional maritime forces 
are growing steadily more sophisticated. These forces, by their nature, have 
considerable access to the people, infrastructure and nation states of the region.  
Therefore they are ideally positioned to enforce the policy of their governments in 
peace, transition to war and in hostilities should that be necessary. As a result these 
maritime forces exert considerable influence.  
 
 Regional economies will increasingly depend on energy imports from locations 
both in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia itself, and from outside the region. 
This includes the Persian Gulf, an area which already features in Australian 
deployment considerations. Such an array of uncertain circumstances implies a wide 
variety of possible sea power roles. Goodwill activity and coercive diplomacy require 
presence and visibility in the form of port visits, exercises or simply the strength of 
presence, so as to influence the maritime security environment in line with Australian 
national interests. Constabulary tasks may involve issues of migration, drugs and 
contraband, fishing and resources, piracy, and the environment. All of these tasks are 
likely to have a higher profile in the future. High intensity operations are likely to 
involve both sea control and denial for purposes of defence of sea lines of 
communications, blockade, support of amphibious and land operations. In short, there 
is no truer example than that in the Asia-Pacific region of Sir Julian Corbett's 
fundamental principle that maritime strategy revolves around lines of sea 
communication.18 This can only be more true of the region with the continuing pace of 
economic globalisation. This results in nations being more inter-dependent than 
previously for economic growth, societal stability and prosperity, and even the 
survival of the government or political structure.  
 
 What does this imply for Australian military strategy given the 
maritime nature of the region? Australia's current military concept of strategy, as set 
down in Defence 2000, reflects an enduring strategic preference for prevention of the 
conditions under which a threat could develop to the Australian mainland by 
achieving decision in the maritime approaches rather than the mainland itself.19 
Australia’s approaches include the archipelagos of Southeast Asia and the Southwest 
Pacific, referred to as the inner arc. The inner arc is characterised as a littoral 
environment in which the three operational domains of sea, land and air converge. 
However, this emphasis in Defence 2000 on the Australian mainland and maritime 
approaches needs to be carefully scrutinised. Threats to Australia’s national interests 
may develop which do not involve threats to Australian territory itself or to the 
maritime approaches.  
 
Despite the increasing importance of trade to Australia’s economic, social and 
political stability, the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (The Dibb 
Report) down played the importance of trade. The report stated that a widespread 
interdiction of trade would only occur in a global war in which Australia could plan 
on being ‘practically self-sufficient in most food, raw-material, and energy 
resources.’20 The emphasis that military strategy is almost solely focused on combat 
operations, on the defence against a direct military attack to Australia itself, has been 
                                                 
18 Corbett, J. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1911, E.J. Grove (ed) United States Naval 
Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 1988, p. 342 
19 Defence 2000 reflects this approach in the section on Maritime Strategy, p.47. 
20 Dibb, P. Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, p. 39 
at the heart of Australian strategy since this report, and it reflects the report’s 
continentalist nature. The 1986 Dibb Report based this reasoning, with respect to 
trade issues, on the fact that Australia is a net exporter of energy. However, with 
globalisation resulting in greater interdependence of economies, great harm could be 
done to the economy and the people of Australia by low-level economic warfare 
against Australian trade at distance. This impacts on the likelihood of interdiction of 
trade. Such interdiction would not require global war, as it could be accomplished via 
low technology, locally based attacks in choke points such as straits and via high 
technology attacks in the open ocean.  
 
The Defence Update 2003 has moved some way to acknowledging this, but its 
focus is more on global terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.21 
Importantly statements that the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than 
it was in 200022 must be viewed from a perspective of maritime strategy.  In reality 
the threat of a direct military attack on Australia was always extremely low. Attacks 
were more likely to be aimed at disrupting Australia’s economic interests via 
maritime trade interdiction or legal and military challenge to the use of strategic 
straits away from Australia’s maritime approaches. 
 
 Dr John Reeve, in his 2001 working paper, Maritime Strategy and Defence of 
the Archipelagic Inner Arc, noted that: ‘the concept of defending the inner arc is (as it 
stands) strategically flawed, potentially dangerous, and in need of further 
development. It is flawed because it does not relate concepts such as manoeuvre in the 
littorals to relevant principles of maritime strategy, especially sea control. He then 
stated that: ‘a concept for defending the inner arc must pay attention to controlling the 
sea or risk failure.’23  His working paper also highlighted the dangers of the inner arc 
concept as it tends to neglect the extent of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their 
intrinsic relevance to Australia’s national security and the need to better understand 
and respond to the fundamentally maritime nature of the region.24  These statements 
and indeed the whole thrust of his paper supports the need for the development of 
                                                 
21 The Defence Update 2003, p.9  
22 The Defence Update 2003, p.9 
23 Reeve, J. Maritime Strategy and Defence of the Archipelagic Inner Arc, Working Paper No 5, RAN 
Sea Power Centre, Commonwealth of Australia, March 2001, pp, 1-3. 
24 Ibid, pp 11-12. 
Australia’s military strategy and ultimately its Defence White Papers to be based 
rigorously on doctrine, especially that of maritime doctrine.  
 
Having emphasised the need to respond to the maritime nature of Australia’s 
environment and to see beyond the inner arc and the immediate region, it is obvious 
that the region will remain strategically important to Australia. For the foreseeable 
future, any sustained conventional land threat to Australia’s physical integrity must 
move through this region. This is not to say that any attack will emanate from the 
inner arc.  However, there is a need to balance the likelihood of an attack being a 
conventional land based invasion scenario, as against other effective forms of 
threatening Australia.  
 
As stated earlier, attacks on Australia may involve interdiction of trade leading 
to economic pressure. Additionally attacks could occur to the coastal infrastructure in 
the east, west and south of Australia, including the major centres of population. These 
attacks are most likely to be from the sea.  The inner arc region is also of importance 
to Australia’s economic well being as much of Australia’s trade relies on freedom of 
navigation through these archipelagic waters. Australia’s close links with the region 
have been demonstrated over many decades and several wars.  Australia is unlikely to 
remain aloof from the range of operations that may arise in the region at varying 
degrees of notice.  
  
The maritime nature of the Australian environment has made it essential that 
Australia be able to conduct effective and successful maritime operations in support 
of its military strategy, especially within these regional areas. As Dr Eric Grove 
wrote; ‘The use of the sea for movement is itself the core of maritime strategy in its 
traditional sense.’25 Tradition in this sense is reality for an island nation in a region 
which is dominated so completely by the sea. The use of the sea for movement is the 
core issue facing Australia. Indeed, due to the overwhelmingly maritime nature of 
Australia’s environment, any aggression against Australia, or any military action 
taken by the ADF in the region, will have a substantial, if not overwhelming, 
maritime component.  
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Maritime Jurisdictions – Legal Issues 
 
In addition to the geographic nature of the environment there is also the issue 
of legal jurisdiction and international maritime law. Maritime strategy cannot be 
viewed in isolation from this as military force is used in peacetime, transition to war 
and wartime.  In any ADF operation personnel involved and actions undertaken are 
subject to international law. Historically with respect to international law, the law of 
the sea evolved to represent the process of freedom of the seas.  Freedom of the seas 
was a concept enforced by great powers that have always found a way to ensure that 
they could use the seas for their own purposes. As nation states developed and the 
concept of freedom of the seas began to be challenged these great states, especially 
the United States, Britain, Japan and the trading states of Europe, sought to protect 
their access to the sea by law.  
 
The complex nature of maritime jurisdictions in the region can be traced 
directly to nations expanding their maritime zones to conform to the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Up until the UNCLOS 
conventions the only limitation to the concept of freedom of the seas was that of the 
three mile territorial sea which arose purely from the range of a typical British cannon 
of the period. Some states had sought to claim a larger territorial sea, but these were 
ignored generally by the great powers. However, what is pertinent is that in 
accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS, in 1990, Australia proclaimed a 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea and in 1994 proclaimed a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). The vast majority of nations in the world have done likewise. 
 
To summarise, it is useful to utilise excerpts from the Introduction to the 
publication, Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones.  This states;  
 
‘from a legal perspective Australia’s domestic legal regime grants State 
and Territory jurisdiction to ‘coastal waters’ out to three miles from the 
coast. The Commonwealth government has jurisdiction from the limit 
of coastal waters to that of the EEZ or to the edge of the continental 
shelf where it continues out beyond the EEZ. Australia may exercise 
jurisdiction over high seas offences such as piracy and slave trading. 
Australian maritime laws may also be enforced against Australian 
flagged vessels and Australian citizens anywhere on the high seas (ie 
waters outside the national jurisdiction of any country), including the 
200 nautical mile EEZs of other countries. In the territorial sea the 
Commonwealth applies much of the legislation of the adjacent State or 
Territory’.1 
 
In a similar fashion the nations of the Asia-Pacific region have enacted 12 
nautical mile territorial sea legislation and 200 nautical mile EEZs. Noting the close 
proximity of many of the nations of the regions and the number of offshore islands 
claimed sometimes by more than one nation, the complexity of maritime law and 
jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific region is sometimes seen as compounding difficulties 
in conducting maritime operations. In fact, maritime operations remain uncomplicated 
in many important strategic ways. Within the foreign nation’s territorial sea maritime 
forces have the right to innocent passage. This right to innocent passage can be 
suspended temporarily by the coastal state for national security reasons,2 but reasons 
for any such suspension must be substantiated and adequate notice must be given. 
Additionally any revocation of the rights of innocent passage must be non-
discriminatory.  Under innocent passage regulations warships can transit through a 
nations’ waters, but a significant number of operations of a military nature are not 
permitted. Flying from a ship or live weapon training for instance is not permitted and 
submarines must transit on the surface.  
 
Importantly, however, outside the 12 nautical mile territorial sea, full military 
operations may occur. Despite declarations by some countries3 that seek to limit 
military operations in EEZs, maritime forces may operate with few if any constraints.  
                                                 
1 Mackinnon, D, Sherwood, D. Introduction, in Policing Australia’s Offshore Zones, Problems and 
Prospects, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No 9, 1997, p. 1 
2 UNCLOS Article 25 
3 Professor Jon Van Dyke in his paper Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic 
Zones of Other Countries, Regime of the EEZ: Issues and Responses, Tokyo Dialogue Feb 03, noted 
that Brazil when signing the UNCLOS in 1982 issued a declaration that it understood that the 
provisions of the Convention do not authorise other states to carry out in the EEZ military exercise or 
manoeuvres without the consent of the coastal state. Cape Verde, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Uruguay have issued similar declarations while Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Britain have filed 
sharply opposing declarations. Australia on signing UNCLOS issued no declaration either way.  
Flying operations may occur, exercises may take place, military training, coastal 
surveillance and manoeuvres may occur. Submarines may remain submerged. These 
activities are conducted having due regard to the coastal states’ rights with respect to 
fiscal, sanitary, immigration and economic issues and in a non-discriminatory 
fashion.4  Some coastal states5 are tending to utilise EEZs as de-facto Territorial Seas 
(TS). Despite this, EEZs are a resource zone and not a zone to be utilised by states as 
a means of extending territorial sovereignty by stealth. The very term EEZ is focused 
on economic resource issues not security or territory.  
 
The tendency by some coastal states to impose restrictions on the military use 
of their EEZs perhaps reflects a degree of unease at the flexibility and utility that sea 
power brings to bear against them. Despite this unease, when the UNCLOS is 
scrutinised in its correct legal interpretation, the ability to conduct a full range of 
naval or maritime operations is a vital factor in determining the freedom that 
maritime-based forces enjoy under the law. This underpins the importance to 
Australia of the maritime strategic concepts, such as sea control, and with it the 
protection of sea lines of communications and power projection. 
 
For Australia an important regional strategic issue is the impact of 
archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) legislation, especially in the cases of Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Conscious of its strategic and economic dependence on passage through 
the archipelagoes to its north, Australia has played a vital role in negotiations on this 
issue. Prior to the negotiation of UNCLOS, the interpretation by maritime states of 
rights of passage between the islands of mid oceanic archipelagoes was based on the 
position that each island generated its own territorial sea in which innocent passage 
was available to foreign vessels. ‘Where the territorial seas of individual islands 
overlapped, a straits regime of non-suspendable innocent passage applied to all 
foreign vessels. High seas freedoms of navigation and overflight applied in waters 
beyond the territorial seas of individual islands. This meant that in reality liberal 
freedoms of navigation and overflight existed through most mid-oceanic 
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5 Examples include India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Uruguay, Cape Verde and China.  
archipelagos.’6 However, having noted this from a legal standpoint, an example of 
differing interpretations of maritime legal issues in the region is the case of Indonesia 
and their decision to designate three North/South ASLs through their archipelago. 
FIGURE 3:  ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES EXAMPLE 
Graphic: Sea Power Centre, Australia 
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Archipelagic Sea Lanes - Australian Position
including east-west ASL based on ‘normal routes.’
The Indonesian decision to designate only three north/south ASLs and no 
east/west ASL, has led to a series of meetings by Government representatives from 
Australia, the United States and Indonesia in the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO).7 Australia has acknowledged the cultural importance of the wawasan 
nusantara8 and the Java Sea to the Indonesian psyche, but the Indonesian 
Government Regulation No 37 of 20029 which was ratified in Jakarta via publication 
on 28 June 2002, does cause Australia some significant difficulty.  This is because it 
goes beyond what is permissible at international law.10  At the centre of this issue is 
the decision by Indonesia to legislate in a manner which purports to limit the rights of 
user states on the basis of internal security matters. 
 
Building on this from a maritime strategic perspective, the important point to 
be observed from the UNCLOS ASL legislation, in contrast to the Indonesian 
interpretation of it, is that the archipelagic state has increased sovereign control over 
the waters between its constituent islands while guaranteeing a non-suspendable form 
of passage for maritime user states in waters which were formerly high seas.  The 
ASL regime devised in the UNCLOS is based on the concept of ‘routes normally used 
for international navigation’ through or over archipelagic waters and the adjacent 
territorial sea from entry to exit points.11  
 
The requirement in Article 53(4) of the UNCLOS, that the sea lanes and air 
routes designated by the archipelagic state; ‘shall include all normal passage routes 
                                                 
7 The Indonesian decision to designate only three north/south ASLs and no east/west ASL has entailed 
a detailed analysis, and in some cases amplification of the relevant articles of the UNCLOS by 
Government representatives from Australia and the United States, in a series of bilateral meetings with 
Indonesia and in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).Since February 1996, Australian 
representatives have participated in three formal bilateral meetings with Indonesia and one formal 
bilateral meeting with US representatives to discuss the Indonesian designation proposal as well as two 
meetings of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO (MSC 67 & 69), two meetings of the Safety of 
Navigation Sub-Committee (NAV43 & 44) of the IMO and the 20th Assembly of the IMO in 
December 1997. See Warner, R. ‘Implementing the Archipelagic Regime in the International Maritime 
Organization,’ in Rothwell, D. & Bateman, S. (eds) Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New 
Law of the Sea, p 170 
8 Indonesian concept of the archipelago as a unitary whole. 
9 Indonesian Regulation 37 of 2002 concerned the rights and obligations of foreign ships and aircraft 
when exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through established archipelagic sea lanes.  
It came into force six months after on 28 Dec 02, having been ratified by Parliament on 28 Jun 02. 
10 Conversations with Professor Martin Tsamenyi, Director Centre for Maritime Policy, University of 
Wollongong, 29 Apr  - 02 May 03. 
11 UNCLOS Article 53(1) & (4). 
used for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters,’12 
is of crucial significance for maritime user states since it preserves customary rights 
of passage formerly enjoyed by foreign vessels and aircraft through archipelagic 
waters. Within the sea lanes and the air routes directly above the sea lanes, foreign 
vessels and aircraft enjoy non-suspendable rights of navigation and overflight;  ‘in the 
normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed 
transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.’13  
 
Therefore, from an international law perspective, despite the differing 
interpretations on the access by maritime user states to EEZs by some regional 
countries, maritime forces basically have freedom to operate, threat permitting, up to 
12 nautical miles from the designated baseline of a coastal state. The only significant 
restriction is in archipelagic waters, but importantly under the auspices of the ASL 
they can transit through such designated archipelagos in ‘normal’ mode. This allows 
passage through the region without seeking prior permission or the agreement of the 
geographically adjacent state. Aircraft can also conduct flying operations through the 
normal routes of the archipelago, but if sea-lanes have been designated overflight is 
restricted to routes above the sea-lanes.14 When passaging under ASL legislation 
maritime forces should not excessively alter course, delay, loiter or conduct 
operations that result in such forces not transiting in good time through the 
archipelagic area. In summary, ships or aircraft exercising ASL passage must operate 
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and 
unobstructed passage and not deviate more than 25 nautical miles off the axis lines.15  
 
In the case of land based aircraft, if passage is not in accordance with ASL 
legislation, the freedom of land based aircraft to over flight of the territorial airspace 
of a third nation is subject to the sovereign agreement of that nation.  There is no 
equivalent legislation to that of innocent passage for aircraft and ASL passage is only 
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available to aircraft if the flight can be completed without the need to utilise a land 
base within the archipelagic country itself.  This reality could directly impact on 
Australia’s ability to project power into the region given that the current land based 
air power would need to transit over the Indonesian archipelago, Papua New Guinea 
and the Philippines to support nations such as Singapore and Malaysia under the Five 
Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), or to conduct any pre-emptive operations that 
the Government might desire.  
 
Maritime Strategic Concepts - The Classical Perspective 
 
Having established the maritime nature of Australia’s regional environment 
and briefly investigated some legal issues involved in the use of the environment it is 
necessary to relate these to maritime strategic concepts as they affect Australia. An 
understanding of maritime strategic concepts is axiomatic to an understanding of the 
universality of maritime power and the role of the sea in the defence of Australia and 
its interests.  
 
It was not until the late 19th century that any intellectual rigour was brought to 
the deliberation of the strategic role of the sea in history. Since then, much has been 
written on the subject, initially as an attempt to counter an ignorance of the role of the 
sea in the survival of nation states.  
 
It was Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, who produced some of the 
most renowned writings on sea power.  They were significant in strategic debates 
amongst nations in the period leading up to the First World War. Mahan’s books were 
the catalyst for debates between proponents and opponents of naval expansion, 
colonialism and aggressive mercantilist capitalism. Mahan used history to show that 
concentration of force, mobility, surprise and the defeat of the enemy fleet was the 
key to sea power. Sea power meant control of the sea.  Despite a tendency at times to 
over state the issue and to draw what could perhaps be termed a ‘long-bow,’ his 
writings were and are impressive for their breadth of vision and scope. As John 
Hattendorf has stated; ‘a century after the first publication of The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History, one can say of Mahan’s work that it formed the most powerful 
single influence on the formulation of naval thought.’1 
 
Mahan emphasised the need for the decisive battle as much as classical 
strategists such as Clausewitz.  However, he recognised that sea power meant the 
stoppage of the enemy’s commerce, which would compel peace. ‘Wars are won by 
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the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea.’2 It was not necessarily the 
invasion or destruction of the enemy’s country that would achieve victory.  Mahan 
knew that it was not always necessary to shatter and destroy. This is a key point when 
considering sea power in the context of the defence of Australia. Diplomatic, 
economic and political pressure is as fundamental to the successful application of sea 
power as the decisive military victory, and Mahan recognised this. A prime example 
of this was the sea control strategy of close blockade that characterised British 
maritime operations of the 17th and 18th centuries.  
 
 Writing at the same time as Mahan was the British strategist, Vice-Admiral 
Philip Colomb, RN.  His work, Naval Warfare, was first published in 1891.  Colomb 
traced the rise of naval warfare and linked it to the establishment of commerce. He 
noted that having vessels that could remain at sea for prolonged periods of time, 
permitted a nation the ability to impact on an enemy that also depended on sea access 
for wealth and security.3  Colomb also wrote about the impact that attacks on the land 
could have on a coastal state.  His writing was about the use of naval power. He noted 
and wrote upon the rise of interest in commanding the sea from the 16th century and 
the advent of sea borne commerce. 
 
Another significant maritime strategist was Sir Julian Corbett who published 
his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911.  It was built on the 
conceptual basis established by Mahan and Colomb and remains highly relevant. 
Corbett’s historical and maritime strategic writing dealt with British sea power from 
the 16th to 19th centuries. His major theme was how a small country had risen to 
great imperial power despite its disadvantages of size.4 
 
  Corbett utilised much of the theoretical aspects of Carl von Clausewitz’s 
writings. He noted, as did Clausewitz, ‘that the nature of a war is critical, the 
distinction between limited and unlimited war, and the concept of force as a weapon 
                                                 
2 Crowl, P. ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian’ in Paret, P. (ed) Makers of Modern Strategy, 
Princeton University Press, 1986 p. 455 
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of state but only one of the possible tools of policy.’5 John Reeve states; ‘his focus 
was on the land-sea interface and this is reflected in his use of the word ‘maritime’ 
rather than ‘naval’.  His subject was the role of the sea in strategy, not how navies can 
win wars on their own’.6 He also emphasised the fact that territory cannot be held at 
sea, and this is a major difference between land and maritime strategy. As noted 
earlier his general conclusion was that; ‘The object of naval warfare is to control 
maritime communications.’7 Corbett stated this repeatedly in Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy. By this he meant that operations at sea are transient and focused 
basically on control of sea lines of communications. 
 
 Mahan, Colomb and Corbett valued the role of history in teaching enduring 
principles about maritime strategy. The purpose was to draw a direct analogy between 
technological revolution, strategic thought and the value of history. They wrote during 
the beginning of a profound revolution in military affairs of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. In a period of 30 years, sail was replaced completely in maritime warfare by 
steam turbine, oil replaced coal as fuel, big gun dreadnoughts were developed, the 
submarine emerged as a significant weapon, the aircraft impacted on sea and land, the 
tank and the machine-gun revolutionised land warfare and importantly wireless 
communications began to be utilised both strategically and tactically.  
 
If innovation and technology can be termed as resulting in ‘a revolution’ then 
this was certainly a revolution in military affairs. Perhaps it was a far more significant 
revolution than that which is invoked in many circles today. In the current rush to 
embrace new technology a significant proportion of strategic thinkers, military, 
academic and journalistic, have neglected to notice that the revolution in military 
affairs that occurred in this period did not tear down the historical fabric of military 
strategy nor did it create a ‘new way’ of fighting wars. Rather it reinforced the 
uncertainty and horror of conflict.   
 
In taking this into account what did the classical maritime strategy of Mahan, 
Colomb and Corbett teach?  In the case of Mahan and Corbett, John Reeve 
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summarises it very well by stating that their writings are valuable in teaching four 
major lessons.  These he lists as; the value of history; the link between sea power and 
liberal societies; the economy of human life involved in the use of naval power and; 
the enormous strategic potential of the sea. He notes that Corbett further stresses the 
interdependent nature of land and sea power. ‘The strategic challenge of Mahan’s and 
Corbett’s ideas is therefore to maintain the balance and the interconnectedness of land 
and sea power and the air power which enhances them both: The challenge is also to 
remember that sea power will not do it all, but that in a global society sea power is 
indispensable.’8  Barry Gough writing about Colomb would agree. He notes that 
Colomb stressed the role of history upon sea power and that ‘history dictated that 
countries that would be strong must learn from the past and control the ocean trades 
and ocean routes of the world.’9 
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Maritime Strategic Concepts – Contemporary Developments 
 
When concluding his discussion of the principal elements which affect the 
growth of sea power, Mahan was entirely correct when he stated famously the often 
quoted line that, ‘from time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or 
wholly torn down; but the foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a 
rock.’1 In recent times in support of this premise, strategists of the maritime 
persuasion2 have attempted to add balance to the unbridled fascination in some 
quarters with technology and to counter ignorance when it comes to the multi-faceted 
role of maritime forces.  The maritime strategy that characterised British maritime 
operations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially the blockade and 
interdiction of enemy forces is as relevant today as then. Maritime Interception Force 
Operations (MIFOPS) would be a contemporary example of this form of maritime 
strategy. The imposing visible presence of ships standing close off-shore has been 
supplemented by advanced long range surveillance including that from space, the real 
possibility of submarine attack, the threat of offensive mining, long range surface 
strike capability and air attack, both sea borne and land based.  Mobility, surprise, 
surveillance and exploitation of information warfare permit a hitherto undreamed of 
ability to exploit traditional strategic operations in a blue water context.  Real time 
tactical data links now permit data fusion between geographically disparate units, 
facilitating force projection and weapon engagement far beyond single unit sensor 
acquisition range. However, the basics of maritime doctrine remain unyielding. 
 
In some quarters there is a belief that networked information systems are a 
panacea for the realities of the environment, the primacy of nature and the very 
essence of human conflict over the centuries. Technology, however, will not do it all. 
Conflict as always will involve the human element.  It will be the sailor, soldier and 
airman together with civilians, national government, infrastructure and corporate 
businesses that will determine the outcome. This is not to say that technological 
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change has not impacted on methods of conflict.  It has, but in a relative not absolute 
way.  
 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Network Enabled Operations (NEO) 
amongst other titles are terms by which the perceived transformation of the way 
forces will fight and be organised in the information age has been grouped.  NCW has 
been defined by different organisations.  One definition is; ‘an information 
superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, 
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of synchronization. In essence, NCW translates 
information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable 
entities in the battlespace.’3 By this definition the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of 
Jutland, as examples, were NCW operations. In these maritime battles individual units 
were controlled as a whole, networked together. NCW is nothing revolutionary in the 
maritime domain. It remains a relative use of available technology. 
 
When accepting the definition of NCW, the question for Australia is what 
does NCW really imply and how does it impact on maritime geo-strategic realities? 
From the Australian operational perspective it should be seen as a logical use of new 
technology, much the same way that military force has utilised technology over the 
centuries.  However, there is a tendency within some sections to see it as changing the 
very character of conflict. In support of the former view, Professor Owens, Professor 
of Strategy and Force Planning at the US Naval War College, has pointed out that if 
Clausewitz’s timeless elements of war, those of its non-linear nature, uncertainty and 
friction are actually valid, then those who stress a new ‘orthodoxy’ in thought are 
wrong. He has stated that; ‘Such an imposition of orthodoxy is based on the 
assumption that it is possible to predict and control the actions of potential 
adversaries…it discounts that the world is dynamic and characterised by uncertainty. 
If the vision is correct, things will be fine. If not, defeat may well be the ultimate 
result.’4 There is great danger in NCW being seen as an absolute revolution in 
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4 Owens, M. Lets Not Rig Our Wargames, Wall Street Journal 29 Aug 2002, p.34. 
military affairs, which imposes its own orthodoxy, rather than a relatively logical use 
of technology in support of strategic concepts. 
 
When reflecting on a tendency towards orthodoxy in strategic thought in 
Australia, especially in relation to the strategic concept of Defence of Australia, it is 
refreshing to prophesize that during the 20th century technology has in fact vindicated 
maritime strategic concepts by providing additional roles for maritime forces. 
However, across the spectrum of maritime operations these roles have a ‘relative’ not 
‘absolute’ effect. These additional roles include coercive constabulary operations such 
as border protection against immigration and resource piracy, nuclear deterrence, sea 
basing and theatre ballistic missile protection. The realities of conflict have many 
times surprised and baffled those whose protestations indicated the premature demise 
of maritime power in conflict.  Examples of this includes the Falklands Island 
campaign of 1982 and the maritime interdiction operations against Iraq in 1990 the 
Gulf War itself of 1991 and even the War against Terror in Afghanistan.5   
 
The multi-faceted nature of maritime power was well appreciated by Admiral 
Sergei Gorshkov who was a significant figure in maritime strategic thought in the 20th 
century. Admiral Gorshkov was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from the 
1956 to 1985. He was expansive in his support for balanced maritime forces.  In his 
book,  The Sea Power of the State, he concluded by noting that one of the main 
qualities of modern naval forces was their universality, their ability to perform 
multiple tasks including attacks on sea lines of communications and operations 
directly against the shore.6 He commented that the predominantly defensive, coastal 
nature of the Soviet navy was no longer adequate to meet the multi-faceted activity of 
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noted that the war against terror in Afghanistan revolved around the need to remove the ‘safe haven’ 
from the terrorists. Military forces did this. The remainder of the anti-terrorist operation is largely a 
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6 Gorshkov, S. The Sea Power of the State,  Pergamon Press, Oxford,  1979,  p.276. 
the navy in wars and peacetime. That the art of using its forces depended on it being a 
‘balanced’ force.7 
 
In further reinforcement of a maritime strategy, it is useful to refer to Professor 
Ken Booth and his description of the functions of navies. He stated that the theme of 
navies and foreign policy is the use of the sea for the passage of goods and people, for 
the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes, for use against targets on sea or 
land and for the exploitation of resources.8   He noted a trinity of functions, of the 
military role, the diplomatic role and the policing role.9   However, the military role 
formed the essence of the three, providing the power projection and threat of the use 
of force, which underpinned the latent diplomatic, and policing functions.   This 
projection of force was the essence of maritime power.  Without this capability, be it 
organic air power, land based air in some cases, cruise missiles or long range 
precision guided munitions, a force is powerless to perform its sea control and 
policy/power projection or military role. This theme is enunciated clearly in 
Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN Doctrine 1).10 It can be seen, therefore, that 
maritime strategic concepts have developed over time, building on historical lessons 
and strategic realities while absorbing the impact of technology, increasing 
knowledge and changing societal values.   
 
In the maritime strategic school terms used to describe maritime concepts 
include command of the sea, sea control and sea denial. Command of the sea was 
historically an absolute concept, which basically espoused free use of the sea by a 
nation. Although this was tacitly understood for centuries, it was Mahan and Colomb 
who made great use of the term.11  Colomb in particular placed great emphasis on 
command of the sea. He stressed that command of the sea was ‘henceforth to be 
understood as the aim of naval war. A power striving for anything else, such as 
evasions, or surprises of ports or territories, or merely defensive guardings of 
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commerce, accepted the position of the inferior and beaten naval power, and could 
never hope, so long as she maintained that attitude, of seriously damaging her 
opponent,’12  
 
The Royal Navy, imbued with the need to achieve such dominance of the 
world’s oceans, held the belief until the end of the First World War that command of 
the sea was determined by a decisive battle.  From 1805 onwards for over 100 years 
the lesson of the Battle of Trafalgar, was concerned was that command of the sea 
maintained the empire and ensured the safety of Britain.  
 
The Battle of Jutland was the catalyst, which hastened for many the end of the 
concept of the decisive battle and command of the sea. The tactics of the Germans 
that led to the battle revolved around attempts to surprise a small portion of the Grand 
Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe was well aware of the German strategic plan to weaken the 
RN portion by portion and his caution resulted in the German High Seas Fleet 
escaping almost certain destruction at the hands of the Grand Fleet. The escape was 
made easier by British tactical problems, communications inefficiency, fractured 
command and control, and poor ammunition flash control. However, the fact is that 
British survival during the First World War was seen as depending on maintaining 
command of the sea, which only the continued existence of the Grand Fleet could 
ensure.13  
 
After the Battle of Jutland, the concept of command of the sea began to be 
challenged.  Indeed as already alluded to, a close reading of classical strategists, 
would have revealed the fact that maritime strategy was certainly not just about the 
decisive battle, but that it included ongoing diplomatic, presence, coercive and 
economic issues. However, for many naval practitioners, the First World War did 
represent a practical watershed in maritime strategy because the lessons learned 
brought this home to even the most traditional in naval circles. The absolute sense of a 
term such as command of the sea could not be maintained. This was due in many 
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respects to the revolution in military affairs that had occurred from 1880 onwards and 
the emergence of more navies. At the dawn of the 20th Century, nations such as the 
United States, Germany and Japan, began to trade more internationally and to begin to 
understand the importance of the sea to their status, and continued emergence, as 
nation states. The lesson of history, as written so succinctly by Colomb, Corbett and 
Mahan, was appreciated by these nations. The need for a navy then became the norm 
for nations other than the traditional trading and empire building nations of Europe 
such as Britain, The Netherlands and France. 
 
In addition to strategic and political realities, the economic burden imposed by 
the continuing revolution in military technology on post 1918 national economies, 
meant that command of the sea could not be preserved.14  In response to these issues 
the term sea control was coined to encompass the more modern realities, whilst 
upholding the vital role of history and strategy.15 Sea control is very much a multi-
dimensional concept as it encompasses the control of the air, control of the surface of 
the sea, control of the undersea water column and control of the littoral sea and 
landmass and control of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Australian Maritime Doctrine 
defines the concept of sea control as: ‘that condition which exists when one has 
freedom of action to use an area of sea for one’s own purposes and, if required, deny 
its use to an adversary.’16 It is a relative rather than absolute concept with the aim 
being to establish sufficient control, in a particular area, for a period of time, to enable 
one to use the sea for one’s own purposes. Control of the sea may be established 
through key battles. Examples of such battles from the Second World War are those 
of Coral Sea, Cape Matapan and Midway. However, again as these battles 
demonstrated, control of the sea is unlikely to be finally settled. It is likely to be a 
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continuing contest. This was certainly the case with the Battle of the Atlantic, which 
ebbed and flowed from 1939 to 1944 as the British and Allied forces contested sea 
control in the vicinity of the merchant convoys which supplied and sustained Britain 
against Germany. 
 
These four battles are just as relevant now to Australia understanding maritime 
strategy as they were in the 1940s. They remain good examples of sea control. The 
result was the ability of the British and American forces to establish sufficient control 
to use the sea for their purposes and to prevent the enemy from being able to interfere 
decisively.  Cape Matapan was crucial in undermining the confidence of the Italian 
Navy in the Mediterranean and permitted the British to more confidently carry out 
traditional maritime roles such as sea lines of communications protection with convoy 
resupply of Malta and logistics support to army units in North Africa. The support by 
maritime forces, naval and merchant ships, of the Australian troops in the siege of the 
North African port town of Tobruk, made famous in Australia by the ‘Rats of 
Tobruk,’ was a good example of the sea control. More broadly the Battle of the 
Atlantic not only sustained Britain in the early stages of World War II but sea control 
around the convoys was axiomatic to the build-up of Allied forces for land operations 
in North Africa and later Europe. In the Pacific theatre, the Battle of the Coral Sea 
prevented a landing of Japanese land forces by sea in the vicinity of Port Moresby, 
while the Battle of Midway enabled the Pacific island advance of United States’s 
forces. 
 
The important point in sea control is the multi-dimensional reality.  Axiomatic 
to sea control is control of the air, which requires maritime power projection and an 
air warfare capability. In a regionally representative threat environment, involving 
operations in close proximity to an adversary that has a viable counter-air capability, 
the absence of air power and air warfare will almost inevitably prevent a force 
achieving sea control.  Without sea control sea lines of communications will be 
interdicted, there will be no power projection and forces cannot be operated ashore. 
The need for the air power to be within the area of operations will be discussed later. 
Suffice to state at this point that the geography of the Australian maritime 
environment will almost inevitably thwart effective counter air or air dominance 
operations by land based aircraft at a distance from the Australian mainland.  
 
Trade in the Australian sense is about controlling the sea lines of 
communications. As mentioned earlier, for Australia the need for protection of trade 
could be within the region, including strategic straits, coastal waters and open ocean 
areas, as well as at distance from Australia itself. Dr Eric Grove has pointed out that, 
‘the overwhelming weight of historical evidence seems to demonstrate that unless 
some direct protection is given to shipping then the exercise of command of the sea 
may be impossible. In other words, the battle around the ships themselves may be as 
vital to gaining command of the sea as operations elsewhere, perhaps more so.’17 His 
use of the term command of the seas in this context is in effect sea control as he is 
referring to superiority of force at the necessary place in which to destroy the fighting 
capacity of the enemy. Maritime assets, both in the air and on or under the sea, are 
required in area, at immediate notice, to achieve this. Thus the protection of sea lines 
of communications is about protecting the ships themselves, not the sea.18To achieve 
this, the forces required need a high degree of prominence in force structure planning. 
 
In addition to protecting sea lines of communications the ability to provide 
power projection is in many ways the most fundamental thing that sea control enables. 
As Professor Colin Gray wrote as the first sentence in Chapter One of his work, The 
Leverage of Sea Power, ‘navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can 
secure ashore, where people live.’19  In this respect the core aerospace capabilities of 
precision strike and rapid force projection are related to maritime ideas of power 
projection.  In the maritime context, however, a fundamental difference is that in 
providing this power projection, maritime forces enjoy the benefits of maritime force 
characteristics such as accessibility, flexibility and ambiguity with which to influence 
events ashore as necessary. 
 
 Supplementing sea control is the concept of sea denial. Sea denial as a 
maritime strategic concept is in effect a subset of sea control. Sea denial can be 
explained as the ability to deny an adversary the ability to use the sea for their own 
purposes without necessarily being able to utilise the sea for your purposes at the 
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same time.20 The U-boat campaigns by the Germans in both World Wars are 
examples of a sea denial strategy as is the concept of offensive mining.  
 
Having defined sea denial it is necessary to state that many sea denial 
strategies, despite an initial success, ultimately fail.  They fail in most cases because 
they are one-dimensional. In the German case, the Battle of the Atlantic was one-
dimensional. It could be characterised as an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach. Once the U-
boat had been countered, the Germans had no other effective weapon with which to 
continue the sea denial strategy.  This can be compared to the very successful 
submarine and air campaign of the United States in the Pacific against Japanese 
shipping. This sea denial operation was successful due to the fact that the United 
States used it as a subset of a sea control strategy. This is relevant for Australia as the 
current over reliance on sea denial, in the absence of a sea control capability, could 
have a significant adverse effect.  This is certainly so when strategic tasks such as 
protection of trade (sea lines of communications) and maritime power projection, 
utilising the Australian Army’s manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment 
concept, are considered.   
 
The maritime strategic concepts of sea control and sea denial are used by the 
RAN to describe the role of maritime forces for Australia. However, a close look at 
Australia’s prime military task, as defined in Defence 2000, of defending Australia 
and its direct approaches (DA) would indicate that this task is not viewed within 
Defence 2000 as a sea control task. Rather, within strategic guidance it is treated as a 
sea denial one, a sub-set of sea control. In noting this, and having defined very briefly 
three maritime strategic concepts, it is necessary to stress that the maritime 
environment is intrinsically a joint one, combining sea, land and air assets. The 
integration of sea, land and air assets is required to achieve success in the application 
of the correct strategy at the right place at the right time. Individual military units 
need to cooperate and complement each other to achieve the common aim. 
Commanders of joint forces have to be able to recognise the distinctive characteristics 
of the various components of the force and be fully ready to employ each according to 
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its strengths and limitations. It is only by capitalising on the synergy of the whole that 
maximum effectiveness can be achieved. 
 
One example of this is maritime air warfare. A proficient air warfare 
capability is vital to operations at sea and in the littoral area. Air warfare can be best 
summarised as active and passive measures taken to facilitate command of the air 
environment to ensure the success of the mission.  This can include defensive 
measures aimed at the defeat of an enemy attack or a plan of attack and offensive 
measures taken to prevent the enemy use of the environment in pursuit of their 
mission. Command of the air environment is defined as denial, superiority or 
supremacy of the air environment as dictated by the mission requirements.  
 
The conduct of maritime air warfare demands the employment and integration 
of a wide range of assets; from wide area surveillance and fixed wing air dominance 
aircraft to long-range surface to air missiles and complementary radar and sensor 
systems, to close-range point defence weapons and electronic warfare systems. It may 
also include strike operations to destroy enemy air power on the ground before it can 
take offensive action. It is fundamental to the success of air warfare that these assets 
are wielded as a coordinated whole, with each capability complementing every other, 
and interference between systems minimised.  
 
One type of force, however, cannot simply be substituted for another. Each 
attribute makes a unique and vital contribution and when combined, they must ensure 
maritime air warfare supremacy in order to be successful. Layered and complimentary 
systems are the key to the resilience of a force, to achieving the sea control that 
underpins maritime strategy. This is an unmovable necessity if mission success is to 
be achieved. The trend to excessive orthodoxy in strategic thought needs to be 
resisted, as does a one-dimensional, technological approach to operations, borne as it 
is from a rigidly of tactical thought.  It ignores the flexibility, poise and persistence 
that layered, complimentary capability offers to maritime operations. The lack of air 
warfare in a scenario, that enabling layer of capability against a regionally 
representative threat to the forces involved, results in Australia being prevented from 
achieving sea control and therefore a successful maritime strategic outcome.  This is 
the key to successful maritime operations in, through and over Australia’s maritime 
geographic environment 
  
Australian Maritime Doctrine and Its Characteristics  
 
In addition to the strategic concepts of sea control and sea denial, Australian 
Maritime Doctrine lists some characteristics of maritime forces, which have been 
enunciated in different ways by maritime strategists over many years. It must be 
remembered that these characteristics are relative to other forces, and the relativities 
are not constant. Australian Maritime Doctrine is the prime source used in this paper 
when describing these characteristics. The characteristics are re-stated in this paper as 
an understanding of them is essential if a proper appreciation of how maritime forces 
underpin Australian strategic realities is to be gained.   
 
First, maritime forces provide mobility in mass as they can be continuously 
mobile, with their own logistics, and so can cover very large distances. This is 
obviously situation dependent, but in the Australian maritime environment and given 
the diplomatic realities of over-flight of foreign landmass, in almost all cases mobility 
by mass will be via the sea. Thousands of tonnes of equipment, cargo and logistics 
supplies can be moved in a number of days within the region or in three weeks as far a 
field as the Persian Gulf without the need for diplomatic permission.  The Australian 
involvement in Vietnam was heavily supported and enabled by sealift. The ex-aircraft 
carrier, HMAS Sydney proved to be the linchpin of Australia’s forward defence 
policy.1 From 1965 to 1972, Sydney made 23 runs from Australia to the Vietnamese 
port of Vung Tau, escorted by at least two surface combatants, and carrying the bulk 
of Australia’s ground forces.2 
 
Maritime forces also provide readiness via rapid deployment. There is no 
immediate need for forward operating bases, or prolonged diplomatic negotiations 
and so maritime forces can typically be quickly operational in theatre. Examples 
include the rapid reaction by the RAN to the Government’s decision to provide assets 
to Operation Desert Shield in 1990 in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Two 
guided missile frigates, HMA ships Adelaide and Darwin and the replenishment ship, 
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HMAS Success were notified on the Thursday and sailed on the following Monday for 
the operational area. In more recent times in response to the MV Tampa incident in 
August 2001, two frigates, HMA ships Newcastle and Warramunga and the 
amphibious transport HMAS Manoora, were diverted from exercises in South East 
Asia for border protection operations. These ships were on station off Christmas 
Island and Ashmore Reef within four days. Operations were then carried out 
involving four suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs) without any ship having first 
visited Australia for either re-supply or further training. A third frigate, HMAS 
Arunta, was sailed from its base in Western Australia with only 12 hours notice 
having only just returned to port from other operations. 
 
Related to response and readiness for an operation is the factor of access.  As 
described earlier, in operations other than war the UNCLOS permits maritime forces 
free operations everywhere except territorial seas, archipelagic waters and internal 
waters. The only limitation is the degree of threat present and that is a similar issue 
for land-based forces.  In the border protection issue, the vessels involved transited 
through the Indonesian archipelago to the area of operations without the need to gain 
any permission from the Indonesian government or to provide any notification in 
advance. This led not only to access but also rapid reaction in accordance with the 
conventions of international law. Another factor for government consideration is that 
maritime forces leave no political footprint in transiting from one area to another. 
 
Maritime forces also provide flexibility via the ability to deploy or withdraw at 
will, providing a rapid response to government direction and a welcome degree of 
ambiguity which is very useful in many operations other than war.  A withdrawal can  
also be accompanied without the diplomatic embarrassment that can come from the 
images of a land headquarters, buildings or bases being abandoned.  Maritime forces 
can simply sail away, and embarrassment or ‘loss of face,’ often vital in diplomatic 
and politically sensitive situations can be limited. Maritime forces are also adaptable. 
This relates to their flexibility and refers to the transition from peace to wartime 
footing quickly, often without any external signs. Maritime forces can be in a foreign 
port, conducting activities as diverse as training, diplomatic initiatives, charity work, 
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supporting trade expositions for examples and then they can sail and loiter 12 nautical 
miles off shore as necessary.  Their demeanour can be aggressive, passive or 
ambiguous without any external sign, if that is the desire of the Government. This 
flexibility is unique to maritime forces, specifically ships.  
 
Reach and poise and persistence are also characteristics of maritime forces.  
They permit operations at long range from home port through self-contained logistics. 
Maritime forces can remain useful in the area of operations for a considerable length 
of time, which may be difficult for an adversary to gauge. A recent example involves 
the border protection operations against illegal immigration. From August 2001 until 
the end of January 2002, HMAS Warramunga was assigned to border protection 
duties for 125 days.  Of these days, 119 were spent at sea, on task.  During that time 
four suspected illegal entry vessels were intercepted successfully with one returned to 
the vicinity of Indonesia’s territorial sea. 
 
 The final attribute is resilience.  Although seen often by some strategists and 
theorists as vulnerable, maritime forces are in fact resilient with good resistance of a 
force or ships to damage. Mobility remains a major factor ensuring the safety of 
maritime forces. Maritime forces can also be viewed as less mission sensitive to 
defects, especially when compared to aircraft operating in areas of operations at great 
distances from their bases. Practical operational experience of distance and aircraft 
operations indicates that there is either 100 percent coverage in the area of operations 
or a zero percent coverage. An aircraft defect when operating at distance from the 
area of operations often results in mission cancellation and no coverage for that sortie 
period. 
 
Australian Maritime Doctrine3 also lists some limitations for maritime forces. 
When compared to land forces transience is one such limitation.  Maritime forces 
cannot hold the sea in the same way as troops can hold the ground. However, 
maritime forces are less transient than aircraft and therefore the scenario again 
determines the role. Indirectness can also be a limitation with the effects of maritime 
campaign often not easy to discern for sometime afterwards. Blockade as a maritime 
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function is an example of an operation whose effects are indirect and often not evident 
for some time afterwards. By then of course, the focus of interest has often shifted and 
the true value of such operations is not analysed fully. When looking at indirectness 
as a limitation, the primary danger is that it tends to disguise the critical nature of the 
maritime environment in most conflicts. However, it is equally true that indirectness 
can be viewed as a positive characteristic of maritime forces especially in relation to 
roles such as blockade.   
 
Another potential limitation is speed.  As mentioned before, maritime forces 
may be slow in comparison with aircraft but they are in fact fast when compared to 
many other forms of prolonged response, especially as the ship is at sea basically fully 
armed, logistically capable and ready to go. Importantly maritime forces do not 
require diplomatic approval to appear in theatre and this does aid in their speedy 
deployment in theatre. 
 
These characteristics are relative ideas and they are situation dependent.  
Australia’s current and planned maritime forces have many of these characteristics, 
but their ability to operate in other than relatively benign theatres, or coalition 
operations is limited by the inability to project force via combat operations at sea. 
Combat operations from the sea have a much more direct and obvious joint or 
combined purpose. However, the ADF will be unable to project land forces ashore 
unless it has the capability to conduct sea control operations and not merely limited 
defensive sea denial tasks.  
 
For a nation in a maritime region, these issues are quite fundamental to 
Australia’s military strategy. If Australia does not understand and apply them, despite 
anything that may be written Australia will in reality be constrained to a ‘Fortress 
Australia’ methodology, a continentalist approach to its security. As such a wide 
range of potentially very effective military options will be inevitably denied. Noting 
that sea control is multi-dimensional, the RAN’s and ADF’s achilles heel is the lack 
of credible maritime air warfare, incorporating air warfare destroyers and long range 
surface to air superiority weapons, command and control capability and maritime 
organic air power. These are all required if a response in the military or diplomatic 
sense is to be truly multi-dimensional. 
 
In recent times, the desire of the Australian Government to have a pre-emptive 
capability has been much in the news. The Prime Minister, John Howard stated on 
radio that given the knowledge of a forthcoming threat to Australia he would certainly 
authorise a pre-emptive strike.4  The Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill was 
quoted as stating that; ‘The need to act swiftly and firmly before threats become 
attacks is perhaps the clearest lesson of September 11, and is one that is clearly 
driving US policy and strategy. It is a position which we share in principle.’5 This 
position was re-stated again on 1 December 2002 by Mr Howard in an interview on 
the Sunday Programme.6 Noting the negative reaction from the region7 to this 
statement of intent, the access of forces from the sea and the flexibility this brings a 
government would be of even more importance should this action ever be needed. 
Whether or not this scenario is ever realised, Australia’s ability to do this without 
implementing a maritime strategy must be questioned. Certainly the problems of over-
flight, diplomatic clearance and sovereignty would limit the ability of Australian 
mainland based air power to operate effectively in any such operation. 
 
When speaking on the implications for Australia of the globalisation of 
security which has arisen since the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 
September 2001, Senator Hill in June 2002 stated: 
 
‘For Australia, it demonstrates again that defence of Australia and its 
interests does not stop at the edge of the air-sea gap. It probably never 
made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of 
diminishing concentric circles around our own coastline, but it 
certainly does not do so now. We are seeing a fundamental change to 
the notion that our security responsibilities are confined largely to our 
own region.  The ADF is both more likely to be deployed and 
                                                 
4 Howard, J. ABC Radio News Canberra (ABC 666) PM 20 Jun 02. 
5 Hill, R. cited in Skehan, C We Back US First Strike On Iraqis, Hill, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Fairfax Press, Sydney, 19 June 2002, p.1 
6 Howard, J. Sunday Programme, Nine Network interview with Mr Laurie Oakes 1 Dec 02.  This 
position was re-stated again by both Mr Howard and the Defence Minister Senator Robert Hill. It 
elicited a strong negative response from regional leaders with the exception of Japan.  
7 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand all expressed dismay/outrage at this statement. 
increasingly likely to be deployed well beyond Australia. This will 
require a greater emphasis on strategic lift in our planning.’8  
 
In short, this approach is maritime strategy with the means of implementing 
strategic concepts required to be from the three armed forces, the RAN, Australian 
Army and RAAF. Maritime strategy, and power projection via strategic lift are 
specifically concerned with the exercise of maritime power. It emanates from forces 
drawn from all three services, both land and sea-based, supported by national and 
commercial resources, exercising influence over sea, land and air environments. 
However, to achieve this there is a need for layered and complimentary forces. A 
strategic lift capability, such as that envisaged by Senator Hill and as enunciated in 
Joint Projects 2048 and 2027, aimed at replacing amphibious systems and giving a 
meaningful transport capability to the army’s manoeuvre operations in the littoral 
environment (MOLE), is limited significantly in value without the enabling element 
of sea control for which air power and sea power is required. In Australia’s region this 
requires maritime power projection and protection of sea lines of communications to 
ensure that the forces involved actually can get to their objective and be landed safely 
in anything but a benign environment. Control of the maritime environment is a 
critical requirement for the conduct of any operation within the region. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Hill, R. ‘Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence,’ Address to the Defence & 
Strategic Studies Course, Australian Defence College, Canberra, 18 June 2002, cited in Yolla, Journal 
of the Australian Defence Colleges Association, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, ACT. 
 
The Continentalist Approach – Aerospace Theory & Land 
Warfare Strategy 
 
 Having made reference to a continentalist approach to military strategy it is 
fitting to define briefly what is meant by this term. For the purpose of this paper 
continental thought is espoused basically as the art of bringing a powerful land force 
to bear via land manoeuvre at the decisive point to achieve victory. In this 
perspective, the use of the term “land force” includes air power. By including air 
power this is in some way a deviation from the traditional continental approach, but it 
reflects and compliments the three dimensional characteristic of maritime strategy and 
indeed it reflects land battles since 1939, especially after the conception and use of 
‘blitzkrieg.’1 By using this approach aerospace power could be viewed more 
accurately as a pre-requisite to success in the two strategic requirements, the 
continental and the maritime, and not as a separate school of strategic thought in its 
own right. 
 
 The RAAF notes that; ‘aerospace power developed into an integral, yet 
discrete, part of warfare. Aerospace power can still provide direct support to the 
surface battle but, through exploitation of unique characteristics, it will be equally 
able to carry out discrete functions that do not necessarily involve surface forces.’2  As 
a strategic statement this is open to contest. It is perhaps true in a limited tactical 
scenario, but not strategically. Aerospace power should be seen in the same way as 
maritime power. As already quoted, ‘navies fight at sea for the strategic effect they 
have ashore where people live.’3 Logically therefore, aerospace power fights in the air 
for the strategic effect it has on the ground, where people live. For a strategic effect to 
be achieved, surface forces, whether directly or indirectly, must be effected by the 
                                                 
1 Blitzkrieg was developed by the German Army in the 1930s and first used against Poland in 1939 and 
then Norway, France, Belgium, Denmark and Holland in 1940. As a manoeuvre warfare technique it 
involves the rapid thrust of armoured units and the integrated use of air power to break through and 
quickly gain ground with incisive effect. Like sea control it is not about holding territory as such, but 
about disrupting and shattering an enemy’s ability and will to fight. 
2 Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, AAP 1000, Aerospace Centre, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 4th edition, Aug 2002, p.121. 
3 Gray, C. The Leverage of Sea Power, p.1 
‘fight.’ The change of government or change of government policy that occurs due to 
a use of aerospace power in isolation, therefore, does involve surface forces in a 
strategic manner.  This is important in understanding how aerospace power effects 
maritime strategy. 
 
 From the perspective of land forces, the Australian Army defines land power 
as; ‘the ability to exert immediate and sustained influence on or from the land in 
conditions of peace, crisis and war. It involves the capability to use land forces to 
uphold and protect Australia’s sovereignty and interests. Land forces will have the 
capability to undertake a wide range of warfighting and non-combat tasks on 
Australian territory and in the regional maritime environment. If necessary, land 
power may be projected further afield.’4 The Australian Army publication, The 
Fundamentals of Land Warfare, also notes that land power does not operate in 
isolation and that the employment of land, sea and air forces in joint operations will 
often be necessary in order to achieve decisive outcomes. It then states; ‘Australia’s 
geo-strategic circumstances require joint forces that can be employed in a littoral 
environment where the respective domains of land, sea and air forces converge.’5  
The key statement that, ‘land forces in this environment are fundamentally dependent 
on sea and air forces for deployment, protection, sustainment and re-deployment,’6 
reinforces the vital role in the Australian context of maritime strategy as the enabler of 
operations at sea, in the air and on the land for any Australian operation in the region 
or beyond. 
 
Countries that rely on the use of a continental strategy are typified by having 
contested land borders with numerous access points.  Historically the survival of the 
nation state in such a geo-strategic situation has required a large land army and, in 
more recent times, an effective land based air force. As Antoine Henry Jomini stated; 
‘Strategy, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the 
important point of the theatre of war or the zone of operations.’7 In the context of 
Australia with the absence of any land border, the only way to achieve this is via the 
                                                 
4 The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, LWD 1, Australian Army, Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, 
p.26. 
5 Ibid,  p. 28 
6 Ibid, p. 28 
sea. This is where maritime strategy should subsume continental strategy for 
Australia. This requires credible maritime forces, maritime air power, sea control and 
the ability within the national infrastructure to support the forces once deployed.   
 
 Dr Norman Friedman, in the Synnot lecture series of 2002, noted that the end 
of the Soviet system meant the end of cheap sophisticated ground weaponry. 
Additionally the rising cost per soldier, or per unit, has led and will lead to a cut in the 
size of armies. High technology can compensate for the loss of mass to a degree but 
this is also expensive.8 This is relevant to the continental debate as it reinvigorates the 
importance of strategic mobility and the use of the sea sanctuary.9 Australia in the 
past was part of an imperial maritime empire and was used primarily as a source of 
manpower for it.10  The maritime empire has now disappeared and thus the emphasis 
must also be reviewed. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Hittle, J. (ed), Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War,  Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvannia, p. 157 
8 Friedman, N. Sea Power as Strategy – The Synnot Lecture Series 4-15 Nov 2002 
9 Friedman, N. Sea Power as Strategy – The Synnot Lecture Series 4-15 Nov 2002 
10 This was evident especially in World War I and to a lesser extent in World War II. 
 
An International Historical Perspective 
 
 Having reviewed the characteristics of the continental and maritime 
environment that determine maritime strategic concepts, it is timely to restate that 
history provides vindication of the maritime strategic approach. Nations that have 
concentrated on a continentalist approach have been successful only until they have 
attempted to project force over the sea or to defend against attack from the sea. For at 
least the last 500 years in the final determination of victory maritime power has never 
lost. This is a vitally important fact if Australia is to truly respond in an adept manner 
to the realities of its strategic and geographic situation. 
 
 History reveals a long and impressive record of the strategic value of flexible 
sea power. Without sea control a maritime power is defeated.  In the First World War 
the North Sea blockade, in which Australia participated, demonstrated the major 
military and commercial advantages of sea control. Notably, during the Second 
World War, the Atlantic victory required surface capabilities as well as sea and land 
based air cover. In the Mediterranean the RAN excelled in a variety of sea control 
roles, which aided the defence of the Middle East and the conduct of the war in 
Africa.  
 
 The Allied naval operations, which won the war in the Pacific, required sea 
control. Sea control was gained via surface and air engagements and amphibious 
power projection. Submarine operations were used primarily for sea denial. Land-
based air cover also depended on sea control for base acquisition and supply. Both 
eastern and western Australia were important bases for allied maritime operations, 
and the RAN was a major alliance builder with the USN. In Cold War Asia, sea 
power was a major factor in coalition building, deterrence and containment. In 
Korea, United Nations sea control, again in which Australia participated, enabled the 
war to be fought in all its aspects.  
 
 Similar circumstances obtained in Vietnam, where the interoperability of the 
RAN’s new guided missile destroyers (DDGs) facilitated alliance politics and 
gunfire support.1 In the Gulf in 1990-91 sea power classically gained time, structured 
the conflict and enabled the eventual counter offensive, utilising blockade, lift, strike, 
and amphibious decoy capabilities. The RAN's Gulf presence then and since has had 
reach and interoperability in contributing to the USN’s sea control in that area of 
operations. The flexibility of sea power has so often established the context of a war 
and been the springboard for victory.  
 
When examining history in more detail, perhaps better understood is the 
experience of Britain and more recently the United States. The great proponents of 
maritime strategy, Britain in the 16th – 20th centuries and the United States from 1901 
onwards, have ultimately been victorious over Continentalist powers due to the 
efficacy of the sea.  Evidence of this includes the North Africa Campaign and defeat 
of General Rommel in 1943, the Pacific campaign of 1942-1945, the 1951 
amphibious landing at Inchon in the Korean War, the recovery by Britain of the 
Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Gulf War of 1991, where the seaward flank was 
secured and maintained throughout. 
 
 The nation, which best utilised sea power in its guise of command of the sea 
and more recently sea control, was Britain. Blockade, the threat of the fleet in being, 
the bringing of the enemy fleet to battle and its destruction or defeat, the maintenance 
of sea lines of communications and the projection of diplomatic power via the sea 
were all exercised by Britain via its maritime forces. Britain utilised a series of 
alliances with land powers to counter the great power status of any single power in 
Europe. This was so in relation to Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russia in the nineteenth century 
and Germany in the twentieth century. The British utilised land power when and 
where necessary to support its allies in Europe.  In the case of the Napoleonic Wars, 
the Peninsular campaign in Spain from 1812 to 1815 was enabled by sea power which 
projected the military power.  Its initial aim was limited but in the end it proved to be 
                                                 
1 Of note is the fact that the destroyer HMAS VENDETTA only served one tour to Vietnam because of 
the problems of logistics supply. VENDETTA, a Daring Class destroyer, was dependent on British 
logistics and systems. For example, main gun ammunition was 4.5” not the USN sourced 5”. This is a 
good example of the need for interoperability with likely coalition forces to be considered closely in 
any procurement decision for major surface platforms.  
a decisive campaign in preventing France from countering an effective continentalist 
attack from Russia and Prussia.  
 
 The history of the United States has shown an increasing awareness of the 
importance of the sea and maritime power in that nation’s security.  The inability of 
the British to maintain control of the sea in the American War of Independence led 
directly to the defeat of the British army under General Cornwallis at Yorktown in 
1781.  This defeat effectively meant the end of the American Revolution2 and the 
independence of the United States. Even though the United States then concentrated 
for a century on internal issues, being isolationist in outlook, the nature of their geo-
strategic environment meant that they almost inevitably became involved in maritime 
issues. Involvement in the Philippines and the Caribbean against Spain, and fear of 
unwelcomed European interest in the North American landmass led to the United 
States developing a substantial navy and a maritime capability and strategy from the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  This strategy has served it well for over 100 
years. 
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Australian Historical Perspective 
 
 In considering the Australian historical perspective there are numerous 
examples that should emphasise the holistic nature of the sea. The very pattern of 
settlement of Australia by Britain reflected this. Australia was settled on the coast 
with the major cities being established firstly as deep-water ports. However, despite 
this overriding historical link, in the context of Australia, maritime forces have 
suffered from a lack of profile.  The statement ‘out of sight, out of mind’ has long 
been true of the Australian knowledge of the pivotal role of maritime affairs in the 
shaping and survival of the nation.  It is the sea that framed and determined the 
ancient history of the island continent.  It is the sea, which kept the indigenous 
inhabitants, the unique Australian fauna and flora isolated for some 40,000 years, and 
ultimately it was by sea that the Europeans colonised the land. Although it was the 
harshness of the western coastline and interior deserts which deterred earlier invasion 
of the continent from the Dutch East Indies or from Europe, it was only via sea that 
any such invasion or exploitation could occur. The historian Geoffrey Blainey notes 
that Tasmania was completely isolated by sea and its segregation was perhaps the 
longest in human history. He also states that although mainland Australia was not 
completely isolated, the narrow strait between New Guinea and Australia, ‘served as a 
deep ditch or barrier for thousands of years.’1 
 
 With the scientific and technological developments of the late eighteenth 
century it was only a matter of time before Europeans would seriously consider 
further exploration in the region of Australia. In the early years after 1788, the first 
colony in Sydney was sustained from the sea. It faced starvation in the first year as the 
initial crops failed and the colonists laboured to understand the intricacies of 
successful agriculture in Australia. As Australia developed, although threats to its 
sovereignty were seen to be via the sea, the solution was often seen to lie in 
continentally based forces.  In the period of the Crimean War in the mid nineteenth 
century, Russia emerged as the main threat. Coastal fortifications were built in 
Sydney and Melbourne specifically to counter the ‘Russian’ threat. Despite a focus on 
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land defences there was some understanding of maritime issues. Many of the colonies 
developed navies or coastal maritime defence forces. There was also enough of a 
focus to ensure that great political emphasis was placed on Britain maintaining 
significant maritime forces in the Australian region.  
 
Later, almost immediately after Federation in 1901, it was Japan that was 
viewed with alarm by the embryonic nation.  In some significant quarters it was 
acknowledged that Australia was absolutely dependent on the sea. ‘Nowhere’, said 
Prime Minister Alfred Deakin in 1906, ‘are maritime communications more important 
than to Australia, seeing that our dependence upon sea carriage is certain to increase 
rather than diminish as population and production advance.’2 It was Australian 
consternation at the apparent lack of priority by Britain in Australian affairs, Britain’s 
1902 treaty with Japan and the growing strength of Japanese naval power that led to 
Deakin independently approaching the United States, the resultant visit of the USN 
Great White Fleet in 19073 and the expansion of the Australian Navy.  
 
An emphasis on maritime affairs in Australia was, however, only appreciated 
by few in this period.  As is the case today there was much greater public awareness 
of the utility of land based forces. The then Minister for Defence, J.W. McCay is 
reported as being of the view that naval developments should await the completion of 
land protection.4 To Captain (later Vice-Admiral Sir William) Creswell, the Director 
of Naval Forces, the most certain deterrent to any enemy landing was the existence of 
an adequate navy. Captain Creswell objected to the priority on land forces noting that 
defeat at sea would be required before any conflict in Australia5 and that in any case 
the only form of attack declared to be reasonably possible was by raiding forces on 
coastal targets. He also found it strange that interstate and overseas trade, greater than 
that of Spain, Portugal or Japan and valued at more than 170 million pounds, had been 
left out of consideration in Australian defence plans.6 In 1901 as part of the 
commemorative edition of the Brisbane Courier Creswell had a page-length column 
adjacent to that of the Prime Minister’s. In this column which emphasised the need for 
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real naval capability Creswell noted, ‘I would conclude by impressing on every 
Australian, and every Federal voter, senator, and statesman that, although a big one, 
Australia is still an island, and must be defended like an island.’ 7 
 
In this period Field Marshal Lord Kitchener embarked on a study tour of 
Australia at the invitation of the Australian government.8  In his 1992 book, An Army 
for a Nation Dr John Mordike raised the point that despite the belief of most that 
Kitchener’s scheme was concerned primarily with local defence it was in fact aimed 
at providing manpower for imperial operations.9  Dr Mordike stated that ‘as a defence 
scheme it was sadly lacking…with no concept of operations…or suggestion how an 
invading force might be constituted or where it might land.’10 Dr Mordike noted 
further that despite Kitchener overturning imperial policy and stating that Australia 
had to prepare for invasion his purpose in this was; ‘to provide a powerful stimulus 
for Australians to establish a strong military capability, (land force) a capability which 
Kitchener undoubtedly intended for use on imperial operations.’11 
 
Despite the imperialistic nature of much Australian defence policy and the 
interests of the British, in the space of four years, from 1909 to 1913, Australia did 
create a credible fleet.  That this could not have been achieved without the support of 
the RN is very obvious.12  However, the all-pervasive influence of Britain in maritime 
issues perhaps had the unintended effect of alienating these forces to some extent 
from Australian ethos and society. At its formation in 1901 the Australian Navy, then 
known as the Commonwealth Naval Forces, was seen as a squadron of the RN and in 
times of hostilities it would come under the command of the British Admiralty.  This 
did not secure the navy a place in the hearts and minds of Australians. Literally these 
naval forces inherited the traditions of the RN, which was secure in British hearts and 
minds as the “senior service”, the bulwark of the Empire. When the British public 
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thought of security and the military and of their military tradition they thought of 
battles such as Trafalgar first.  The nation was truly one with the tradition of ‘Rule 
Britannia’ and ‘Hearts of Oak’. 
 
The RAN did not have this standing within Australia, and in many ways it has 
always struggled to gain recognition.  This situation was not helped in any way by the 
almost immediate outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and the following four years of 
continentalist warfare in Europe and the Middle East. Not surprisingly the First World 
War had a significant impact on the outlook of society and of Australians’ 
understanding of themselves. This was due largely to the substantial casualties 
incurred13 and the controversy and division caused to society by the conscription 
debates of the period. As stated previously, the RAN was placed under the control of 
the RN as part of an imperial maritime strategy. After the initial success of 
expeditionary operations in the Asia-Pacific, and the destruction by the cruiser HMAS 
Sydney of the German light cruiser SMS Emden  at the Cocos Islands, coincidentally 
while HMAS Sydney was participating in the escort of Australian soldiers to the 
Middle East, the RAN’s war effort was for the most part in the North Sea.  This was 
irrelevant to Australians and was ignored.  The overwhelming psychological impact 
of events at Gallipoli and on the clash of mass armies on the Western Front in France 
naturally took centre stage.  
 
 To better understand this it is necessary to appreciate that C.E.W. (Charles) 
Bean has the major role in Australian historiography of the First World War. Bean 
wrote the first six volumes of the 12 volume Official History of Australia in World 
War I. This History had an indelible effect on Australia and was arguably the most 
important work produced in the first 40 years after Federation.14 More remarkably it 
did not so much depend on those that read it to achieve this because its message had 
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transcendence across the whole society.  As the Official History, generations of 
school children, parents and the soldiers of the Second World War were brought up 
with the legend of ANZAC.   
 
Bean spent the entire war with the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF), from 
the landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 to the surrender of the German forces on 11 
November 1918.  Importantly this time was spent with the soldiers at the front, not 
rewriting second hand reports of the fighting, but witnessing first hand as many 
conflicts and actual battles as he physically could.  His descriptive prose, backed up 
with sketch maps of the battlefield, meant that he set the tone for the beginning of the 
ANZAC legend.  Importantly his work from 1921 to 1942 in producing the Official 
History of Australia in the War ensured that his impact on Australian historiography 
of the period was immense. By becoming the only authoritative account of the age it 
shaped the very structure of Australia’s development as a nation. Bean felt a moral 
need to ensure that the truth of events and history was available to the nation.  He saw 
that; ‘the final product would be more than a simple work of record.  Through its 
“truth”, it would alter the conduct of Australians and help shape their view of 
Australia’s role in world affairs.’15  
 
The narrative style with which his six volumes of the Official History was 
written meant that it achieved its aim to be a tribute to the heroism of the Australian 
soldier and to be welcomed into many homes, schools and libraries.  The 
completeness of the battle coverage and the important fact that a bibliographical note 
exists for every soldier named in the History, ensured its place as an accurate record 
of battle and as the most influential Australian account of the war. Bean’s work had 
its greatest influence in the creation, and importantly the continuation, of the ANZAC 
legend.  ANZAC Day was first celebrated in 1916 and between 1921 and 1927 
became a public holiday in all States.16  Bean’s influence on the development of an 
Australian perception of Australian cultural identity was profound. As noted by Inglis; 
‘The Story of ANZAC ended with an affirmation that “it was on the 25th of April 
1915, that the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born.” Bean did as much 
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as anybody to propagate that view of the nation.’17  Importantly it was not just by 
word that Bean had a profound influence in Australian historiography of the First 
World War.  As an example he was active in lobbying for the creation of the 
Australian War Memorial in Canberra and in fact was Chairman of its Board in 
1952.18   
 
The jubilation that followed the arrival of the fleet unit in 1913 and the sinking 
of the Emden by HMAS Sydney in 1914 had been overshadowed by four years of 
bloody trench warfare.  The feeling that the creation of a powerful navy presaged the 
birth of the nation as an independent entity had been displaced by the growing 
ANZAC mythology that the nation’s independence had been bought with blood on the 
shores of Gallipoli. The national psyche and sense of nationhood was irrevocably 
shifted to an army focus.  This would have serious repercussions for the RAN, 
especially from 1919-1939 in terms of trying to maintain a credible force, as the will 
to invest in an effective and independent navy declined. 
 
This influence also extends beyond that conflict, through the Second World 
War and into all areas of Australian cultural identity today, be it military, civilian or 
sports based.  The egalitarian, ‘fair go’ society could well be described as the 
‘Australian Dream’.  Much of its basis can be found in the writings of Bean.  Prime 
Minister Keating’s moving speech at the entombment of the Unknown Australian 
Soldier at the Australian War Memorial on the 75th anniversary of the armistice on 11 
November 1993 summarised the essence of the legend19 as; “it is legend not of 
sweeping military victories so much as triumphs against the odds, of courage and 
ingenuity in adversity.  It is a legend of free and independent spirits whose discipline 
derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship 
and the demands for necessity.  It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which 
Australians have gone to war ever since.”20 
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An understanding of this period almost immediately after Federation is vital if 
an appreciation is to be gained of why Australians are unaware of the efficacy of the 
sea and maritime issues on the nation and the future development of it. Society in the 
First World War was riven by debates on soldering, on men going off to fight a 
continentalist campaign at great distance from Australia. Built upon the legend of 
ANZAC and of the heroism of the Australian soldier, was the social schism that 
occurred in Australia due to the two divisive conscription referendums during the war 
and the impact of the extensive casualties on families and the society. This was 
especially so in small towns where in some cases whole families or a large proportion 
of the community were decimated by the bloody trench warfare, especially on the 
Western Front in France.  The blooding of Australia was therefore seen 
understandably as a continental battle, revolving predominantly around images of 
land warfare and the ‘digger’.  It remains so today. 
 
 Despite the overwhelming continentalist nature of the Australian 
understanding of conflict in the First World War, the Australian geo-strategic 
environment offers further cases in support of the maritime strategic viewpoint. 
Australian military history itself is filled with examples of the utility and necessity of 
sea power. During the first days of the First World War it was the hunt for the 
German Admiral Graf von Spee and the very successful expeditionary attack on the 
German colony of New Britain, its capital Rabaul and the Solomons that initiated 
Australian forces in combat. The very existence of the battlecruiser, HMAS Australia, 
is acknowledged by von Spee himself as preventing the German squadron attacking 
Australian coastal cities.21 Indeed in 1933 the Prime Minister W.M ‘Billy’ Hughes 
declared; ‘But for HMAS Australia the great cities of Australia would have been 
reduced to ruins, coastwise shipping sunk, and communications with the outside 
world cut off.’22 
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FIGURE 4: HMAS AUSTRALIA, SYDNEY 1913 
Photo: Royal Australian Navy 
 
German New Guinea became Australian because of maritime strategy.  The 
Gallipoli campaign was also maritime strategy in operation. Its failure was perhaps 
due more to the planning, command and execution of the operation at the tactical 
level rather than the strategic design, which underpinned it. The RAN was there at the 
start with the penetration of the Dardenelles on 25 April 1915 by the RAN submarine 
AE2. This was the first successful penetration of the strait, and it was significant, as 
was the submarine’s successful interdiction of Turkish shipping for the next five days 
prior to her destruction. 
 
 Perhaps the best example of maritime strategy in the Australian context is the 
Pacific campaign of both the Japanese and the Allies in World War Two.  The 
Japanese were successful in the early period of the war because of their control of the 
sea and the air over it. Their aggressive campaign to capture the peninsula of Malaya 
and ultimately Singapore was made possible by this control.  On many instances when 
they met stiff land opposition on the Malayan peninsula, the Japanese by-passed it and 
inserted troops further down the coast.  This was only possible via their control of the 
sea. That they had achieved this with air power that was land based, through the 
destruction of the British capital ships, HM Ships Prince of Wales and Repulse, did 
not diminish the utility of sea power in these operations. Rather it enhanced the 
linkage between sea control and air control in the maritime environment. It was 
maritime strategy. 
 
 The same is true of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Dr Norman 
Friedman makes the point that to the United States Army the critical issue in the 
Pacific, when faced with the prospect of Japanese aggression, was the defence of the 
Philippines. United States planners in the mid 1930s admitted that the Philippines 
probably could not be held, yet General MacArthur acted on the theory that the 
islands should be held at all costs.23 MacArthur’s war aim was then to regain the 
Philippines, whereas the United States Navy’s (USN) aim was to defeat Japan first. 
Once this was achieved then the territories that had been seized by Japan would then 
be regained.24  Due to Japan’s almost total reliance on imports the USN concentrated 
on the need to gain bases to permit blockade and bombardment of Japan, leading to 
her surrender. Once again it was maritime power that facilitated this. This was 
underpinned by United States sea control, which was the enabler for the blockade and 
power projection operations. 
 
 As has been established, the American led offensive in the Pacific between 
1942 and 1945 was a maritime strategy.  Immediately prior to this the threat to 
Australia in 1941 from the Japanese was maritime in nature. The Japanese never 
intended to invade Australia. Rather, they planned to isolate Australia by severing its 
strategic linkages with the United States. Once rendered strategically irrelevant and 
operationally impotent there would be no need to invade, and Australia could be 
forced to accept Japanese terms and conditions at an appropriate time in the future.25 
These plans foundered as Japan lost control of the seas. 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea, which prevented the Japanese from invading Port 
Moresby by sea, was the first sea battle in history where opposing ships never saw 
                                                 
23 Friedman, N. Seapower as Strategy, Navies and National Interests, p. 46 
24 Ibid, p. 46 
each other.  It was fought by carrier air power intrinsically as sea power in operation. 
That the USN achieved sea control, or at least prevented the Imperial Japanese Navy 
from achieving sea control, effectively saved Port Moresby on that occasion. This 
lack of sea control required the Japanese to attempt a land attack with inadequate 
logistics support over the New Guinea highlands and led to the famous battles and 
heroic Australian defence of Milne Bay and the Kokoda trail. This also led to the 
actions by the RAAF in defence of Port Moresby and the more offensive combat air 
patrols over Papua New Guinea. The indirect characteristic of maritime power, as has 
been mentioned earlier, disguised this fact. As a result, the successful defence of Port 
Moresby is not seen as a result of maritime strategy. This is rarely mentioned in the 
annals of Australian military history, and where mentioned, its true impact is 
understated. 
 
It is relevant at this stage to review briefly some of the major issues 
surrounding the operations of Allied and Japanese naval forces during the war in New 
Guinea from 1942 to 1944. This period gives a pertinent example of maritime 
strategic issues in an Australian context. It deserves this study, as it was the one 
period since Federation when Australia was threatened directly. Dr David Stevens in a 
journal article for the Australian War Memorial has provided very good evidence in 
support of the vital role of maritime strategy in the New Guinea campaign.  As part of 
this article he noted;  
 
‘The Japanese, however, had already rejected the invasion of Australia 
as being beyond their ability. Instead, before the United States could 
muster a significant response, they aimed to occupy Port Moresby and 
the southern Solomons, followed by Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. 
Having secured their resource base, the Japanese expected these 
additional operations to shore up their defensive perimeter while 
simultaneously cutting Australia’s vital communications with 
America. Isolated from its allies, Australia would thereafter be 
prevented from acting as a staging area for manpower and materiel. 
Subsequently, Australia would either be forced out of the war, or 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Tanaka, H. The Japanese Navy’s Operations against Australia in the Second World War, Journal of 
rendered harmless until a Japanese invasion could proceed at a more 
favourable time in the future. Assisted by an efficient intelligence 
system, MacArthur had an accurate understanding of Japanese 
intentions, and soon made it clear that he considered Australia’s 
security lay in Port Moresby rather than on the mainland.’26 
 
 Building on this theme, Dr David Stevens noted that with the land campaign 
underway in New Guinea, the Japanese, not unexpectedly, commenced submarine 
attacks against merchant shipping. This resulted in a convoy system being introduced 
by early 1943, which stretched from Melbourne to Darwin and the New Guinea bases. 
As Dr Stevens states; ‘Once the land campaign in New Guinea was underway, 
Australia’s role as a rearward support base came to the fore, and Allied shipping 
movements along the East Australian Coast and up to forward areas increased rapidly. 
After Coral Sea, the Japanese no longer risked surface ships south of New Guinea, 
and so their attempts to disrupt Allied communications were generally limited to what 
could be achieved by their aircraft and submarines.’27  
                                                                                                                                            
the Australian War Memorial, no 30, Apr 97, p.1 
26 Stevens, D. The Naval Campaign for New Guinea, Australian War Memorial Journal No 34, June 
2001, also citing Tanaka H., The Japanese Navy’s Operations against Australia in the Second World 
War, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no.30, April 1997, p.1. 
27 Stevens, D. The Naval Campaign for New Guinea, p.3 
 
 
FIGURE 5: MARITIME CONVOY/ RE-SUPPLY NEW GUINEA/ EAST COAST AUSTRALIA 1942-
1944 
Graphic: Sea Power Centre, Australia 
 
 As the battle for New Guinea unfolded, the Japanese continued to attempt to 
disrupt the flow of supplies. ‘Enemy aircraft maintained frequent attacks against the 
supply lines around New Guinea and across northern Australia, while submarines 
tended to operate further south. With fighting ashore concentrated along the north 
coast of New Guinea, the Allied northern supply line, and in particular, the run from 
Milne Bay to Oro Bay, assumed the greatest importance. Insufficient friendly aircraft 
were available to cover all ships on this passage.’28  By the end of 1943, naval 
authorities had allocated over sixty warships for convoy escort duties, while other 
formations remained available to provide cover. These vessels included Australian 
and Allied destroyers, corvettes and a wide assortment of smaller anti-submarine 
vessels. The period May-June 1943 saw the Japanese campaign peak with nine ships 
torpedoed over four weeks. The scale of the attack forced the Australian naval 
command to reduce the number of convoy sailings by half so that the number of 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p.5 
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escort vessels allocated to each convoy could be doubled.29 Meanwhile, the RAAF 
pressed all possible reconnaissance aircraft into service, employed three reserve 
squadrons on the escort task, and ordered training aircraft to carry weapons and keep 
a sharp lookout for submarines.30  
 
 Without wishing to get into too much detail on the New Guinea campaign it is 
vital in any investigation of Australian strategic realities to note again that history  can 
give a good indication of the future direction of conflict. After Kokoda there were no 
other northern advances across New Guinea. The movement of Allied forces was in a 
westerly direction in a series of amphibious assaults. While the Allies were able to 
protect their supplies and gain the initiative via amphibious landings thereby avoiding 
the main Japanese land forces, the Japanese themselves were systematically starved of 
reinforcements and logistical supplies.  Indeed food became very scarce for the 
Japanese troops. Again in terms which should remind Australians today of the 
importance of a balanced maritime capability, David Stevens has written that ‘the 
Imperial Japanese Navy paid only minimal attention to the problem of maintaining 
and protecting supply services. This was a critical weakness, for although Japan’s 
industrial development had rendered the nation increasingly dependent on shipping, 
her merchant marine was inadequate even for peacetime needs.’31  
 
                                                 
29 "Report by CNS on Operations" cited in Stevens, D. The Naval Campaign for New Guinea’ p. 6 
30 Odgers, G. ‘Air War Against Japan 1943-1945,’ The Official History of Australia in the War of 
1939-1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968), pp.140, 144, 148., cited in Stevens, D. The 
Naval Campaign for New Guinea, p.6 
31 Stevens, D. The Naval Campaign for New Guinea,  p.8 
 
 
FIGURE 6: ALLIED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS NEW GUINEA 1943-45 
Graphic: USGPO32 
 
 
There are numerous examples of successful interdiction of Japanese supply 
lines.  One of the best known of these is ‘The Battle of the Bismarck Sea.’  This very 
successful attack by RAAF land based air power was the result of a clear 
understanding of the vital importance that the destruction of logistics and 
reinforcements would have on the ability of the Japanese to wage a successful land 
battle. ‘Good intelligence allowed the Allies to mount a massive air attack, and in 
what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese lost all eight 
transports, four out of eight destroyers, and at least a third of their troops.’33  This 
battle was clearly a victory for air power as an element of a maritime strategy.  
However, it would be a mistake to regard it as an isolated battle.  It was significant 
mainly as part of a mature maritime strategy in which surface, sub-surface and air 
forces all combined to maintain continuous pressure on the Japanese.  In January 
1943, two months before the Battle of the Bismarck Sea the submarine, USS Wahoo 
reported that after a ten hour battle she had sunk an entire convoy of two Japanese 
                                                 
32 Reports of General MacArthur   USGPO   Washington   1966,  p135     
 
33 Ibid, p.9 
freighters, one transport and one tanker.34 This was but one example of the co-
ordinated nature of the Allied maritime strategy.  Over many months allied aircraft 
and submarines conducted attacks throughout the day and torpedo boats attacked 
shipping at night. 
 
 In summary, it has been written that although allied maritime power could not 
ultimately remove the Japanese from New Guinea, it did directly affect the course of 
events ashore. Throughout the operations, the protection and maintenance of the sea 
lines of communication were vital to the successful progress of MacArthur’s 
campaign. The simultaneous denial to the Japanese of their own supply lines meant 
that the enemy had no hope of competing with Allied ‘troopers, beans and bullets in 
greater and greater numbers.’35 Later, when the Allies had clearly established the 
capability to establish local superiority on the sea and in the air, it was possible to 
exploit this control for combined operations. Compared to overland assault, power 
could thereafter be projected at times and places chosen by the Allies and with 
remarkable speed and economy.  The Japanese, on the other hand, consistently failed 
to allocate sufficient priority to either a concentrated offensive against Allied 
shipping, or protection of their own lines of communication. Once they had lost 
control of the sea and air off the New Guinea coastline, any Japanese local superiority 
ashore could never be effectively applied. Starved of reinforcements and supplies, 
Japanese strong points were consistently neutralised, and either disposed of piecemeal 
or left to waste away. Though too often ignored by historians, the operations of naval 
forces around New Guinea were vital to the war’s outcome, providing the ‘enabling 
factor’ that allowed the campaign to be fought to its successful conclusion.36 Simply 
put, Allied maritime power rendered the Japanese useless in a strategic sense. 
 
 Building on the lessons of the New Guinea campaign, the concurrent island 
hopping operations of the Allies through the Pacific was classical maritime strategy. 
Islands were attacked because the Allies achieved sea control. Air power, both sea 
and land based, and maritime strike via bombardment were used to gain superiority 
over the area of operations until air bases could be captured and close air support 
                                                 
34 Ibid,  p.9 
35 Morrison, S.E. Breaking the Bismarck’s Barrier, History of USN Operations in World War II, vol.VI 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950, p. 448  
mounted from these by land based air power. Each element contributed to success, 
which may not have been achieved in the absence of any one layer. Sea control was 
the enabling factor that permitted the success of the Pacific campaign.  The ability of 
the United States to control the sea was contested frequently by the Japanese but from 
the Battle of Midway on, the United States managed to defeat all major attempts.   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: US MARITIME CAMPAIGN PACIFIC 1942-1945 
Graphic: USGPO 
 
However, this maritime lesson is not well understood in Australia. From the 
context of 2003 and Defence 2000 it can be ascertained that in many ways the 
strategic policy of today continues the trend in the historiography of Australia to deny 
or diminish the maritime component in any threat to Australia’s security. In the period 
of the New Guinea campaign the Australian Chief of Naval Staff was Vice Admiral 
Sir Guy Royle, RN and it was he who was responsible for the convoy system off the 
coast of Australia and the maritime operations in New Guinea. Pertinently for this 
paper, Admiral Royle wrote a personal letter to the Commander Allied Forces in the 
                                                                                                                                            
36 Stevens, D  The Naval Campaign for New Guinea ,p.10 
South-West Pacific Area (CANFSWPA), Vice-Admiral A.S. Carpenter USN, in 
February 1943 in which he expressed his ‘considerable concern’ over MacArthur’s 
policy regarding release of information to the public;  
 
‘No mention has been made of the importance that control of the 
sea has had, and is having in the New Guinea campaign or in the 
South West Pacific Area generally, and the work of our ships 
and men is passing entirely unnoticed. ...the public mind is  
becoming less and less conscious of the important role of Sea 
Power, and is acquiring an entirely erroneous standard of values.  
This is to my mind harmful to the Navy at present, and fraught 
with danger for the future.’37  
 
Based on Australia’s approach to maritime strategy, certainly in the last 20 
years, these were prophetic words indeed. 
                                                 
37 Letter Royle to Carpenter 18 Feb 43, cited in Stevens, D (ed) The Royal Australian Navy in World 
War II, Allen & Unwin, 1996, p.99 
 
Contemporary International Maritime Strategy 
 
 This paper has thus far established the maritime nature of Australia’s 
environment, investigated some classical and contemporary maritime strategic 
concepts and explored the lessons of history. However, before exploring further the 
proposal that Australia needs to implement a credible maritime strategy, it is useful to 
reflect on how some other countries, whose operations may impact Australia’s 
strategic area into the future, are responding to contemporary strategic challenges. 
 
In the post 1945 era, great power relationships and strategy were dominated by 
the Cold War, the era of nuclear deterrence involving the United States and the Soviet 
Union, brought on by mutually assured destruction. With the end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was left as the only great power.1 
Given the structure and size of its maritime forces vis-à-vis any challenges, for the 
present the United States assumes that it will have supremacy, or in maritime 
doctrinal terms, sea control, when and where it needs it.2  The United States 
presupposes that it has control of sea lines of communications, that it can project 
power ashore where and when it requires and that it can deny the use of the sea to any 
adversary, for the period of time and in the area of operations necessary to ensure 
success. This is one of the most important points to comprehend with respect to the 
use of maritime power by the United States.  Because this is backed up by economic 
and nuclear power no other nation can deny the USN the use of the sea. Because of 
this assumed sea control, the United States can implement a maritime doctrine that is 
now focused on the projection of maritime power from the sea.  
 
                                                 
1 In this sense the USA is seen as a power whose great status and influence transcends being 
hegemonic. Hegemonic (as defined in the Macquarie Dictionary) can be seen as; ‘leadership or 
predominant influence exercised by one state over others, as in a confederation.’  This presupposes a 
degree of acceptance or acquiescence by other states.  A great power on the other hand does not require 
the acceptance or acquiescence of other states or even the existence of a confederation. 
2 US Defence budget for Fiscal year 2004 is US$380billion. This exceeds the cumulative defence 
budgets of the next 20 largest defence spending countries in the world. Australia does not feature in the 
top 20. The budget for the USN and USMC for FY 04 is US$114.7billion, the USAF US$93.5billion, 
US Army US$94billion. Janes Defence Weekly, 5 February 2003 p. 8 reports that the Defence budget 
for FY 05 is likely to grow to nearly US$400billion while FY09 could see US$483.6billion spent on 
defence. 
The foundation of United States maritime operational concept is provided by 
the concept of operations forward from the sea. Forward from the sea concentrates on 
crisis management and warfare in the littoral regions of the world – those regions 
adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the 
striking power of sea-based forces. The expanding role for the USN in overseas 
presence suggests the increasing importance and likelihood of multinational naval 
cooperation. It also means that regional navies are likely to be caught up more in the 
process of facilitating or interfering with United States operations and being a link to 
the other national military services that may be less adapted to United States’ 
requirements. 
 
The latest operational concept for the USN is termed Sea Power 21. The USN 
and the US Marine Corps (USMC) under the terms of a ‘Naval Transformation 
Roadmap’ have launched this operational concept. The heading and key theme of this 
concept is ‘Power and Access…From the Sea.’ The foreword to the transformation 
document states from the United States perspective that;  
 
‘Naval forces are unique in their contribution to the nation’s 
defence.  Versatile naval expeditionary forces are the nation’s 
first responders, relied upon to influence the course of a crisis, 
control the early phases of hostilities, and set the conditions for 
decisive resolution.  America’s ability to protect its homeland, 
assure our friends and allies, and deter potential adversaries 
depends on maritime supremacy and credible projection of 
combat power.’3 
 
Under this concept there will be three core capabilities – Sea Strike, which is 
projecting offensive power; Sea Shield, which is projecting defensive power and Sea 
Basing, which is allowing US access to foreign theatres.4  When announcing this 
concept the USN Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, stated that Sea 
Strike is about projecting dominant and decisive offensive power against key enemy 
                                                 
3 England. G (Secretary of the Navy), Clark. V (Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations), Jones, J 
(General, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps), Naval Transformation Roadmap. Department of 
Defense, USA, 2002 
targets. In the transformation document this is expanded further to project decisive 
and persistent offensive power anywhere in the world and launch immediate, agile, 
and sustainable operations from the sea. Sea Strike is a broadened naval concept for 
projecting dominant and decisive offensive power from the sea in support of joint 
objectives.5    
 
Sea Shield will provide protection to the United States homeland by projecting 
defensive firepower deep overland emphasising a joint focus and a nuclear deterrence. 
The Roadmap states that Sea Shield will exploit control of the seas and forward-
deployed defensive capabilities to defeat area-denial strategies, enabling joint forces 
to project and sustain power.6  Sea Basing is about projecting sovereignty around the 
world.7 In more detail the Roadmap notes that Sea Basing will project responsive 
forces worldwide with the capability to fight and win, operate continuously from an 
expanded and secure manoeuvre area and minimise vulnerabilities tied to overseas 
land support. Sea Basing will enhance manoeuvre ashore by reducing the need to 
move in major command and control elements, heavy fire support systems, or 
logistical stockpiles.  By locating these critical functions at sea to the greatest extent 
possible, Sea Basing will provide the nation with unmatched operational freedom of 
action.8   
 
The essence of this document, and the point that is dismissed within 
Australian thinking, is the strategic independence that maritime operations provide. 
The elements of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing all build on the intellectual 
work of the classical and contemporary maritime strategists as outlined earlier in this 
paper. The whole emphasis of power and access from the sea again indicates that the 
USN considers that it has already established sea control and this allows it to conduct 
this maritime strategy. Importantly for Australia this capability involves maritime air 
power, precision strike from the sea, interdiction and sea control assets. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Koch, A. Sea Power 21 to change face of US Navy, Janes Defence Weekly, 19 June 2002, p. 3 
5 Naval Transformation Roadmap, p. 2 
6 Naval Transformation Roadmap, p. 3 
7 ADM Vernon Clark cited in Koch. A Sea Power 21 to change face of US Navy,  Janes Defence 
Weekly, 19 June 2002, p. 3 
8 Naval Transformation Roadmap, p. 4 
In the case of Britain, the basis for its maritime operational concept is short 
notice contributions to joint expeditionary campaigns in the littoral, similar to the 
Balkan conflicts and the Gulf War. The Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations, is 
the RN’s overarching document arising from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. 
This has spawned the British Future Navy Operational Concept (FNOC).  It is 
basically an expeditionary posture similar to that of the USN. Having stated this, with 
the exceptions of the period 1914 – 1918 when Britain conducted a very bloody 
continental strategy to defend France, rather than defeat Germany by utilising a 
maritime approach, and the period of the Cold War, with its emphasis within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of anti-submarine patrol requirements off 
Britain, the central core of British strategy has been expeditionary.   
 
Therefore the operational concepts that the British are espousing today should 
come as no surprise. Also, British maritime doctrine implicitly assumes that British 
forces will likely operate in concert with allies, most probably as part of a United 
States led coalition. As host nation support may not be available, the RN is seeking to 
develop its aircraft carrier capability. This reflects an understanding in Britain that sea 
control involves control of the air, which cannot be assumed if the air combat arm is 
land-based only. The need to have a harmonious linkage between strategic lift, both 
by sea and air, and sea control has been recognised by the British with their decision 
to procure two aircraft carriers equipped with the F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) for air 
dominance and power projection ashore.  
 
The FNOC has firmly linked the RN with a manoeuvrist approach to 
operations. In support of the FNOC, however, capabilities will be expressed less in 
platform terms and more in effect based terms. The concept is based on four core 
maritime capabilities. The first British maritime core capability, Power Projection, 
has two components, littoral manoeuvre and maritime strike.9 Littoral manoeuvre 
places the maritime and amphibious forces into the littoral, and maritime strike 
interdicts the land, using direct and indirect fire.  The next core capability is Global 
Reach – using the advantages associated with freedom of the seas to forward deploy. 
Optimised Access is the third core capability which means manoeuvre in the open seas 
and littoral and the last core capability is Command, Control, Computer, 
Communications, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) which is about 
knowledge superiority.10 
 
In reviewing the Russian situation, despite the break up of the Soviet Union 
and the demise of much of the operational capability of its Navy, Russia remains an 
important element of the Asia-Pacific region. When looking at Russian maritime 
operational concepts it is difficult to get much information on contemporary Russian 
maritime doctrine. However, during the era of the Soviet Union after 1945, Admiral 
Sergei Gorshkov controlled the build-up of the Soviet Navy. Dr Chipman noted in a 
1982 article on Admiral Gorshkov that he successfully challenged the conventional 
dogma that classified Russia as only a land power and supplemented this with sea 
power doctrine. Under Gorshkov’s influence, the Soviet military developed 
aspirations to dominate the maritime frontier.11 
 
Russia has the world’s longest continental maritime frontier, but doctrine 
development was constrained by three issues: ice, chokepoints and distance. Admiral 
Gorshkov designed his fleet to overcome these by using icebreakers to help open 
winter ports and long-range replenishment ships to circumvent the effects of 
chokepoints and distance.12 Soviet foreign policy also utilised foreign ports to further 
overcome all three.  Soviet naval strategy moved from defensive to assertive as the 
fleet developed.  In support of their evolving maritime strategy the Soviets had four 
basic naval missions.  The first was sea presence, which they defined as the peaceful 
use of naval ships in foreign areas. Next came sea control, which in the Soviet context 
involved anti-submarine warfare and interdiction. Third was power projection with an 
emphasis on amphibious warfare, and fourth was deterrence, which involved the use 
of ballistic missile submarines. The sea presence mission showed that nations can 
gain great benefit from maritime operations and that such operations can be extremely 
influential in peacetime. Through the use of port visits the Soviets utilised diplomatic 
leverage and this was extremely valuable, especially when combined with a Soviet 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Scott, R. To Fight and Win in 2015, Janes Navy International, Janes Information Group, Surrey, June 
2002, p.14. 
10 Ibid, p.14 
11 Chipman, D, Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy, 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1982/jul-aug/chipman.html Jul-Aug 1982. 
merchant fleet of over 1700 ships and fishing fleets of over 4000 ocean going 
vessels.13 
 
Since the break up of the Soviet Union, there appears to have been little 
change in Russian maritime doctrine. Russia’s Naval Strategy is ‘to ensure Russia’s 
military security and international authority, further its national interests in the 
world’s oceans, as well as politico-economic and defence interests and maintaining 
military- political stability at sea.’14  This is basically the sea presence, sea control and 
deterrence missions of the old Soviet Navy. Only power projection ashore 
(amphibious operations) has been reduced in emphasis. 
 
As with Britain, the French operational concept states that while France faces 
no immediate and identifiable threat, the established order further afield is volatile 
and represents a threat to the preservation of a peaceful global community and the 
safety of French and European interests. French naval strategy is focused towards the 
land. The importance of the interaction between land and sea-based environments in a 
global strategic reality involving combined operations lies at the heart of French 
maritime doctrine.15 
 
The French Navy states that French maritime forces operate to achieve three 
major objectives.  The first is deterrence and nuclear weapons remain the backbone of 
the French defence strategy. Nuclear weapons provide the threat of inflicting 
unacceptable damage on any aggressor, which threatens French vital interests.  The 
Navy and its strategic submarine force provide the main element of the French 
nuclear deterrent. The second objective is operational action. France participates in 
the preservation of world stability based on sea control at the appropriate level.  To 
protect France’s sovereign responsibilities and contribute to global security, naval 
forces are permanently pre-positioned.  A patrol is maintained in the North Atlantic, 
the focal point of French supply routes, in the Mediterranean, the link between 
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, the hub of maritime and 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Russian Navy World Wide Web Homepage - http://www.navy.ru/main-e.htm July 2002 
15 Admiral Jean-Louis Battet, Chief of Naval Staff, Foreword, French Navy World Wide Web Home 
Page, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/anglais/present/present.htm 5 Jun 2002. 
strategic communications, in the Pacific around the French territories and generally 
everywhere that France has interests that must be protected. The third objective is 
public service, which covers the major non-warfighting roles ranging from search and 
rescue, safeguarding the environment, preservation of resources, and policing 
activities within the EEZ.16 
 
The French Navy has also acknowledged the fact that while Western nations 
control the sea, maritime strategy is oriented towards the land. French maritime 
strategy emphasises the imperative of maritime air power. The eminent strategist, 
Admiral Raoul Castex who lived from 1878-1968, is quoted in the foreword to the 
French Navy homepage that; ‘The influence of sea power in world crises today 
depends on the air-ground power force that it can deploy, and this influence at the 
same time depends directly on the strength of the naval-air force that it can throw into 
the balance.’17 Admiral Castex is an important strategist as his writings and 
experiences are based on those of the twentieth century. Due to the somewhat 
traumatic experience of the French in maritime operations18 he is aware of the limits 
of naval power. His emphasis is on the importance of high technology, especially 
aircraft carriers and submarines as force multipliers, and he notes throughout his 
writings that this is required even more so for smaller sea powers. This for France 
underpins that nation’s expeditionary warfare or power projection capability. 
 
There is much contained within the operational concepts of the United States, 
Britain, Russia and France which should be of direct relevance to Australia. In 
analysing parallels with Australia, the United States’ emphasis is on versatile naval 
forces as the nation’s first response. These can be relied upon to influence the course 
of a crisis, control the early phases of hostilities, and set the conditions for decisive 
resolution.  The renewed British emphasis on expeditionary warfare reflects a nation 
with no land borders, which desires to deflect and diffuse conflicts far from home.  
Russia, despite current financial problems still places emphasis on the requirement for 
maritime power to promote international authority and further its national interests in 
                                                 
16 Ibid 5 Jun 2002. 
17 Admiral Castex, cited in Foreword, French Navy World Wide Web Home Page, 5 Jun 2002. 
18  Despite some successes in the 18th century, particularly in the West Indies, and off the fledgling 
USA, the Napoleonic War period was disastrous. Their has been limited opportunity ever since.  The 
the world’s oceans.  Finally France places great emphasis on the importance of high 
technology such as aircraft carriers and submarines as force multipliers, which is 
stressed as even more influential for smaller sea powers. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
destruction of much of the remaining French Fleet by the RN in 1940 to prevent it falling into German 
hands at the surrender of France was also a low point. 
 
Contemporary Regional Maritime Strategy 
 
Having reviewed the maritime operational concepts of the one remaining 
super power and three other significant powers, it is useful to reflect on regional 
maritime doctrine. Asian navies appear less influenced by the power projection 
considerations that are driving doctrine in the major Western navies. Although 
obviously a factor of size and capability, these nations concentrate more closely on 
the basics of economic and national survival. The concerns of coastal states such as 
Malaysia and Singapore, as examples, are more with coastal patrol and local trade 
protection operations. The Republic of Singapore Navy stresses the defence of 
Singapore against sea-borne threats and the protection of shipping that encompass the 
Singapore Straits and its access routes.1 The Royal Malaysian Navy focuses on 
territorial integrity, national sovereignty and resource protection.2 
 
Japan, China and India as cases in point are more focused on achieving sea 
control, perhaps at some distance. This reflects the blue water nature of their sea lines 
of communications and means that the security of these routes is also given great 
emphasis. This consideration is a reflection of the importance of seaborne trade in the 
region and the dependence of Northeast Asian countries, in particular, on energy 
imports by sea. Other factors influencing maritime doctrine in East Asia include the 
situation in the South China Sea and other disputes over offshore islands; possible 
conflict between China and Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula; Chinese naval 
expansion; and finally, lingering concern over the long-term commitment of the 
United States to the security of the region. 
 
With respect to China it is relevant that to date China historically has viewed 
the sea as an invasion route by foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for 
achieving national goals.  This attitude has appeared to change over the past decade or 
so and China’s post-Cold War focus is on offshore sovereignty, economic matters and 
resource issues. The fall of the Soviet Union removed or significantly reduced a 
significant continental land threat from China’s northern and western borders. This 
                                                 
1 Republic of Singapore Navy Web-Site, 5 June 2002, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/navy/ 
2 Royal Malaysian Navy Web Site, 6 June 2002, maf.mod.gov.my/english/navy/homepage/  
has permitted the Chinese to explore the potential of a more maritime approach to 
regional strategic issues. This in turn, has meant an evolutionary shift from its static 
coastal defence role (brown-water navy) to an offensive offshore active defence, 
whereby it will be used for both tactical and strategic purposes in asserting Chinese 
influence and in protecting territorial and economic interests, using force if necessary.  
 
Strategic analysts have forecast that this offshore active defence strategy is 
planned in two phases.3 They state that Chinese naval strategic planners are aiming to 
achieve a so-called 'green water' capability between 2002-2010. This means being 
able to operate out to the 'first-island chain' of Japan, the Senkaku islands, Taiwan and 
the west coast of Borneo. China’s doctrine emphasises defence in depth and in line 
with this the objective is to defend all China’s claimed offshore territories, including 
the Spratly (Nansha) Islands out to an effective operational range of approximately 
430 nautical miles.4 
 
By 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) hopes to have extended 
its operational capability further out to the 'second-island chain' (Kuriles in the north, 
the Bonin and Marina islands, and Papua New Guinea to the south). With such plans, 
the assumption is that a true-blue water capability will be achieved by 2050.5  By 
then, doctrine may shift from an 'active forward defence' to an 'active forward 
deployment' scenario, with the possibility of one or more naval bases on foreign 
shores. China is also increasingly concerned about its dependence on energy imports 
and the security of its sea lines of communications. These considerations partly 
explain its longer-term interest in a two ocean navy – the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
 
 Japan presents as an undeveloped or incomplete maritime power due in a large 
part to the complications posed by the renunciation of war in the Constitution. Article 
Nine of the Japanese Constitution states: 
 
                                                 
3 “Navy Profile – Chinese Military Strategy and its Maritime Aspects,” Naval Forces, Vol. XX,, 11/99, 
4 “Navy Profile – Chinese Military Strategy and its Maritime Aspects,” Naval Forces, Vol. XX,, 11/99, 
p. 16. 
5 Mazumdar, M. & Levick, G. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) The Future Fleet of 2050, 
www.china-defense.com/plan/plan2050/plan2050-2.html 
‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognised.’6 
 
 As the right to self-defence is not prohibited, Japan maintains self-defence 
forces, and to date the roles of these are purely oriented to self-defence. Some 
weapons such as inter-continental ballistic missiles, bombers and aircraft carriers are 
prohibited and military deployments to the sea, land and air spaces of other nations 
for the purpose of ‘using force’7 are also not permitted. The basic precepts of 
Japanese policy is to be purely defensive, not to become a military power and to not 
possess, produce or permit nuclear weapons in Japan.  
 
The definition of ‘self-defence,’ as understood by the Japanese, has been 
interpreted to mean in essence that Japan can only respond militarily to a direct attack 
on Japan. The basic defence policy was proclaimed in 1957. It states that the objective 
of national defence is; ‘To prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to 
repel such aggression, thereby preserving the sovereignty and peace of Japan based 
upon democracy.’8  It is a continentalist approach to the defence of a maritime nation. 
The Japanese have since 1945 relied on the United States alliance for the maritime 
aspects of their security at distance from Japan. Despite this, and also the severe 
limitations that the Constitution imposes, Japan has a significant maritime capability. 
Recently Japanese destroyers and supply ship have conducted logistics and support 
missions as far afield as the Indian Ocean.9 
 
                                                 
6 Constitution of Japan, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Web Page. 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm, 14 March 2003. 
7 Government View on Purport of Article 9 of Constitution; http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm 
8 The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defence Policy, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm 
9 The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defence Policy http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm, 14 March 2003 
In the case of India, as with China, it may be considered as a latent 
predominant Asian power. From the 1970’s India’s naval operational concepts 
developed as the:  
 
‘Protection of the Indian coast, offshore facilities, and merchant 
shipping; The neutralisation or destruction of the Pakistan fleet in the 
event of renewed hostilities, in order to establish a blockade of Pakistan 
and allow action against that country’s coastline and economic zone 
assets; Protection of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands against 
incursions; Denial to any foreign force the ability to operate effectively 
against Indian interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone; and to a lesser 
extent demonstration and enforcement of Indian interests within the 
country’s area of strategic influence.’10  
 
The Indian Navy (IN) has developed from these responsibilities. It is now the 
largest navy of the states bordering the Indian Ocean. India is a leading advocate of 
the position that the resources of the Indian Ocean should only be exploited by states 
that border the Indian Ocean. The IN is building a ‘powerful force-projection 
capability, which will be used to increase Indian influence against China in Southeast 
Asia.’11 This indicates that India now is able to concentrate a little more on maritime 
strategic issues because the reality of nuclear deterrence, with Pakistan, India and 
China all possessing nuclear weapons, has reduced the threat of a traditional 
continental war.12 For Australia this final point is pertinent. With no land border 
Australia is extremely unlikely to fight a continental war on mainland Australia unless 
its sea, air and expeditionary land forces are destroyed first. From the perspective of 
Defence 2000 and the Defence Update 2003, however, not enough is made of the 
geographic advantages that Australia enjoys over countries such as India who contend 
daily with disputes, infractions and complications that an extended land border bring. 
 
                                                 
10 Goldrick, J. No Easy Answers, The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sir 
Lanka 1945 – 1996, , Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No 2, Lancer Publishers, New Dehli, 
1997, pp. 115-116 
11 Farrer, M. India Moving to Dominate Indian Ocean, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter June 2002, p.34 
12 Ibid, p. 34 
In reviewing the development of India’s navy, its continued insistence on 
maintaining a maritime air power component,13 its desire to gain nuclear attack 
submarines, and its very capable surface combatant force, including air warfare 
destroyers, would indicate that India is intent on gaining a capability to achieve sea 
control, rather than merely a sea denial capability.  As has been stated earlier in this 
paper, sea control is an essential pre-requisite before power projection activities and 
sea lines of communications protection can be assured.  India, it would appear, 
understands the role of maritime strategy precisely. 
                                                 
13 Reporting in Defense News Sep 2002 indicates that India is intending to acquire two Air Defense 
Ships (aircraft carriers) of around 37000 tonnes by 2020 to replace its one current aircraft carrier.  
These vessels will be built indigenously and will carry a range of air dominance, air/surface 
surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft. 
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Recent Maritime Operations and Realities 
 
Having reviewed some contemporary maritime strategies and already 
examined Australian doctrine, maritime operations in recent times can be better 
understood. Although largely ignored by the world’s press, the multi-national naval 
operations against Iraq in the Persian Gulf area in 1990 - 1991, were significant and 
contributed greatly to the coalition victory.  Naval forces facilitated an immediate 
diplomatic and political response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by economic 
blockade, as well as providing the initial air defence of Saudi Arabia from USN 
carriers. They then utilised strategic sealift to transport the vast majority of land 
forces and their equipment to the area of operations. They then provided significant 
naval gunfire support and offensive strike via carrier borne aircraft and cruise missile 
attack against Iraqi military installations and positions.  At the height of the conflict 
six aircraft carriers (including two in the Red Sea), two battleships, 15 cruisers, 67 
destroyers and frigates and over 100 logistics, amphibious and smaller craft were 
involved. These forces were drawn from 15 nations and deployed more than 800 
rotary and fixed wing aircraft. 1      
 
 The Iraqi navy consisted of brown water units, supplemented by captured 
Kuwaiti patrol boats.   In the early days of the war they made only tentative forays 
and were subjected to air and surface attacks.  They played no meaningful part in the 
conflict and were attacked, harassed and destroyed by allied forces with relative 
impunity.  Some 138 vessels of all types were assessed as sunk or being rendered 
non- - mission capable.2   Despite the threat of floating mines, Allied control of the 
sea was absolute, with the economic blockade being implemented against Iraqi 
maritime trade.  In addition to the success of the strategic strike from the sea, the 
threat of amphibious attack caused consternation to the Iraqi command and resulted 
in significant Iraqi forces being retained in Kuwait itself, rather than being moved to 
face the Allied land offensive when it began.   
                                                 
1 CTG 627.4 Operation Damask Report  (Unclassified),  Apr 91,  p.4 
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 The Gulf War was an excellent example of the contribution that maritime 
units and maritime power can make.  The roles and tasks of maritime surveillance, 
maritime patrol and response, protection of offshore territories and resources, 
intelligence collection and evaluation, protection of shipping, strategic strike and 
operations in support of land forces,3 were all executed by the Allied navies in and 
around the Persian Gulf.  The ability of countries to project military and diplomatic 
force via a maritime capability was abundantly demonstrated in the Gulf War.     
 
 It must also be remembered that during the period of Operation Desert Shield, 
prior to hostilities, a small force of USN, RAN and RN destroyers and frigates was 
forward deployed in close proximity to Kuwait and Iraq.   The capabilities of these 
units, supported by the integrated air power of USN carriers at that stage in close 
support in the Gulf of Oman, rendered the Iraqi forces powerless to interdict or 
respond.  The critical importance of this is emphasised even further when the 
geographic features of the Persian Gulf are taken into account.   The Persian Gulf is a 
virtually landlocked body of water approximately 500 nautical miles long and 200 
nautical miles wide throughout its entire length.  In Operation Desert Shield, a period 
of extremely high tension when an Iraqi pre-emptive strike was considered very 
probable, technologically advanced maritime forces were able to offensively operate 
close to Iraq whilst monitoring and tracking Iraqi F1 Mirage aircraft by radar.  This 
despite geographically imposed limitations in manoeuvrability, the proximity to 
potentially hostile countries, the constant threat of mines and a real threat from a 
capable Iraqi air force of some 1315 aircraft, including 83 Mirage F1 EQ5/EQ6 
variants armed with air to surface Exocet missiles.4 
 
 The failure of Iraq to intervene in an effective manner with the maritime 
strategic operations of the Allies once Operation Desert Storm commenced stemmed 
from their lack of an operational concept, joint doctrine, lack of third party over the 
horizon targeting and loss of command, control and communications at the 
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3 Bateman, S & Sherwood, D  Concepts of Australian Maritime Operations,  cited in LCDR P. Ong, 
RAN Policing Duties: Coastguard or Navy., Australian Defence Force Journal, N0 117 Mar/Apr 96,  
pp. 19-20 
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commencement of operations.  Iraq’s strategic posture was understandably 
continentalist. Despite relatively modern missile boats being captured from the 
Kuwaiti navy, the only real maritime interdiction capability was that of the Iraqi 
airforce via its Mirage F1 aircraft and Super-Puma helicopters, both armed with the 
Exocet missile.  As with the naval elements, lack of targeting ability, identification 
ability and the effectiveness of the Allied air and sea-based assault on airbases, 
communications and command links severely limited the combat effectiveness of the 
Iraqi air force very soon after the commencement of Desert Storm itself. Indeed early 
on in the conflict the few remaining serviceable aircraft, those that had not been 
destroyed on land or in the air, were tracked on sea-borne radars flying to Iran for 
safety. 
 
 The Gulf War reinforced the lessons of other recent operations, such as the 
Falklands War of 1982.  The Falklands War illustrated the flexibility of a maritime 
strategy.  The RN ships utilised in the Falklands War were designed primarily for 
anti-submarine warfare in the northern Atlantic and sea approaches to the United 
Kingdom.5 With few modifications they successfully executed a sea control, power 
projection and sea denial strategy at a distance of some 8000 nautical miles from 
Britain.  The distances involved also had the advantages in some ways of allowing a 
graduated use of force, time for diplomacy and psychological influences to play upon 
the Argentinian forces and permitted time for the British to assemble a task force. 
This was the ultimate form of expeditionary warfare and it culminated in a classic 
British use of the indirect manoeuvrist approach to warfare with an assault where the 
Argentinian forces did not expect one – at San Carlos waters and not the capital Port 
Stanley itself. The land attack then commenced its advance towards Port Stanley 
against an entrenched enemy that enjoyed relatively short supply lines and limited 
land based air support.   
 
The casualties suffered by ships and troops close to the Falkland Islands 
could have led to an Argentinian victory had the British not understood the need to 
gain sea control as the necessary pre-requisite to amphibious/power projection 
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operations. The operation would have been impossible without organic sea based air 
power, which was provided in this case by Sea Harrier aircraft from HM Ships 
Invincible and Hermes. Land based bombers did attack the Port Stanley airfield in 
failed attempts to render the runway unusable by the Argentinian air force, but the 
tyranny of distance meant that close air support had to be provided from the sea. Due 
to the distances involved Argentinian land-based air power was ineffective, despite 
some heroic attempts by Argentinian pilots, in attempting to prevent the British 
amphibious operation from proceeding. The British in the Falklands War gained sea 
control and power was projected ashore only because control of the air was 
established from the sea. Air warfare capable surface combatants and combat aircraft 
achieved this. 
 
 Indeed the lesson that the Falklands War was a ‘close run thing’ was learnt by 
the British and, as mentioned previously, an organic maritime air power capability 
was retained. In fact in the 20 years since the Falklands War, this decision has been 
vindicated time and time again, most recently in operations off the coast of the 
Balkans. Due to the often proven flexibility and adaptability of sea based air power 
in operations of the last 12 years, and despite some budgetary pressures, the British 
are planning to build new aircraft carriers, with a much greater capability than that of 
the Invincible class.   
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FIGURE 8: ROYAL NAVY FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
Graphic: BBC Online News 30 Jan 03 
 
So profound has been their experience that the British appreciate that maritime 
force brings key enabling capabilities such as sustainment through a sea base. The 
quote; ‘this last enabler allows reduced dependency on host nation support and 
minimises the logistics footprint ashore in potentially hostile environments,’ 6 is borne 
of lessons learnt over the last 200 plus years. In reality this ‘new’ approach is nothing 
more than commonsense maritime strategy in operation. This is a major about turn 
from the continentalist policy that was becoming prevalent in British defence circles 
immediately prior to 1982. Again this ‘new’ commonsense should be observed 
closely by Australia.   
 
For Australia, the need to achieve sea control before conducting expeditionary 
operations at any level was evidenced in the East Timor operation of 1999, Operation 
Stabilise.  The International Force East Timor, which began in September 1999, was 
expeditionary by nature. It was maritime strategy in operation.  First control of the sea 
had to be assured and then the amphibious and logistical sealift nature of the operation 
could commence.  The Commander of the operation, then Major General Cosgrove, 
stated in his Anzac lecture at Georgetown University in April 2000 that there was a 
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tremendous range of direct military experiences and lessons to be learned from 
Operation Stabilise. One well quoted passage in this address was that;  
 
‘another military blinding glimpse of the obvious is the utility of 
sea power in the East Timor operation. The persuasive, 
intimidatory or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me 
as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to 
have ‘add-on’ but an important indicator to all of us who relied 
on sea lifelines. It was a classic case of the ‘presence’ pillar of 
sea power.’7   
 
This powerful vindication of sea power for the East Timor operation could be 
considered understated as sea power was in fact more than the ‘presence pillar’. It was 
the enabler of the operation itself.  At the commencement of the operation it was 
Australian surface combatants demonstrating national resolve towards Indonesian 
naval units which gained Australia the necessary sea control to enable the land 
operation.  After gaining sea control the vast majority of logistics support to forces 
ashore was supplied via sea.  
 
Dr Norman Friedman re-iterates this noting that;  
 
‘The Royal Australian Navy made possible the Australian Army 
operation in East Timor in 1999. Without shipping little could have been 
done. If the Australians had encountered opposition at the outset, only 
the Navy would have been in any position to fire back. Effective air 
support could not have been provided from bases in Australia because 
the transit time to the battle area would have precluded any sort of quick 
reaction. Bases on the scene could not have been seized without naval 
support. Such considerations presumably made in the absence of heavy 
gun capability and any sort of floating air base (i.e. carrier) a matter of 
considerable concern for the Australian Army going ashore.’8 
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Even when examining the events arising from the terrorist attack on the United 
States on 11 September 2001 it must be recognised that a significant portion of the 
response from the United States has been by use of a maritime strategy. The United 
States’ reaction to events of 11 September 2001, the implementation of the attack on 
Afghanistan and operations in the Persian Gulf are all evidence of a robust maritime 
strategy in operation. The events of 11 September should not entail less of an 
emphasis on maritime strategy for Australia. Rather astute commentators should 
observe that a significant element of Australia’s response has been to implement to 
some degree maritime strategy by continuing the rolling deployments of surface ships 
to Persian Gulf operations, which has occurred since 1990.  
 
Indeed the RAN has been active in the Persian Gulf for 13 years, something 
that is habitually overlooked by strategic analysts.  As Australian Maritime Doctrine 
notes, ‘some of the activities which take place in maritime conflict may only be 
indirectly linked with effects on the shore but, sooner or later, that link is established 
and a terrestrial result accomplished.’9  Indeed building on this is the fact that the 
inherent flexibility of sea power is in many ways an effective antidote to the multi-
level threat of terrorism and other forms of asymmetrical warfare.  This is because the 
proper use of power projection from the sea can be an effective form of asymmetric 
warfare itself. An adversary does not have the certainty of knowing where forces from 
the sea are based, where they may strike, how they may be employed and what their 
operational range is. Intelligence information on issues such as force numbers, type, 
operational cycles and launch times is also harder to obtain when the threat is from 
the sea than when it is from a fixed land base. 
 
In support of the delivery of force from the sea the great advantage of 
maritime power projection is its pervasive presence and deterrence effects. Maritime 
power projection can take the form of the landing of amphibious or Special Forces or 
the delivery of seaborne land forces, or bombardment by guided or unguided weapons 
from seaborne platforms or the provision of air power from seaborne platforms.  
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The delivery of force from the sea is maritime power projection. When 
examining the use of air power in a maritime environment and the role of surface 
combatants in sea control and power projection, a good understanding of the 
advantage of surface ship launched precision-guided munitions and the use of mobile 
organic sea based air power is required. Power projection from surface platforms 
possesses all the advantages of poise, persistence, adaptability, ambiguity and access. 
Surface platforms do not have the concerns that submarines have of remaining 
stealthy. Stealth is the submarine’s greatest protection.  Once located a submarine, 
particularly a diesel-electric submarine, is at great risk. In addition, given the reality 
and vagaries of submarine operations, communications with submarines can not be 
depended upon. In all probability there will be a fundamental requirement for 
unimpeded two-way communications to and from the launch platform and the shore 
headquarters, up to the moment before launch of a precision strike weapon. This 
requirement may even extend to the duration of the flight of the weapon itself. This 
requirement will be even more important should the diplomatic situation impose any 
Government concern at unintended civilian casualties that could result from a 
targeting error.  
 
Contemporary maritime operations confirm maritime doctrine and reflect 
Australia’s maritime environment in demonstrating the requirement for a viable and 
layered maritime combatant force.  This force must be able to execute the required sea 
control functions, but additionally it must be capable in precision shore strike. 
Precision strike from surface ships is a significant element of the United States’ 
strategy, yet this cost effective capability has had little exposure or debate in 
Australia. Additionally organic sea based air power not only provides flexibility in 
projecting air power ashore but also provides platforms capable of performing 
forward basing functions, at least until shore facilities are captured, rendered safe and 
repaired. As of 2003, there are significant limitations in Australia’s maritime 
capability, which would limit Australia’s ability to execute this sea control and power 
projection function, even with an enhanced strategic sealift and airlift capability. 
 
Australian Strategic Issues 
 
At present one of the major problems with a credible maritime strategy is one 
of terminology and understanding. One aspect that needs an explanation for strategic 
concepts in Australia to be understood is exactly what is meant by the term maritime. 
‘Maritimeness’ in the Australian context needs be seen as truly national, involving the 
military, government and commercial entities. Sea power, aerospace power and land 
power, together with the larger national issues all create a maritime strategy.  The 
army fighting in New Guinea, conducting manoeuvre operations in the littoral 
environment is a maritime strategy.  The RAAF operating from fixed bases and 
conducting operations in support of sea control and its enabling factors such as 
protection of sea lines of communications and power projection is a maritime 
strategy.  The RAN conducting combat operations at sea, combat operations from the 
sea and peacetime maritime tasking is also maritime strategy.  This approach is not a 
threat to the existence or structures any of the armed forces, rather it needs to be 
viewed as an enabler for Australia. This is so because Australia is an island.  
 
Despite being downplayed in the Defence Update 2003,1 the current 
significant white paper, Defence 2000, states that the priority task for the ADF is the 
Defence of Australia. It further states that Australia’s approach is shaped by three 
principles.  First, Australia must be able to defend itself without relying on the combat 
forces of other countries – self-reliance.  Second, Australia needs to be able to control 
the air and sea approaches to the continent – a maritime strategy.  Third, although 
Australia’s strategic posture is defensive, Australia would seek to attack hostile forces 
as far from our shores as possible – pro-active operations.2   
 
Operations in East Timor from 1999 and operations off Afghanistan and in the 
Persian Gulf subsequent to the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001 
would indicate that in addition to the above tasks the role of the ADF in expeditionary 
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warfare may well increase. Comments by the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert 
Hill tend to support this view.3  This emphasis on forward engagement was 
formalised to some degree in Defence Update 2003. This document reflected the 
Government’s response to global terrorism. It stated that, ‘These new circumstances 
indicate a need for some rebalancing of capabilities and priorities to take account of 
the new strategic environment, changes which will ensure a more flexible and mobile 
force, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve outcomes in the 
national interest.’4 This is in contrast to the strategic thought that existed in Australia 
in the 1980s for example, when previous important capability decisions relating to 
maritime air power were made. Nevertheless, even before the events of 2001, Defence 
2000 indicated that expeditionary warfare was a likely scenario, with Australia’s 
strategic objectives including the requirement to contribute to maintaining strategic 
stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region.5  
 
In addition, Defence 2000 states that the capability priority for the ADF is 
firstly to maintain maritime capabilities – mostly naval and air forces to defend the 
sea-air approaches and also have the ability to support Australian forces deployed in 
the region and coalition operations in higher intensity conflicts. 6 However, this 
cannot be achieved without power projection ashore and close air support. The second 
capability priority is maintaining land forces – including the air and naval assets 
needed to deploy and protect them.7  This would appear on first reading to support the 
stated maritime strategic primacy for Australia, however, it is in the area of executing 
these forms of operations, projecting power ashore and then supporting deployed 
Australian forces that there is a gap.  This gap involves the lack of in-theatre maritime 
air power and air warfare and precision land attack capable surface combatants. This 
gap does not appear to be recognised either in the Defence Update 2003. That report 
concludes by emphasising interoperability with allies, specifically via programmes 
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6 Ibid, pp 53-54. 
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such as the JSF, AEW&C and submarines.8 The need for surface combatants and sea 
control is not mentioned at all. 
 
Defence 2000 states:  
 
‘The key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea 
approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships 
and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our 
forces. That means we need a fundamentally maritime strategy. 
Our strategic geography, our relatively small population and our 
comparative advantage in a range of technologies all dictate that 
our defence should focus on our air and sea approaches.’9  
 
Defence 2000 then mentions the land forces necessary to defeat any incursions 
into Australia. In the next section on proactive operations, Defence 2000 notes that 
although Australia’s strategic posture is defensive, if attacked,  
 
‘Australia would take a highly proactive approach…seek to 
attack hostile forces as far from our shores as possible, including 
their home bases, forward operating bases and in transit. We 
would aim to seize the initiative and dictate the pace, location 
and intensity of operations.’10  
 
This is further emphasised in Defence Update 2003, which noted that, ‘ADF 
involvement in coalition operations further afield is somewhat more likely than in the 
recent past.’11 
 
Despite the stated aim to be pro-active, when viewed from the perspective of 
both classical and contemporary maritime strategists, the claims in Defence 2000 that 
Australia’s strategy is ‘fundamentally maritime’ and the expeditionary emphasis in 
Defence Update 2003 need to be critically examined. As already noted and explained 
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Australia is a maritime nation, in a maritime environment. Observing the capability 
gap in providing support to deployed forces, Australia’s military strategy is not in 
reality maritime in nature. Sea control is not afforded the emphasis and prominence 
that a purported maritime strategy should give it. Thus Australia’s maritime strategy 
does not carry any great weight. Perhaps, realistically, given the current and planned 
force structure Australia has a capability to conduct maritime tasks such as sea denial 
close to the Australian mainland and not the sea control function that underpins a truly 
maritime strategic posture.  This is a vital issue.  
 
The strategy of Defence of Australia in Defence 2000 can perhaps be 
categorised more properly as a continental approach in philosophy and emphasis. It 
refers almost solely to the exercise of land based military power, rather than more 
indirect scenarios. It has similarities to those continentally based nations which have a 
coastline, but which also need to structure forces, especially their air forces, for 
conflict over a land border. These nations usually seek to project air power and 
maintain some degree of air control out to about 200 to 300 nautical miles from their 
major air bases, with an ability to conduct some strategic strike missions at longer 
range.  Limited by fixed land bases located within continental Australia, and the geo-
strategic realities of the Asia-Pacific environment, this is in reality all Australia can 
do. This does not constitute a maritime strategy.  This should not be of surprise as the 
history of the development of the ADF since Federation, and the national and public 
focus on defence issues, has tended to be inward looking and continental in context. 
 
In contrast, Defence Update 2003 does focus on a more global role, however, 
it does this to an extent that is almost to the detriment of the nearer region. In doing 
this, the maritime environment and realities are ignored and the perspective of the 
document is predominantly on the development of ‘niche capabilities,’12 perceived as 
useful in response to the threat of terrorism. 
 
When looking beyond Defence Update 2003 and concentrating on the pattern 
of continuity in Australian strategy, certainly since the 1986 Dibb Review, the 
continued focus on land based air forces, configured to conduct a continental strategy, 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Defence Update 2003, p. 23 
needs to be reviewed. Australia gains certainty and stability from the fact that much of 
its inherent security comes from having no land borders, a situation that only a few 
select nations can claim. Australians should not view the challenge of a long coastline 
and sparse population as a strategic problem.  Rather it should be viewed as a strategic 
bonus.  If Australia develops forces that are truly maritime in nature, the problems for 
any adversary looking to attack Australia or its interests would be compounded. This 
in the Australian context is not well understood. Indeed in many ways it is ignored.  
 
The former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Shackleton stated in April 2002 that;  
 
‘Yet, although Australian history cannot be understood 
effectively without constant reference to the sea and the tyranny 
of distance, Australians strangely remain a continentally 
oriented society, where the bush and its folklore dominate the 
central theme of nationhood…..That Australian military 
experiences in general, and our formative Naval history in 
particular, has tended to result in the Navy’s involvement in 
shaping Australia’s security being somewhat understated; Navy 
is the ‘Silent Service’.13  
 
He further noted that; ‘The Navy must become less of a ‘Silent Service’ – and 
be able to articulate its case amongst the many competing pressures that Australia 
faces as a nation.’14  Although Vice Admiral Shackleton in this section was referring 
mainly to Navy’s place and standing in the Australian community, there is an 
underlying theme that in strategic terms and force capability planning a vigorous 
debate is required.  
 
When viewed in this perspective, even given resource constraints within the 
Defence budget, the somewhat diffident nature of the emphasis on maritime affairs in 
both Defence 2000 and Defence Update 2003, cannot be understood. A true maritime 
strategic capability for Australia would build on a blue-water, open ocean sea control 
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and power projection capability. Australia does not have this capability and is thus 
constrained to a large extent in any open ocean scenario. Of the nations in the Asia-
Pacific region it should be of interest to Australia that India does have this capability 
and China is seeking to develop it.  Neither of these nations is as inherently maritime 
as is Australia in a geo-strategic sense. 
 
A maritime approach to war also has as its advantage the use of manoeuvre 
warfare rather than attrition based warfare. This approach was used successfully in the 
first instance by the Japanese in Malaya in 1941/42 and then by the Australians in 
New Guinea operations. In support of this Corbett also emphasised the power of 
manoeuvre, noting that the essence of defence is mobility.15  Maritime forces are 
ideally suited to this approach. This is the very basis of credible deterrence and 
defence.  By denying the enemy the initiative, by possessing the means for decisive 
strike, by exercising the option of strategic surprise, true maritime capability is 
justified.  Later in his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett notes;  
 
‘In criticising the maritime history of France we must be careful 
to distinguish policy from strategy.  It was not always the 
defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned 
her Admirals to negative operations. Seeing that she was a 
continental power with continental aspirations, it was often a 
policy from which her military exigencies permitted no 
escape.’16  
 
This observation is also particularly relevant to Australia in 2003, given the 
shaping of defence capability. 
 
Looking more broadly at strategic issues, and leaving aside the minor 
amendments in Defence Update 2003, Australia’s strategic interests as defined in 
Defence 200017 are: Protection of Australia’s direct maritime approaches from 
intrusion by hostile forces; Support for protection of the stability and cohesion of 
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neighbouring countries from internal challenges and external aggression; Prevention 
of the intrusion of potentially hostile powers and resolving peacefully any problems 
that may arise between countries in the region; Avoidance of de-stabilising strategic 
competition between the region’s major powers, and preserving a security 
environment in which the region’s economic development can proceed unhindered by 
threats to trade; Prevention of the rise of a dominant regional power with interests 
inimical to Australia’s; Safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the nations in the 
nearer region, especially maritime Southeast Asia; Prevention of the positioning in 
neighbouring states of foreign forces that might be used to attack Australia; and 
Prevention of regional WMD proliferation. The implementation of these strategic 
interests requires Australian credible diplomatic and military involvement in the 
region itself, not merely on mainland Australia or in the sea and air approaches. 
 
 To execute these strategic issues Defence 2000 describes a range of strategic 
tasks ranked in priority order. Priority one is Defending Australia and its Direct 
Approaches (DA).18 This recognises the fundamental responsibility that exists to 
ensure the defence of Australia as a sovereign state and to protect its people, territory 
and interests from menace. The second priority in the strategic tasks is for military 
forces to Contribute to the Security of the Immediate Neighbourhood (CSIN).19 
Defence 2000 states that this task recognises the important priority of the immediate 
region to Australia’s security and contemplates fostering its security or a significant 
military response if threats develop within it. Next is Supporting Wider Interests 
(SWI),20 which is Australia’s third priority and is explained as demonstrating 
Australia’s commitment to regional and global stability. It means that Australia wants 
to promote stability and cooperation closer to home and support strategic stability and 
security more widely. Accordingly, Australian military contributions and actions 
would be strongly influenced by responsibilities and interests in the region. In 
addition to these core tasks, Defence 2000 states that the ADF will also undertake 
what is known as Peacetime National Tasks (PNT).21 This acknowledges that the 
ADF will, because of its expertise and specialised capability, be called on to 
undertake tasks in the national interest under whole-of-government or inter-agency 
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arrangements. These include tasks such as border protection, counter-terrorist 
operations, maritime search and rescue and disaster relief. 
 
 Defence 2000 specifically acknowledges that a maritime strategy is involved 
with the DA task.22 Noting the characteristics of maritime forces and their efficacy in 
operations other than war, notably in diplomatic and constabulary tasks23 a credible 
maritime capability would also be of invaluable use to Australia in ensuring that the 
strategic tasks of CSIN, SWI and PNT are effective. For example the CSIN role is 
derived from Government’s desire that Australia would want to be in a position, if 
asked, to help its neighbours protect themselves against unprovoked armed 
aggression, to help ameliorate the effects of a natural disaster, or to help and support 
them against other internal challenges to their stability. SWI has a similar emphasis. 
Operations would be conducted predominantly in coalition, most probably in a UN-
sanctioned regional or international coalition. As the region is maritime if Australia 
wishes to be prepared to be the largest force contributor for the CSIN task, and if 
appropriate take a leadership role, maritime issues especially sea control and power 
projection will be fundamental, not only as the enabler but as an essential pre-
requisite.  
 
When reviewing the strategic interests and tasks listed in Defence 2000, even 
with a good appreciation of the realities of budget restrictions, the fundamental 
precept of self-reliance24 is not being met in a maritime strategic sense. The current 
and future structure of the ADF means Australia will not achieve the capability to 
influence the maritime areas off the continent other than in coalition. Therefore in 
many circumstances, Australia may be restricted in DA, CSIN, SWI and PNT tasks to 
the direct and immediate approaches to continental Australia. Defence Update 2003, 
published as a response to the prominence of global terrorism in the last two years, 
does amplify the importance of expeditionary warfare for Australia. Although terms 
such as CSIN and SWI do not appear in the update, there is an implicit and increased 
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emphasis on such tasks.  However, the maritime dimension continues to be 
marginalised. 
 
Having examined contemporary maritime thought from countries such as the 
United States, Britain and China amongst others, it is important to acknowledge that 
in an attempt to respond in a pro-active manner to Defence 2000 the RAN has 
produced its own future operational concept. Called the Future Maritime Operational 
Concept (FMOC) it is an effort to delineate the requirements for the maritime force of 
the future and to define the manner in which these forces will be operated and 
supported.25 These are excellent documents, which provide a good basis for testing 
force capability options in experimentation of the proposed maritime components.  
This includes components such as equipment, personnel, training, tactics, doctrine, 
logistics, organisation and facilities.26 As official defence documents both FMOCs are 
centred on guidance provided in documents such as Defence 2000, Australia’s 
Military Strategy (AMS 2001) and Force 2020.27  
 
FMOC 2020, Maritime Shaping & Control, is the manuscript which seeks to 
explore the future naval requirement that meets the underlying Defence 2000 strategic 
tasks. Because it is responsive to Defence 2000 it contends that; ‘to be able to 
effectively contribute to the ADF’s mission in 2020, the ADF maritime forces must be 
able to project power (including strike) and exert control within the maritime 
approaches.’28 In outlining the operational and capability enablers inherent in this 
mission, the FMOC does well in canvassing issues such as the requirement for 
knowledge, command and control, comprehensive manoeuvre, assured engagement 
and sustained presence.29  
 
However, despite being a comprehensive document, the reality is that the 
FMOCs are essentially limited by the necessity for them to focus on the areas in 
Defence 2000 that are seen as of strategic importance to Australia. As a result the 
focus is on: northern coastal waters and littoral; principal air approaches from the 
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archipelago to northern Australia; principal maritime approach routes to vital assets 
and resource infrastructure in northern Australia; choke points for coastal shipping in 
northern Australia; the important archipelagic shipping straits; and the Sub-Antarctic 
EEZ and possibly even the Antarctic EEZ.30  Despite the welcome addition of outer 
territories and choke points, the accent in the FMOCs is not on sea control and the 
protection of sea lines of communications and maritime power projection at distance 
from Australia. Nor do tasks conducted predominantly in operations other than war 
figure prominently. This is due to the emphasis in Defence 2000 on DA.  
 
The section on networked air warfare gives a good indication of the issues 
involved. It states that; ‘Networked Maritime Air Warfare envisages the sensor 
netting of all surface warships, AEW&C, ground based air defence, Air 6000 strike 
fighters and possibly helicopters to develop a comprehensive multi-sensor air picture 
in blue and littoral waters. The Air Warfare Destroyer (Sea 4000) and Air 6000 would 
play a crucial role in maximising the opportunities to engage aircraft before they are 
able to effect missile release against ADF forces afloat and ashore.’31  This is an 
accurate portrayal of the issues involved, however the practical difficulties of relying 
on land based air support at distance from Australia is not highlighted. 
 
Despite the best endeavours of the FMOCs, a commentator or foreign nation 
when comparing the current and planned ADF force structure to one which would 
truly reflect a maritime strategy, would come to the conclusion that the maritime 
strategy that is espoused by Defence 2000 is narrowly based. The fact that the force 
structure is based predominantly on DA tasking exacerbates this situation with the 
other vital areas of CSIN, SWI and PNT having only a minor influence. Defence 
Update 2003 does indicate some rebalancing of capabilities but it will not 
fundamentally alter the size and structure of the ADF. It recognises the need for a 
more flexible and mobile force but an acknowledgment of the need for sea control to 
project such a force at range from Australia is not cited. 
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Despite this lack of recognition, the need for a maritime emphasis is probably 
greater now than at any time in the last 100 years. That emphasis, that real strategic 
commitment, if enunciated clearly, would justify a true maritime capability. 
Unfortunately, in the last twenty years the combat capability of the RAN at sea has 
declined in relative terms with that of the region. An air warfare capability has been 
lost and there is a gap of more than a decade before the Air Warfare Destroyer 
project, with its significant contribution to sea control, may deliver capability at sea. 
There is also the danger that in a nation where maritime strategy is not well 
understood this project could be subject to further delays, cuts in capability and even 
possible cancellation. 
 
More dangerously to a nation where meaningful debate should be encouraged, 
since the vitriolic service based debates of the 1960s to early 1980s that surrounded 
the aircraft carrier issue, little real emphasis has been placed on maritime air power. 
Debate within the ADF has been stifled. The lack of debate has inevitably resulted in 
Australian maritime strategy being developed to reflect the platforms planned or 
already in service, rather than forces being procured in response to a mature maritime 
strategy.   
 
In 2000 the RAN produced Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1. 
The aim of this doctrine publication was to not only educate those in the ADF, but 
also to foster debate across all areas of Australian society. It was an attempt to raise 
the level of awareness and debate on maritime issues. Although an excellent and 
timely publication, as yet, its impact has been muted. All change is evolutionary, 
however, and over time the impact of Australian Maritime Doctrine, in an open-
minded environment should be significant.  The problem is that many areas of 
Australian strategic thinking and planning fail to truly acknowledge the primacy of a 
maritime strategy for Australia. Major surface combatants are seen as vulnerable, and 
the all-encompassing nature of maritime operations across the spectrum of conflict 
operations is given scant attention. Discussions of a tactical nature are substituted for, 
and even called, strategic discussions, perhaps because the strategic reality is too 
challenging to grasp. Classical strategic theory incorporating deterrence and defence, 
via mobility and power projection has been neglected.   
  
In this way the Australian use of air power could be coined as ‘one 
dimensional’ due to its dependence on static land bases, a situation that any intelligent 
enemy would be sure to capitalise on. There are many elements to this debate.  There 
is an accepted position that continental air power, defence of the sea-air gap and of the 
EEZ, constitutes credible defence of Australia. The emphasis is on a strategy that 
revolves around advanced technologies and the tactical use of a land based aerospace 
power. There is not an appreciation that maritime air power brings an added 
dimension to aerospace theory. Use of the sea to base air power complements the land 
based options and provides a credible maritime strategy for Australia and a viable 
balanced defence force.  
 
In summary from an Australian strategic perspective the sea surrounding 
Australia is vast. This can be both a strategic bonus and a strategic liability. Currently, 
given the lack of a credible maritime strategy the sea is in many ways a strategic 
liability. This is because the sea eliminates geography. This means that access to 
Australia can come from any direction, not just the north. The lessons of history, of 
maritime strategy, of proper layered defence and of conditional and measured 
response have been marginalised. To rely solely on land based air power is to have a 
first response, which is absolute, but one that is also the last resort.  More than any 
other instrument of political, diplomatic and military intent, for a nation such as 
Australia, maritime forces provide substance and intent to a nation’s foreign policy. 
The graduated force that credible maritime units permit is even more valuable when 
the political and diplomatic situation is likely to be complex.  This is the situation in 
which Australia finds itself.   
The Aircraft Carrier Debate  
 
Maritime fixed wing air capability at sea has been present before in the ADF  
in a number of forms. This ranged from the sea plane carrier HMAS Albatross1 in the 
1920s and 1930s, fixed wing reconnaissance planes embarked in RAN cruisers before 
and during World War Two to the three aircraft carriers of the post World War Two 
period, HMA Ships Vengeance, Sydney and Melbourne.  However, its history has 
been marked by disagreement between the RAAF and the RAN as each vied for the 
necessary funding.  
 
In fact there was intense disagreement between the RAAF and RAN in 1947 
as to whether the RAN or the RAAF should command the aircraft that would be 
operated from the planned aircraft carrier(s).2 On this occasion the naval argument 
prevailed, but worryingly this inter-service rivalry set the scene for the next 35 years 
of debate between maritime and land based air power. Despite the best efforts of some 
this debate was characterised for its lack of in-depth appreciation with respect to 
Australia’s maritime strategic environment. Additionally the benefits, limitations and 
operational capabilities of maritime and land based aircraft was also relegated to a 
very secondary consideration.  The hard won lesson of the Second World War, when 
maritime and land based air power contributed significantly and co-operatively to the 
defeat of the Axis powers was ignored.  Of note, however, is that this disagreement 
over the role of air power in support of maritime operations was not a phenomenon 
that was peculiar to Australia.   
 
Indeed Britain had its own divisive debate, which had culminated in the 1966 
Defence Review.3 The RN was devastated by the decision to cancel the projected fleet 
carrier project, CVA-01, as it had formed the central core of the RN’s plans and self 
image. 4 The RAF won the day on that occasion due in large part to the fact that they 
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better understood the bureaucratic environment, convincing the Government that 
land-based air power, even with its limitations was the only cost effective solution in 
a fiscally limited period which also coincided with the draw down of British military 
power and influence across the world. The term ‘East of Suez’ began to be observed 
more in diplomatic assurances rather than military reality.5 
 
 As finance was the real point,6 the problem for the British naval staff was that 
the scenarios modelled indicated that land based air power was required whether or 
not carrier power existed. The carrier was argued more as ‘an adjunct to, rather than 
an alternative to, a land-based air force.’7 Additionally there was disagreement 
amongst naval officers themselves, with manpower for new carriers and supporters of 
an increased role for surface combatants in strike, used to undermine the aircraft 
carrier position. The RAF was also content for inter-service relations to be sacrificed, 
whereas the leadership of the RN was reticent to act in other than a statesmanlike 
fashion.8 The RAF, however, saw it as a challenge to the very efficacy of aerospace 
theory and perhaps even the rationale for a separate service, and ensured that issues 
such as the costs of land-bases and even the position of continents themselves were 
suppressed or moved to meet the budgetary and strategic requirement.9 
 
The situation had also been replicated in many other nations around the world. 
Small and medium sized carriers, most of which were ex-RN World War Two 
carriers, were retired and the loss of capability acknowledged.  The most obvious loss 
was in the power projection role for which air cover was essential.10 Writing in 1986, 
Philip Pugh  in The Cost of Seapower, noted that the in many ways the large fleet 
carrier was doomed to extinction through excessive cost.11 However, his book was 
written based on 1980s technological thought and before STOVL  developments had 
progressed to the technology of the JSF.  There is much in modern strategy and 
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technology which would refute this position.  Even though he stated this position, 
Pugh also noted that small differences allow large arguments and that ‘had costs not 
been so evenly balanced they would have enforced a choice long ago. As it is 
proponents of land and sea basing have been able to propagandise their rival views 
upon many occasions over many decades, often with more passion than reason.’12  
 
The situation by the late 1960s in Australia was hauntingly similar to that in 
Britain. Pugh’s ‘propagandist’ statement was true for Australia as well. Indeed the 
same aircraft, the F-11113 was integral to the disagreements on strategic strike and 
bombing in Australia as it was in Britain. As far back as 1954 the power projection 
role was removed from the RAN, and the carriers were focused on anti-submarine 
warfare.14 From 1954, air power had been the cornerstone of Australia’s defence, yet 
the fundamental limitation of air support at distance from Australia remained 
unresolved. Nevertheless, the RAN was benefiting from this emphasis on forward 
defence with new submarines, fast support ships, minesweepers and new surface 
combatants all under construction. However, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) existed 
precariously for the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Fixed wing aviation was 
threatened with extinction on more than one occasion.15 Chief amongst the problems 
was manpower shortages and cost. A hauntingly similar issue to that faced today.  
 
That the RAN was successful in modernising the fleet was due in great part to 
the political acumen of the Minister for the Navy, Senator John Gorton.16 Fixed wing 
aviation gained a reprieve with new anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters and 
ASW aircraft17 being provided. Significantly, however, the RAN achieved a limited 
air strike and air defence capability when 20 McDonnell-Douglas A-4 Skyhawk 
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fighter-bombers were acquired, the last 10 at the expense of a 7th and 8th Oberon Class 
submarines.18 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9: HMAS MELBOURNE 
Picture: Royal Australian Navy 
 
Despite this, the ignorance of the efficacy of the sea in Australia’s strategic 
environment was never far removed. Linked to this unawareness was the sad fact that 
defence procurement in the period proceeded in fits and starts, depending in large part 
on the interest, commitment and political ability of the Minister of the day of each 
service, the RAN, the Army and RAAF. The disagreement in Australian circles was to 
be put bluntly, an example of a dysfunctional policy making system. In the early 
1960s, the RAAF saw the Skyhawk, as a competitor to funds for its new F-111 and 
vice-a-versa. The RAN saw a strike role as a logical adjunct to its other roles, yet 
strategic considerations were reduced all to often to acrimonious arguments on the 
tactical superiority or inferiority of the relevant aircraft itself. Such disagreement and 
lack of joint comprehension boded ill for the RAN when the issue of a carrier 
replacement required decisive action in 1977. 
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The carrier suffered from what could be termed ‘illegitimate isolationism.’19 
This can be defined as where a specific capability of a platform is targeted in isolation 
from its other capabilities. If this is done within the wider strategic debate, a platform 
or capability, which is actually very good and cost effective across a range of strategic 
tasks, if measured against specific absolutist scenarios and viewed in isolation, can be 
discredited. This is because in such debates, propagandists can state that a capability 
is not necessarily the only possible way of achieving any single task. This is exactly 
what happened to the carrier debate in Australia. A carrier is very effective, and 
arguably the most flexible and cost effective platform across a range of activities in 
war and operations other than war. In war carriers are potent platforms to effect air 
warfare, surface warfare, undersea warfare, sea-lift, amphibious warfare, power 
projection, protection of sea lines of communication, close air support to ground 
forces, land strike and afloat support. In operations other than war carriers are potent 
platforms to effect deterrence, coalition operations, exercises, peacekeeping, oceans 
governance, national interests, search and rescue, defence assistance to the civil 
community, disaster relief, diplomatic tasks, sea-lift and afloat support. Its flexibility 
and adaptability is its prize asset, in sporting parlance it could be termed the ‘all-
rounder’20 of the team. 
 
Compounding the issue was the fact that the era of the 1970s was marked in 
defence in Australia by the reorganisation of the Department by Sir Arthur Tange. Sir 
Arthur Tange was Secretary to the Department of Defence from 1970 to 1979. During 
this tenure he conducted the most significant reorganisation of the Department. This 
included the abolition of the Departments of Navy, Army and Air, the integration of 
the Department of Supply, and the co-location of resources management and policy 
advice, such as strategic policy and force development, in departmental organisations 
under the Secretary of the Department.21 His reorganisation brought civilian 
bureaucrats more to the fore in defence planning and reduced the power of the RAN, 
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the Army and the RAAF with respect to acquisition policy. Tange used the principle 
of ‘creative tension’22 to ensure that the services vied with each other to prove the 
joint worth of a single-service project.  The Government saw the Tange reorganisation 
as an advance that would ensure that the military services were focused on joint issues 
and not on niche areas that would be of direct benefit to that service alone. This 
reduced single service influence in decision making with the hope that the problems 
of acquisition and defence planning would be rectified. However, the RAN soon 
discovered to its chagrin that the carrier issue would be fought on single-service lines. 
The RAN saw the carrier as a flexible offensive weapon, whereas the RAAF saw it as 
a ‘needless duplication of capability.’23 In addition, two strike-projection task groups 
were seen as surplus to Australia’s requirements.24 However, as alluded to previously, 
more telling was the fact that ‘illegitimate isolationism’ was used to discredit the 
carrier options. Individual RAAF capabilities were pitched in isolation against the 
carrier’s flexibility. The RAAF ensured that the debate avoided canvassing, at a 
strategic level, the holistic advantages or disadvantages of land and sea basing. It 
remained more centred on narrow technical and platform centric issues of aircraft 
performance, range and single mission tactical employment. 
 
However, despite ongoing disagreements with the RAAF and problems with 
manpower and funding, in 1977 the RAN had achieved an important milestone with 
the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) approving a design investigation 
for a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) and helicopter carrier, while 
eliminating a conventional carrier, due mainly to its higher cost and manpower 
needs.25 The costs of the carrier had risen considerably and despite the uncertain state 
of security in 1980, the carrier project came under intense scrutiny. HMAS 
Melbourne’s life was extended to 1985, but the RAAF continued to assert that land 
based aircraft could serve the fleet air defence role and that the performance of 
STOVL aircraft such as the Sea Harrier in the air defence role was limited.26 This last 
point was true, but the arguments were made using an absolutist approach, rather than 
one that addressed the relative merits of the options. Despite this opposition the 
                                                 
22 Conversation with CDRE W.S.G. Bateman, AM, RAN (Rtd) at HMAS Creswell 6 May 2003. 
23  Jones, P. ‘1972-1983: Towards Self-Reliance,’ in Stevens, D (ed), The Royal Australian Navy, p. 
217. 
24 Ibid, p. 218 
25 Ibid, p. 225. 
strategic situation for Australia remained uncertain27 and on 20 August 1980 Cabinet 
agreed to acquire a purpose-designed aircraft carrier.28  However, significantly it was 
aimed at ASW operations with any decision on STOVL aircraft being delayed. 
 
Unexpectedly in late 1981, the British announced that the first of their new 
STOVL aircraft carriers, HMS Invincible was available for sale at a very favourable 
price. The members of the DFDC were split on traditional lines with the Chief of 
Defence Force Staff (CDFS), Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, the Chief of Naval Staff 
(CNS), Vice-Admiral Sir James Willis, and significantly the Chief of the General 
Staff (CGS), Sir Donald Dunstan, supporting the acquisition, while the Secretary, W. 
B. Pritchett and the acting Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Vice-Marshal F.W. Barnes 
disagreed. Significantly the CGS was not necessarily supportive at the start of the 
DFDC meeting, but he was persuaded during the meeting by the arguments for power 
projection and protection of deployed ADF elements at sea.29  
 
On 25 February 1982, the Minister for Defence, Mr D.J. Killen, announced 
that the Government had decided to acquire the carrier which was to be re-named 
HMAS Australia. As a result the 1982-83 refit of the aircraft carrier Melbourne was 
cancelled. The opposition ridiculed the purchase in Parliament, with its leader, Mr 
Hayden calling the decision amongst other things a ‘serious blunder’, stating that the 
Invincible did not project sea power.30 This was not unexpected, as the Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) did not support power projection as a strategic requirement for 
Australia, having a continentalist, rather than maritime approach to strategy. On the 
other hand in his ministerial statement Mr Killen noted that;  
 
‘The acquisition of this ship will enhance our manifest capability to 
deter aggression in our neighbouring regions in the decades ahead. Air 
power is fundamental to maritime operations…. The value of shore-
based aircraft to Australia’s maritime defence will remain of particular 
                                                                                                                                            
26 Ibid, p. 226. 
27 As examples, Soviet forces were very active in SE Asia, Afghanistan, Iran was in turmoil and oil 
supplies were seen as threatened. 
28 Jones, P. ‘1972-1983: Towards Self-Reliance, p. 226. 
29 Conversation with CDRE W.S.G. Bateman, AM, RAN (Rtd) at HMAS Creswell 6 May 2003. 
30 Wright, A. Australia’s Carrier Decisions, Papers in Maritime Affairs No 4, Maritime Studies 
Program, 1998, p. 170 
importance….The carrier will provide the Government of the day with 
additional options, particularly in areas further from our shores and 
remote from our military airfields. The importance of this cannot be 
over emphasised for a country like Australia surrounded on three sides 
by vast oceans, and dependent for its very livelihood upon trade carried 
in ships.’31   
 
Although the Liberal Government had not committed to buy the STOVL aircraft that 
would be needed, the substance of this response from Mr Killen still holds true in 
2003. 
 
On 2 April 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands forcing the UK to 
mount a maritime campaign to reclaim them. Subsequently on 1 June 1982, Prime 
Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, wrote to the British Prime Minister stating that in light 
of developments Australia would not hold the UK Government to the earlier 
obligation. On 30 June 1982 the Melbourne was de-commissioned. On 13 July 1982 
the Minister for Defence announced that the UK Government would retain the 
Invincible in RN service.  
 
Other options were explored, but there was considerable hostility, especially 
from the then Labor opposition, which resolutely opposed any carrier purchase. In 
March 1982 the Senate also referred the issue of an aircraft carrier purchase to the 
Parliament via the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (JCFAD). The 
JCFAD report, An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, was produced 
the same year. The report investigated the relevance of an aircraft carrier to 
Australia’s current and perceived environment, the role of an aircraft carrier in the 
Defence Force structure and the effects of the purchase of a carrier on the future 
defence procurement program. 
 
The report was not favourable. This was due in a very large part to the 
assumptions used at the time and the lack of commitment in the Department of 
Defence to a maritime strategy. The world situation was characterised by the potential 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p. 168 
for conflict between the super-powers escalating to nuclear conflict and the focus on 
the threat to Australia being an invasion. These scenarios were marked as extremely 
unlikely. When other intermediate and low level threats were examined, the aircraft 
carrier was best described as ‘useful’ but limited due to aircraft type and limited 
size.32 Again the approach was one of ‘illegitimate isolationism.’ In a damming 
sentence the report read, ‘not all the functions outlined in the preceding sections 
require an aircraft carrier capability for their effective performance. In all cases, use 
of an aircraft carrier is substantially dependent on a favourable air and maritime 
environment.’33  This last sentence certainly holds little basis in historical fact when 
aircraft carrier operations and performances from World War II were assessed.34  
 
In the second section on the role of an aircraft carrier, the Committee report 
focused on the capability of a ship of about 20,000 tons.35 ASW was the primary task 
assigned to such a vessel, with air defence, anti-shipping strikes, command and 
control, force projection, surveillance and patrol operations and peacetime tasks 
relegated to secondary importance. The ability to deny the enemy intelligence and 
targeting and identification information by an ability to engage shadowing 
surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft was ignored.   
 
The lack of a credible maritime strategy36 not surprisingly counted against the 
utility of maritime air power, with land-based air power providing continental defence 
in the vicinity of Australia. With this strategic view, a continental strategy as 
                                                 
32 An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1982, p.15. 
33 Ibid, p. 15. 
34 Appendix II to the JCFAD report was a paper produced by the RAN on 17 July 1944 which 
recommended that favourable consideration be given by the Government to the provision of aircraft 
carriers for the RAN. The arguments set out in the paper were accepted by the Defence Committee, and 
was the basis for the Chifley Government’s decision to establish the RAN FAA. The paper succinctly 
outlined aircraft carrier operations via specific battles and operations. This demonstrated the ‘important 
and varied’ uses to which carriers can be put. A copy of this paper is at Appendix III. See also 
Sandison, J.M, Ross A.T. Historical Appreciation of the Contribution of Naval Air Power, Working 
Paper SACG 7, Central Studies Establishment, Australia 13 Jan 1978 
35 This is understandable as the RAN had defined its requirement for a ship of about 20,000 tons 
capable of operating up to 22 helicopters and STOVL aircraft. 
36 A credible maritime strategy is one which focuses on sea control as the basis for the defence of 
Australia. That is control of the air above the sea, the surface of the sea, the undersea water column and 
the littoral landmass enabling protection of SLOCs and power projection at distance, as the basics of 
the defence of Australia. Maritime strategy for an island nation begins with an emphasis on 
espoused by the Department of Defence, not surprisingly the carrier was perceived 
more as a luxury item, and not an essential component of any of these operational 
tasks. 
 
In conclusion the Committee ‘acknowledged that an aircraft carrier can 
provide functions which would be valuable in the Australian Defence Force.’37 
Crucially however, it noted that at the price of Invincible a credible case could be 
made, but that the full project cost, which would be involved in the acquisition of a 
purpose-designed ship could not be justified, certainly at current defence expenditure 
levels.38 This was not unexpected as the new CDFS, the Secretary and the RAAF had 
all opposed the carrier purchase.39  
 
Especially damning was evidence provided in the air defence role where the 
STOVL Harrier aircraft was criticised severely, basically to the point of denigration, 
and also land strike, where the report stated that land-based strike aircraft would 
destroy the enemy’s air strike capability before naval forces entered the area.40 
Conveniently, despite the success of the Harrier in the Falklands War of 1982, the 
features of that conflict were described as, ‘atypical, which should not influence 
judgements, certainly not before full details are available.’41  Interestingly any 
decision by the JCFAD was not going to wait for the full details of the effectiveness 
of the Harriers to be ascertained.  
 
Thus the Department of Defence evidence was not favourable for the RAN. 
Vital in this was the fact that Admiral Synnot had retired as CDFS and been replaced 
by Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara. Admiral Synnot did appear, arguing a 
comprehensive case, but in the capacity as a retired senior officer. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
manoeuvrist not attrition based warfare and operations across the continuum of conflict in a location of 
Australia’s choosing and not on the mainland of Australia or its direct approaches.   
37 An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, p. 51 
38 Ibid, p. 52. 
39 CDFS - Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara, Secretary, Mr W.B. Pritchett, Air Vice Marshal 
F.W. Barnes RAAF (Rtd). 
40 An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, p. 25. 
41 Ibid, p. 25 
The Committee report, although seemingly thorough and comprehensive, was 
seriously flawed because its basic premise was a continental defence of Australia. It 
foreshadowed the move to the Defence of Australia and ‘inner-arc’ concept that was 
formalised via The Dibb Report. Maritime strategy, sea control, the maritime 
environment, the need for protection of sea lines of communications and the ability to 
project power through the maritime environment was reduced in emphasis.  Thus 
maritime air power was not seen as critical for Australia in 1982. 
 
Noting the JCFAD report and the Labor opposition, it was no surprise, 
therefore, that without first informing the then Chief of Naval Staff,42 the incoming 
Labor government of Mr Bob Hawke announced on 14 March 1983 that the 
Melbourne would not be replaced. Two months later the Government announced that 
flying by fixed wing aircraft of the RAN would be phased out.43 The provision of 
Australian air power in support of maritime forces then became the sole responsibility 
of the RAAF, operating from fixed land bases.   
 
Perhaps it could be surmised from this that an unintended casualty of the 1982 
Falklands War was the RAN, or more properly the ADF. There is no doubt that the 
Invincible was not an ideal ship,44 and that true air dominance would have been hard 
to achieve from such a platform.  Indeed the rationale for the Invincible class began as 
an anti-submarine platform designed to enforce the RN’s role in containing Soviet 
submarines in the Iceland-Faroe Island gap in the North Atlantic. In this role, air 
defence was seen as being provided from land based aircraft, and as such the carriers 
were fitted with sea-to-air missiles, much like any guided missile destroyer.  
However, the Falkland Islands conflict provided undeniable evidence of the 
flexibility, survivability and capability of these ships and the need for sea based air 
power to achieve sea control at distances from land bases.45 The carrier decision in 
reality removed sea control from Australia’s capabilities and substituted at best a 
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45 This class of ship was originally termed a ‘through deck cruiser’. It was designed to act as a 
command ship with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. Its role as a strike and air defence carrier 
developed over time as STOVL aircraft (Sea Harriers) became available. The Falklands War 1982, 
proved how essential this role is. 
defensive sea denial capability and an ‘inner arc’ mindset to defence strategic 
planning. 
 
FIGURE  10: HMS INVINCIBLE 
Picture: www.sci.fi/~fta/gulf-oth.htm46  
 
Another, perhaps also unintended casualty of this era, appears to have been 
that of further debate on the subject within the Department of Defence. Despite the 
rigour of maritime doctrine and the changing nature of technology this is still true 
even after a period of 20 years. Such was the acrimony and politicisation of the whole 
issue that even with a budget of AUD$16B for Project Air 6000, the first phase of this 
three phase project is looking only at land-based options. It would appear that any 
novel or lateral ideas for studying other means of better providing air power in a 
maritime environment have been marginalised. The costs and strategic advantages or 
disadvantages of extensive air-to-air refuelling planes and land bases that are needed 
effect a land-based option must also be included to fairly balance it against the sea-
based option. These land-based capabilities continue to be viewed and costed in 
isolation, and not as a collective whole, when the issue of projecting air power is 
studied. 
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In proposing a study into maritime air power and aircraft carriers it is vital to 
understand the opportunities now available. Today, as the ADF examines new air 
power projects there is a chance, with aircraft such as the JSF, to again provide 
organic air power in support of expeditionary warfare. What likelihood is there of a 
mobile bare base operated by the RAN with the combat air power for the vessel being 
provided by the RAAF?  Is this a better option in the light of Australia’s Military 
Strategy than the present arrangement with static bare bases spread through the north? 
To re-iterate, Australia is an island continent in a maritime environment, with the 
strategic bonus of no land borders but also the strategic problem of an extensive 
coastline. The critical strategic issue for Australia is to control the sea where 
Australia’s interests are threatened. This could be at distance in protection of sea lines 
of communications, closer to Australia in the sea approaches to Australia itself, not 
just the northern approaches. It could also be in the littoral contiguous region of the 
Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia when attempting to safely escort Australian Army 
units to the area of operations and then in providing support for them during the 
conflict.  Other nations that exist in a strategic environment less inherently maritime 
than that of Australia seem to have understood this much better. Many continue to 
emphasise the sea-based air power option. The following table illustrates that other 
nations continue to see worth in maritime power projection and air power, even if 
Australia does not. 
 
Aircraft Carriers 1990-2003 
 
Countries 1990/91 2003 In Contract/building 
 
Australia 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Argentina 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Brazil 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Britain 
 
4 
 
5 
 
2 
 
China 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
France 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
India 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Italy 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
    
USSR/Russia 7 1 0 
 
Spain 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Thailand 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
USA 
 
29 
 
25 
 
4 
 
List includes CV (multi-purpose aircraft carrier), CVA (attack aircraft carrier), CVH 
(helicopter carrier), CVL (light aircraft carrier), CVN (multi purpose aircraft carrier (nuclear 
powered)), CVS (ASW aircraft carrier), AVT (auxiliary aircraft landing training ship),  CGH 
9helicopter cruiser – USSR/Russia only), LHD (amphibious assault ship – WASP Class US 
only), LHA (amphibious assault ships – Tarawa Class US only), LPH (amphibious assault 
ships – Iwo Jima Class – US only)47/48 
 
FIGURE 11:  TABLE OF COUNTRIES OPERATING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1990-2003 
 
 
Complicating this is the reality that Australia can only ever be a medium 
power with a limited ability to project force. A fundamental strength that underpins 
the range of options available under a maritime strategy is the possession of the full 
inventory of maritime capabilities, especially maritime air power. In this regard the 
presence of such maritime capabilities not only significantly increases the range of 
response options available to meet changing requirements but the possession of such 
capabilities in itself acts as a major deterrent. It also adds uncertainty of response to 
any action for an adversary and appreciably complicates their strategic options. The 
ability to project combat air power throughout the maritime region in defence of 
Australia’s national interests is not only a significant force multiplier but is a major 
and highly versatile capability that can be employed when and as required. It is this 
hidden or latent capability that is one of its greatest strengths in contributing to 
Australia’s maritime strategy.  
 
In noting Australia’s geo-strategic realities, and in maximising the flexibility 
of maritime power there is little doubt that the requirement for a credible maritime air 
power capability is entirely justifiable. It is time to relegate the aircraft carrier debate 
that culminated in 1983 to that era and to move on and engage in a new study on 
maritime air power that rigorously reviews the technology, operational concepts and 
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48 Saunders, S. Jane’s Fighting Ships 105th Edition , Janes Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, Uk, 
2003. 
strategic realities of 2003 to 2040 with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
Surface Combatant Capability 
 
Sea power is rightly recognised for its flexibility, in particular the ability of 
surface combatants to change their readiness swiftly between different levels of 
operations and apply graduated force commensurate with the situation and across the 
spectrum of conflict. In the diplomatic role, surface combatants make a psychological 
impression through their perceptible presence and powerful appearance. They have 
similar visibility in the policing role and possess inherent capabilities for interdiction 
and boarding. In higher intensity operations surface combatants combine readiness 
and global reach with sustainability and controllability, which can be non-invasive 
and easily withdrawn if required. Deployed in the protection of sea lines of 
communications they have multi-dimensional capabilities and are essentially weapons 
of sea control rather than denial. In support of land operations, surface combatants are 
likewise capable in a wide range of tasks including escort, bombardment, supply and 
on occasion lift, including where necessary evacuation. In amphibious operations, 
especially in conjunction with maritime air power, surface combatants can facilitate 
approach with manoeuvre and surprise. All these functions relate directly to 
Australia’s national and regional circumstances and make surface combatants 
essential to the central concept of sea control. 
 
The modern surface combatant therefore retains a vital, indeed fundamental, 
role to play in the future maritime force structure. Their mobility and endurance 
allows the flexibility to maintain a continuous presence in moving scenes of action 
which other ADF units cannot achieve. Their sensors and weapons work throughout 
the maritime battlespace and span operations against aircraft, ships and submarines, 
and against forces and assets ashore. Properly armed they can be highly effective 
offensive platforms, especially against other ships and against land targets. Moreover, 
mobile naval platforms have the ability to poise and persist in theatre, often for 
months at a time. The surface combatant thus remains a potent and flexible capability 
to execute the sea control requirement, particularly when they lever off other assets 
and advanced intelligence, surveillance fusion and dissemination systems. Indeed, the 
flexible response options and sustained presence of surface combatants in periods 
short of open hostilities may help to control or prevent escalation, particularly in 
complex or ambiguous circumstances where submarines and aircraft are not free to 
make full use of their primarily offensive potential. Surface combatants are inherently 
capable of responding at short notice to peacetime contingencies and support for allies 
in operations other than war.   
 
Australian surface combatants must be capable of operating throughout the 
maritime approaches and beyond. Project Sea 4000 is the project which will ensure 
that Australia will acquire and maintain some sea control capability into the future. 
Able to act across all environments simultaneously, the ships will provide a variety of 
capabilities appropriate to securing sea lines of communications, the projection of 
power ashore, the provision of fire support, the protection of friendly sea, land and air 
forces in the open ocean and the littoral. This includes the very real potential to offer a 
degree of defence against attack by ballistic missiles. The mission requirement is to 
provide a sea control capability for the ADF. In this way the role and mission of the 
Project Sea 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) could perhaps better be understood 
in terms of a sea control combatant.  
 
The current surface combatant force comprises 10 frigates with supporting 
infrastructure that includes modern simulators and warfare systems centres. With its 
existing level of capability the force is effective in achieving sea control in low threat 
environments only. It could be an effective contributor in some medium threat 
environments as part of a highly capable coalition force. When viewed in relation to 
sea control capabilities of previous force structures, the current RAN surface 
combatant force has a reduced capability relative to forces of other world navies and 
also those in the Asia-Pacific region.  The following table is illustrative of the relative 
decline of Australia’s surface combatant capability vis-à-vis other nations since 1990. 
 
 
 
 
Sea Control Combatants – Air Warfare Capable Destroyers 1990 – 2003 
 
Countries 1990/91 2003 In contract/building 
 
Australia 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
    
Britain 13 11 6 
 
Canada 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
China 
 
0 
 
2 
 
4 
 
France 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
 
Germany 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
India 
 
5 
 
8 
 
0 
 
Italy 
 
6 
 
4 
 
2 
 
Japan 
 
5 
 
9 
 
2 
 
South Korea 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
Spain 
 
0 
 
1 
 
3 
 
Taiwan 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
The Netherlands 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
USA 
 
70 
 
63 
 
15 
 
USSR/Russia 
 
55 
 
11 
 
0 
 
Table based on ships with an area air defence weapon (SM-2 equivalent) and/or 3D radar and 
C2 capability above 4500 tons. List includes CG (guided missile cruiser), CGN (guided 
missile cruiser (nuclear powered)), DDG (guided missile destroyer),12 
 
FIGURE 12:  TABLE OF COUNTRIES OPERATING SEA CONTROL COMBATANTS                            AIR 
WARFARE DESTROYERS 1990-2003 
 
The issues surrounding HMAS Australia and the German Pacific Fleet of 1914 
has been covered previously. However, it is worth re-emphasising that Australia then 
had the ability to achieve sea control in a high threat environment.  By the Second 
World War this had been reduced. Indeed the period 1919-1939 could be summarised 
for the RAN and for Australia as the era of the loss of strategic deterrence. The 
lessons of keeping the cities, infrastructure and trade of Australia secure, which had 
been achieved in the First World War, were ignored.  
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Despite the clear deterrent value that the RAN had provided against an enemy 
raiding threat, the ensuing fate of the RAN for the decades of the 1920s and 30s was 
unhappy.  The jubilation that followed the arrival of the fleet unit in 1913, the 
successful maritime operations that led to the capture of Rabaul and German New 
Guinea, and the sinking of the SMS Emden by HMAS Sydney in 1914 had been 
overshadowed by four years of bloody trench warfare. The Great Depression would 
strike further blows at the RAN. At its lowest point in 1932 the RAN would comprise 
just three ships in full commission. Henceforth Australian naval capability would be 
restricted to a few cruisers for trade protection.  Australia abrogated its maritime 
defence to the RN and it was seen as a minute element of the Imperial Navy. 
Australian naval deterrence between the wars was a victim of an unfortunate series of 
circumstances, which saw the RAN reduced from a formidable fleet water unit in 
1919 to a limited trade protection force in 1939. 
 
The core of the RAN surface combatant fleet post 1945 was aircraft carriers 
and then the DDGs. These platforms permitted meaningful sea control and power 
projection operations in the Korean War (HMAS Sydney) and then the Vietnam War 
(DDGs).  In 2003 the absence of maritime air power, command and control capability, 
air warfare and power projection capability means the current surface combatant force 
is lacking in its ability to execute sea control in anything other than relatively benign 
operations. From the mid 1990s the RAN effectively lost an air warfare capability as 
the three guided missile destroyers and their surface-to-air missile (SM-1) 
progressively became more obsolescent. The last DDG was withdrawn from service 
in 2001.   
 
Having noted the state of the surface combatant force, there are a number of 
approved and planned projects designed to rectify elements of the problem.  Project 
Sea 1390 is the upgrade project for the six Adelaide Class guided missile frigates.  
The main aim of this project is to re-dress a shortfall in ship self-protection especially 
against anti-ship missiles (ASMs).  A contract for the upgrade was signed with ADI 
Limited in 1999.  Project Sea 1348 is delivering eight Anzac Class frigates into 
service with the RAN between 1996 and 2006. Two additional frigates have been 
delivered to New Zealand. The national aspects of being a maritime nation are crucial 
to a viable surface combatant capability.  As an example of national benefits from a 
maritime strategic approach the ANZAC project over 15 years will inject around $4 
billion dollars in gross domestic product and create almost 10000 full time jobs.3 
 
Despite the current operational limitations, Australia has a proud record of 
credible surface combatants fulfilling essential tasks at sea, across the continuum of 
operations both off Australia and deployed to other regions and oceans. However, 
Project Sea 4000 is the project to provide air warfare and command and control 
capability at sea, or more properly a sea control capability. Without this capability as 
an absolute minimum, Australia will not achieve sea control in any operation that is 
not benign. The Chief of Army’s 2002 statement that; ‘The army’s land forces must 
be highly mobile, well prepared and able to manoeuvre effectively in a littoral 
environment,4 offers further support of Project Sea 4000 and sea control.  The RAN 
requires credible surface combatants able to project power ashore to support such 
forces and indeed defend them during the passage to the area of operations and then 
ensure that the logistical support is able to get to them.  In summary strategic sealift, 
manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment and power projection are 
unachievable without SEA 4000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13: DUTCH LCF – A TYPICAL SEA CONTROL COMBATANT 
Photo: Royal Schelde 
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Project Air 6000 – The Need for an Organic Maritime Element 
 
In considering Australian military strategy and policy it is worth noting that 
Defence 2000 states specifically that air combat is the most important single 
capability for the defence of Australia.1  Importantly the same air combat section of 
Defence 2000 notes not only that the ADF must be able to protect Australia from air 
attack and control our air approaches, but also that it must be; ‘capable enough to 
provide options to deploy an air-combat capability to support a regional coalition’ and 
‘also have the capacity to provide air-defence and support for deployed ground and 
maritime forces in our immediate region.’2 Defence 2000 then lists the major 
challenges facing the ADF in meeting the air combat capability as, addressing the 
deficiencies of the F/A-18 vis-à-vis regional air combat aircraft, retaining the air-to-
air refuelling (AAR) capability and thirdly addressing the future of our air combat 
capability as the F/A-18 reach the end of their service life between 2012 and 2015.3  
 
 The Government’s plan to address these challenges is to upgrade the F/A-18, 
acquire at least four Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW & C) aircraft, 
acquire up to five new-generation AAR aircraft and then to acquire up to 100 new 
combat aircraft to replace both the F/A-18 and F-111 (AIR 6000).4 Project Air 6000 is 
the biggest force structure program in the history of the ADF with some AUD$16 
Billion over three phases being set aside to achieve the requirement.5   
 
Defence 2000 notes that one of the reasons that an AAR capability is 
important to our air combat is because; ‘it extends the range and endurance of our 
fighters. This is critical for covering our extended air approaches, including offshore 
territories such as Christmas and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and for providing air 
support to surface ship deployments including amphibious task forces and land forces 
deployed in our immediate neighbourhood.’6  
 
                                                 
1 Defence 2000, p. 84 
2 Ibid, p. 85. 
3 Ibid, pp. 85-86. 
4 Ibid, pp. 86-87. 
5 A summary of Project Air 6000 is at Appendix 2. 
In commenting on this last requirement it is germane to remark that 
complicated forms of warfighting are often doomed to failure. Christmas Island is 
some 870 nautical miles from Australia and the Cocos (Keeling) islands are even 
further afield. The difficulty of achieving air parity or supremacy over these 
Australian territories should the need ever arise, via land based aircraft operating from 
the Australian mainland, should not be under estimated. These include factors such as 
response, resilience, reliability, persistence, weather, communications, coverage and 
flexibility. These limitations are explored in more detail later. The JSF and an aircraft 
carrier as a package would be a better option, building on the current vision and 
providing a greater range and reality of responses for Australia. 
 
The ADF publication Force 2020 notes in its defining influence;  
 
‘that it is driven by the concept of a ‘seamlessly integrated force’.  This 
concept goes beyond the contemporary understanding of ‘jointness’, but 
it does not signify a merger of the three Services, nor does it seek to 
undermine their identities and cultures.  Given the ADF’s relatively 
small size, the main reason why it must aspire to be a Seamless Force is 
to maximise its collective warfighting capabilities and specialisations... 
As such, the concept of a Seamless Force looks towards a future where 
the ADF’s traditional forces are not only seamlessly integrated with 
each other, but also externally integrated with a wider range of 
supporting organisations, agencies, and to an extent, the community. 
Becoming a Seamless Force might mean that: units are ‘born joint’ (tri-
Service units based along functional lines). Some force elements would 
be joint and inter-agency on a permanent basis. There would be a 
different and/or greater degree of joint asset management and 
employment. For example, Naval amphibious assets might have jointly 
operated helicopter support attached.’7  
 
Force 2020 is a powerful concept but this concept could be expanded to 
include RAN vessels such as aircraft carriers, operating RAAF via air force assets. 
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Given the actuality of the 1999 East Timor operation, the seamless force 
concept from Force 2020, Australia’s Military Strategy as espoused in Defence 2000, 
the comments in Defence Update 2003 that pertain to a more flexible and mobile 
force and the elements of maritime history and strategy itself, now must be the time to 
rekindle the debate on the need for organic maritime air power for the ADF. The 
Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Houston has noted that current Project Air 6000 
plans call for replacement of the air dominance and strike capabilities of the F/A-18 
and F-111 to be introduced into service commencing in 2012.8  The opportunity 
presented by the need to replace the current air-to-air refuelling capability and by 
Project Air 6000 should not be missed. 
 
At the 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference there was a broad range of air 
power issues, which were discussed. Although maritime specific issues such as the 
strategic Australian environment were rarely mentioned, self-reliance, the need for 
homeland defence to include going out and destroying the enemy wherever he may be 
was.9  Specifically Dr Alan Stephens noted that air campaigns needed to concentrate 
more on how to destroy armies, that platform range and basing flexibility must be 
looked at for Project Air 6000, that fixed bases have been the air forces achilles heel 
and that diplomatic issues complicate access to third country airbases.10  
 
In mentioning land bases it is illuminating to look at issues involving fixed 
operating bases. The RAAF’s air power doctrine publication, states that;  
 
‘Fixed-wing aircraft depend fundamentally on air bases. These bases 
are generally large in area; providing a substantial infrastructure 
including fuel, power, water and airfield approach aids. Permanent 
bases are also supported by command and control systems, well stocked 
and continually re-supplied. In Australia, the use of bare-bases is 
fundamental to the application of aerospace power. Such bare bases do 
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10 Stephens, A. Afghanistan and the Australian Way of War, 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference. 
not have the same level of support even when fully activated. The 
physical security of an air base will usually require a substantial number 
of personnel. Furthermore the high value of an air base makes them a 
focus of enemy intelligence and a focal point for attack.’11 
 
The same publication notes correctly that base dependency and vulnerability 
can be reduced by: creating redundancy, establishing forward operating bases, use of 
air-to-air refuelling, hardening base infrastructure and employing air defence 
measures.12 Whether or not these will prove effective in a future high intensity 
conflict remains to be seen.  An additional characteristic, that of maritime mobility 
which aircraft carriers provide, does reduce vulnerability to precision weapons. 
Maritime mobility also reduces the requirement for a forward operating base by being 
one. It also reduces the need for air-to-air refuelling and eases forward re-supply 
issues. This can only be of benefit in the Australian geo-strategic environment. 
 
Other speakers at the Aerospace Conference emphasised the need for air 
supremacy to conduct amphibious operations.13 Air power gets its decisive edge from 
being able to operate rapidly and effectively and over long distances. Air parity was 
required to contest control of the air and achieve air parity for operations such as the 
evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940 to be achieved and that loss of air parity blunts the 
intent of the military Commander.14 Although the maritime environment as a reality 
to any operation in the Australian region, was surprisingly not the focus of any of the 
speakers, the issues mentioned are all related directly to it.  
 
The success of Dunkirk, of saving the core of the British army, was due in part 
to the RAF airbases in southern England being reasonably adjacent to Dunkirk.  The 
tyranny and complications of distance were minimised in this case.  Australia will 
rarely, if ever, experience the same degree of re-assurance. The Pacific campaign of 
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World War II has provided much overriding evidence of the all encompassing nature 
of the sea and sea based power in operations in Australia’s region.  
 
Given the convergence of opportunity provided by Project Air 6000 and 
Project Sea 4000, now is the time for Australia to embrace the ‘seamless force’ 
concept and look critically at how best to achieve local air superiority, air dominance 
or air control when and where it is needed in support of government policy.  In this 
way the JSF could be configured in one or two variants, depending on the outcome of 
any study.  
 
 
FIGURE 14: JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 
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One possibility is that a portion of the JSF purchase could be in a maritime 
configuration while the rest would be a land base version. If around 100 aircraft are 
purchased, 30 to 40 of them could be a variant capable of operating from aircraft 
carriers.  This also overcomes some of the issues involved in retaining the strategic 
strike capability of the F-111 while also meeting the air dominance capability of the 
F/A-18 all from a single platform. The remaining precision shore strike requirement 
could be transferred to surface combatants via long range surface launched precision 
guided munitions and helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). From a RAAF 
perspective importantly all the aircraft could be RAAF aircraft with the benefits of 
commonality and critical mass in logistics and training support that flow from that 
approach. The JSF concept would permit considerable synergy in training, operational 
support, through life logistics and maintenance if such a position was taken. 
 
As has been detailed, combat air support for ADF operations has been limited 
to that provided by land based aircraft since 1982. Practical experience in operations 
and exercises in this period has indicated that this reliance is fragile in the maritime 
environment. Land based aircraft operating in support of maritime operations, 
including expeditionary warfare, suffer from a number of issues that can delay or 
prevent them achieving control of the air or even air parity in the area of operations. 
These limitations include, but are not limited to the following: 
 
Diplomatic Issues  
 
The operation of aircraft from a foreign nation’s territory can involve 
extensive and prolonged diplomatic negotiations, which even if successful can 
prevent those aircraft being used as Australia may well wish. Some nations are 
increasingly reluctant to allow foreign air bases or foreign forces on their soil. If they 
do allow such access the negotiation of transit rights and landing rights even for 
temporary operations can be a protracted issue. This may mean that a nation limited 
only to land-based air power options will find it difficult to react in a timely manner to 
a crisis. This is especially so in peacetime or in periods of increased tension short of 
war itself. Air to air refuelling is not an answer in every case. Effective operations at 
range may well require a secure air base and transit over-flight rights which could 
require extensive, long and delicate diplomatic negotiations. 
 
The diplomatic effort expended by the United States in the Middle East in 
2002/2003 in operations against Afghanistan and Iraq, with respect to conditions on 
aircraft operating from third party territory, is a case in point.  The experience of 
NATO in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans is also well documented. In this 
operation strict compliance rules imposed on operations by the countries in which the 
aircraft were based prevented tactical and operational freedom of operations. Within 
the region the exception was carrier borne aircraft.  In peacetime before the 
ramifications of a failure to take action are acknowledged by other nations, aircraft 
carriers can deploy to the region without many of the problems that bedevil a 
deployment involving a land element and third party sovereign issues. 
 
Security Issues - Vulnerability  
 
At times of heightened tensions the security of ADF assets, including 
equipment, logistics and personnel operating in a third country would involve 
considerable local and ADF security operations. This could also be intrusive and 
fragile. Aircraft, equipment and personnel would be more vulnerable to asymmetric 
attack such as terrorism. Although there have been successful terrorist attacks on 
ships, the USS Cole being a prime example, generally speaking if there is a terrorist 
threat ships are less vulnerable than fixed land based forces. This is simply because 
they are mobile and if necessary they can remain at sea and be supplied at sea.  Their 
movements at sea are also less certain, which disrupts and complicates any attack 
planning. 
 
Resilience and Reliability  
 
Unless the land base is adjacent to the area of operations, the ever-present 
issues of aircraft defects on mission start, mission critical repair facilities and access 
to the logistics to repair them in situ limit the provision of aircraft to the operation. 
Although aircraft carriers require maintenance on machinery, hull etc prudent margins 
of safety in peacetime can ensure prolonged availability in theatre when required. 
 
Air Control  
 
The reality of time and distance in the Australian strategic environment has 
meant the ability to control the air is difficult from land bases. Even if aircraft are 
operating on combat air patrol, with alert aircraft ready to surge from land bases, an 
aircraft such as an F/A-18 or JSF would in all probability be mission critical for 
weapons and fuel on completion of a single air-to-air engagement in the area of 
operations. The term mission critical refers to the fact that the fuel reserves of the 
aircraft may well be substantially expended by high speed manoeuvring in combat 
while the small number of air-to-air, air-to-surface weapons may well be expended 
requiring the aircraft to return to base prematurely. With distances to East Timor from 
Darwin in the region of 360nm, Norman Friedman’s earlier comments are pertinent 
indeed. Aircraft would need to return to base with an inevitable gap in air control until 
the alert aircraft arrived on station. Extensive long range air-to-air refuelling would be 
required to minimise this to any effect.  
 
Reaction time to air attack by enemy forces operating within or adjacent to the 
area of operations needs to be within minutes and needs to be reliable. Time and 
distance has been demonstrated in exercises and via experimentation as a critical 
factor which inhibits Australia’s ability to gain the sea control necessary to conduct 
maritime operations. 
 
Weather 
 
The weather at the land base, especially one at some distance, may well be 
different to that at sea or in the littoral area of operations. In the monsoonal conditions 
of Northern Australia and the Asia-Pacific region this factor must be considered. At 
worst weather at the distant air base could prevent any air support in the area of 
operations. In many operations weather effects can and do reduce aircraft time on 
station due to the need to allow fuel reserves in case of diversion requirements. 
 
Communications, Command and Control 
 
Despite the best efforts of technology, the friction and uncertainty of warfare 
will overly complicate communications, command and control. This will be 
compounded further when coupled with the distances that may well exist between 
land based support and the maritime strategic operations.  Additionally reliance on 
land based support reduces the ability of a deployed force to be reactive immediately 
to the changing tactical scenario.  The emission control posture of the force is also 
compromised by an excessive reliance on land based support and the need to 
communicate with that support for each and every detail of the mission to be passed. 
 
 
Tactical Flexibility 
 
An adversary has less certainty as to the range of aircraft operating from a 
base whose location and movements are unknown.  This provides inherent tactical 
problems for an adversary above and beyond that which air power brings to the battle. 
An adversary will also find it more difficult to gain intelligence cuing on aircraft 
operations if they are conducted from the sea. Fixed land bases will in all probability 
be under satellite surveillance and human observation.  The mobility of aircraft 
carriers makes continuous observation by an adversary of rates of effort, maintenance 
and launch and recovery more problematical.  Aircraft carriers are also operational on 
arrival in theatre. It is not reliant on the arrival of support units or equipment to obtain 
operational capability as it is inherent within the platform. 
 
Land Base Protection 
 
A proportion of assets are required to guard a land base from attack. This is 
obviously also true of the sea base, but it has the inherent advantage of mobility. 
Whether referring to the bare bases in the north of Australia or a forward land base, 
the fact that these bases are static is a vulnerability, which needs to be acknowledged. 
This factor should not be under-stated. Forces operating from these bases may well 
spend a substantial proportion of their rate of effort defending the base, which may be 
many miles from the critical area of operations, reducing the air control for the 
deployed ADF forces. Reference to actual combat losses in the Second World War 
indicate that the majority of aircraft carriers were destroyed or seriously damaged by 
other carrier fleets while seeking battle with other carrier fleets. Those lost to land 
based air attack or submarine attack were in most cases sunk due to consistent 
deployment in a particular area which allowed the enemy to respond.15  
 
In this era of precision guided munitions it can be argued that fixed 
installations and land bases are relatively more vulnerable as they cannot be moved, 
even if intelligence provides advanced warning of any impending strike. Traditionally 
to overcome this limitation, land forces and air forces have utilised bomb proof 
bunkers and spread their equipment over as large an area as possible to complicate the 
enemy attack and reduce casualties to personnel and damage to equipment.  However, 
new precision-guided munitions are capable of inflicting significant damage on even 
the best-protected fixed bases and their accompanying forces. Infrared satellite images 
and computer mapping has also rendered much of the traditional camouflaging 
techniques ineffective.  
 
Logistical Resupply 
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An issue that cannot be ignored for fixed bare bases or for any land forward 
operating base is that the local infrastructure could be inadequate, placing further 
strain on transport of supplies via the sea or via transport aircraft. This is a major issue 
for Australia with respect to the bare bases in the north and west of the country. The 
supply of fuel alone will stretch the RAAF and the national support infrastructure in 
any high level contingency, especially in the wet season when the interior of the 
country is largely impassable.  Resupply by sea may not be an option if sea control 
cannot be assured. Additionally fixed fuel storage installations, ammunition bunkers, 
water supplies, accommodation and support issues are also vulnerable to interdiction.  
 
General  
 
These points are by no means exhaustive and may or may not be relevant in all 
operations. They are relative not absolute factors. All professional naval personnel are 
advocates of air power. This is because the maritime environment is multi-
dimensional and control of the air cannot be ignored. Given the opportunity presented 
by new ADF projects and noting the investment of AUD$16 Billion in Project Air 
6000 alone, it is certainly time to leave the vitriolic debates of the 1960s to early 
1980s behind. The three services, navy, army, and air force on behalf of Australia 
should review critically the role of organic maritime air power in the execution of 
Australia’s military strategy.  Britain has done it, France has done it, India is doing it 
as is Italy, plus many others.  None of these nation states, especially Britain with its 
current trade emphasis on Europe, exists in an environment that is as inherently 
maritime as is Australia’s. The RAF and RN had spent much of the previous 70 years 
at odds of the issue of land based air power and sea based air power. However, the 
RAF has recently voiced its support for the British CVF project. A RAF service 
source is quoted as saying; ‘We have long since stopped talking about air forces. We 
are interested in air power, and carriers seem like a pretty good platform from which 
to project it.’16 
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Professor Paul Dibb17 stated in the Australian newspaper in August 2002, 
when commenting on the need for a high technology force structure and when 
referring to comments by the Chief of Air Force on the decision to nominate to be part 
of the JSF development that; ‘This confirms what the white paper said about air 
power being the most important single capability for Australia’s defence.’18 This 
comment in this context appears continue Australia’s single dimensional use of air 
power.  The air power he is referring to is purely land based, which is very limiting 
given Australia’s maritime environment.  This emphasis is reinforced as Professor 
Dibb is making a direct reference to a statement by the Chief of Air Force that the JSF 
will ensure Australia will control the air in the land areas, predominantly over 
northern Australia and over the maritime approaches to Australia. This is not a 
strategy that meets Australia’s strategic requirements.  Air power, as has been 
established, is a vital element of a balanced force structure that would permit a 
successful outcome for Australia strategic contest, but this is in the context of 
maritime strategy.  An element of the JSF purchase could be configured as an aircraft 
that is seamlessly integrated with the maritime force elements.  This would provide 
the flexibility of maritime air power, protect maritime logistics and over the shore 
assault forces and provide close air support for the land forces that ultimately execute 
the land battle. 
 
A revealing exercise could be to review the roles that Invincible would have 
played in the execution of Government policy had it been purchased in 1982. Given 
the development in short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft over the 
period since 1982, and given their success in the Falklands War of 1982, the ship 
could have been utilised to provide a measure of air defence, land strike, close air 
support and air dominance in medium level scenarios.  Those in which the ADF has 
been involved and in which such a capability would have been useful are the 1991 
Gulf War, the 1999 East Timor operation the 2001-2 Afghanistan operation and the 
Iraq War of 2003.  Certainly given the forces used in the Gulf War, Afghanistan and 
Iraq War, such a capability would have been functional and useful. In the context of 
the issue of sea control in the East Timor scenario, the vessel would have been very 
                                                 
17 Professor Dibb was the author of the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities which was the 
foundation of the 1987 Defence of Australia 1987, 
useful.  There is also the additional provision of logistical support to land forces that 
such a capability provides. 
 
Significantly, however, the attributes of sea borne mobile air bases versus the 
issue of current fixed land bases are not being studied in Australia. Noting that any 
new carrier could have a life span of some 50 years and new aircraft around 30 years 
this decision will impact on the structure and capabilities of the ADF out towards 
2060. At present Project Air 6000 phase 1 is stated as a replacement program for F/A-
18s and F-111. With Prime Minister John Howard’s comments on 27 June 2002 that 
the ADF will be part of the multi-national development of the JSF,19 the opportunity 
exists for it to be a project, which delivers air dominance and strike by whatever 
means necessary in support of Australia’s military strategy. The issue of effects based 
operations could be debated more vigorously in relation to our maritime environment. 
 
No proposal to study the requirement for an aircraft carrier can ignore the 
people issue in defence. When the RAN operated the aircraft carrier HMAS 
Melbourne its operational strength was around 17000 personnel. Major units in the 
1970s consisted of one aircraft carrier, three guided missile destroyers, three 
destroyers, six destroyer escorts, one tanker, a destroyer tender, six submarines, a 
squadron of mine hunting vessels and fifteen patrol boats. As of 30 May 2003 the 
RAN operates ten frigates, two replenishment ships, three amphibious ships, six 
submarines, six mine hunters and 15 patrol boats plus other craft.  The operational 
strength of the RAN has fallen to 12400, with 323 reserve personnel on full time 
service and 90 personnel on unpaid leave.  This gives a total strength of around 
12800. Importantly the Navy is funded for around 14000 personnel. The Directorate 
of Workforce Planning and Establishments (DWPE) states that when determining the 
sea/shore personnel ratio the planning is based on two personnel at sea and one ashore 
at the Able Seaman level, three at sea and two ashore at Leading Seaman, one to one 
at Petty Officer and Chief Petty Officer. Officers do not have a set sea/shore ratio. 
Basically if a ship needs ten extra officers, a further ten officers will be added to the 
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RAN officer manning level. Generally speaking the accepted ratio from historical data 
for the RAN is that one person at sea equates roughly to two people ashore. 
 
Therefore, when considering manning for a single carrier, an RAN scheme of 
complement of around 300 to 400 and RAAF manning of 200 to 300 would appear 
reasonable. From the RAN’s perspective this may result in a need to increase RAN 
manning in total by 900 to 1200 for a single carrier. When looking across the 
spectrum of the ADF, the fact that much of the actual flying, maintenance and flight 
deck operations would be the responsibility of the RAAF would mean that any study 
would need to review the total impact on ADF numbers. This should take into account 
any savings in RAAF personnel from potential closure or reduction in size and 
operational functions of some fixed bases. 
 
Initially therefore, as part of Project Air 6000, the ADF should study the 
common links of air and sea control. Any carrier, or carriers, should be studied more 
as ‘mobile bare bases’.  Cost and unit vulnerability has often been used as a reason 
why Australia cannot re-open debate on the issue. However, when compared against 
the costs of running, maintaining, manning and defending fixed bare bases, a study 
into these issues should be conducted. The issue of cost should be investigated and 
compared with the expenditure of building, maintaining, supplying and defending the 
bare bases that have been built on Australia’s west and north coasts. As noted earlier 
logistical re-supply of these bases, especially in the monsoonal wet season is no easy 
feat.  Their defence will be costly and complex. Their threat to Australia should they 
fall into enemy hands should also not be underestimated. 
 
The construction of surface combatants indicates that the cost of the actual 
hull and machinery is around 15 to 20 percent of the total cost.  Around 80 percent of 
the cost is the weapons, sensors and combat and communications systems. An issue, 
which should be investigated, is whether any new aircraft carrier requires an extensive 
command and control suite. If it is operated as more of a ‘mobile bare base’ the cost 
of such a platform may not be prohibitive for Australia.  
 
When assessing vulnerability, Dr Alan Stephens’ comment about the fixed 
land bases is again relevant. Precision-guided weapons may render these bases 
indefensible, and place the aircraft and personnel operating from them at extreme 
threat, especially when on the ground.  A significant force and proportion of any air 
dominance aircraft available to support the defence of the maritime approaches may 
well be dedicated to defending the very bases themselves. Carriers may also be 
vulnerable in some circumstances, but as previously noted their very mobility, the 
synergy of Task Group operations and the layered offensive and defensive systems 
that typify maritime deployments makes it a hard target. Any study may well reach 
the conclusion not to remove the bare bases, as each layer has its role to play.  
However, the ‘all-in-one-basket’ effects of current policy should be understood. 
 
As stated aircraft carriers for Australia could be viewed more properly in the 
context of mobile bare bases. They would build on the positive attributes of 
Australia’s current fixed bare bases, but overcome the limitations of these bases, by 
being able to bring air power to the area of operations, should the strategic and tactical 
situation require it. Evolving aircraft technology permits the possibility of Australia 
being able to operate an air dominance aircraft from a maritime platform.  Noting the 
seamless force statement of Force 2020, the RAAF could operate an air dominance 
and air strike combat air group from the mobile bare base exactly as it does today 
from land bases.  The RAN does not need to re-create a fixed wing fleet air arm. The 
operation of air dominance aircraft is what the RAAF does already. Australia should 
just move the base to sea as necessary. The RAN would operate the ship, steam it to 
where it is required and maintain it. The RAAF could be responsible for the fixed-
wing air group, including maintenance and training. 
 
This approach builds on the UK use of RAF GR7 Harrier aircraft from the 
Invincible class aircraft carriers off Yugoslavia. In fact between 2002 and 2006 the 
RN’s Sea Harriers will be removed from service. This will result in the three 
Invincible class aircraft carriers deploying solely with RAF fixed wing aircraft.20 As 
already stated the British are moving to provide a two carrier fixed wing air 
dominance and strike capability to permit expeditionary warfare from 2012. Australia 
seems not to have studied this aspect of operations. It is time to investigate this option 
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with a view to operating either a common aircraft variant from land and mobile sea 
bases or even a different variant should that be the preferred and logical outcome.   
 
There would of course be significant challenges. It is some 20 years since the 
RAN operated fixed wing aviation at sea. It would be a period of 30 to 35 years (1982 
to 2012/17) by the time the Project Air 6000 platforms could be commissioned into 
service. To be effective at sea aircrew would need to be educated in maritime 
operations. This includes a basic understanding of how ships work, both at sea and in 
harbour. This includes issues such as standing watches, conducting damage control 
training, ship safety training and survival at sea. Issues such as obtaining experienced 
Carrier Air Group Commanders to command the air element would be taxing.  The 
development of the ‘shipside’ such as the ship’s Commander Air, its head of the Air 
Department, and the team responsible for the shipboard side of training and 
operations would also be demanding. The RAN and RAAF would need to build this 
up over the next few years, by exchange postings to overseas forces operating aircraft 
at sea.  Given the Force 2020 proposals and vision this should be possible. Noting 
Project Air 6000’s impact on Australian strategy and its very significant budget, this 
proposal should be investigated in a meaningful and open fashion. 
 
The benefits that could flow from such an approach are more diverse than just 
the direct strategic options such a capability provides.  Less obvious effects perhaps 
could be an increase in the retention of aircrew, with them being given better 
opportunities to serve in operational environments away from Australian bases than 
occurs at present. Other effects may include a reduction in the identified Defence 
2000 need for five long range air-to-air refuelling aircraft; provision of enhanced air 
dominance and strike in the area of operations; enhanced protection for and 
interoperability with the AEW & C aircraft; operations free from considerations of 
diplomatic issues of third nation land based air operations. There are many other 
benefits, which may well follow.  Such an approach should at least be considered as 
part of Australia’s requirement for air dominance and strike as the current force 
approaches obsolescence. 
 
Project Sea 4000 – The Sea Control Combatant 
 
Project Sea 4000, is the project which is slated to resolve one pillar of the 
problem with air warfare at sea. However, the project still faces many hurdles and 
possible delays as the debate continues within defence as to the affordability of the 
future defence capability projects. That such a vital maritime project continues to be 
subject to controversy is even further confirmation that Australia’s strategic posture is 
not truly maritime in nature. Of all future projects the requirement to have a platform 
capable of achieving a degree of sea control by securing sea lines of communications 
and projecting power ashore by escorting the army, providing fire support and 
securing the protection of supplies to that land force and any land based air should be 
self-evident. 
 
 The mission requirement of the AWD should be primarily to provide an air 
warfare capability.  Specifically, it is required to provide an area air control capability 
which includes all of the measures needed to achieve air superiority through the use of 
installed or embarked weapons systems. The AWD should also have a significant 
command and control capability to permit the embarkation of a task group 
commander with all necessary communications capabilities. It should also be able to 
perform effectively in long-range undersea warfare and long-range surface warfare as 
these are vital to achieving sea control.  
 
 DSTO survivability studies1 indicate that a 6000-7000 tonne warship, or 
larger, shows significant improvements in survivability against damage when 
compared with the Anzac Class, because vital systems are less vulnerable due to the 
increased separation of vital equipment. Ship size is not a major cost driver. 
Colloquially speaking, ‘steel is cheap, air is free.’  As stated earlier the hull of a 
warship represents a small proportion of the total cost of the vessel with the systems 
within the hull accounting for the largest part of the cost of a ship. The increased 
survivability afforded by size is relatively cheap.  Over the centuries ships have been 
designed to be hit and to survive and hit back.  The idea of being hit should not come 
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as any surprise to those who understand maritime strategy properly. The challenge is 
to build a ship to survive and to function effectively even when hit, and increased size 
aids in this. 
 
 The AWD should be equipped with at least a single three dimensional phased 
array radar, long range surface-to-air missiles, close range missiles, a surface effect 
gun with a capability to provide precision fire support to land forces, anti-ship missile 
decoys and a degree of radar, infra-red and noise reduction technology. The ship 
should contain complex tactical data links, at least a single helicopter and be capable 
of operating advanced unmanned aerial vehicles.  
 
A maritime air warfare capable surface combatant force offers significant 
support to Australian military strategy and tasking via the contribution they would 
make to air control around Australia itself or to deployed forces.  A long-range three-
dimensional tracking and targeting capability, linked to the SM-2 missile,2 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC))3 and Link-164 would be a considerable 
force multiplier.  It could impact on any adversary attack plans and assist RAAF in 
concentrating fighter aircraft to localised threat sectors and reduce aircraft patrol 
times by offering alternate means of defending an airspace. A combination of surface 
combatants, aircraft carriers, AEW & C and fighter aircraft would offer a significant 
improvement in the strategic control and denial capability of the ADF via enhanced 
surveillance, classification and targeting capability.  This combination would also be 
effective in defending deployed ADF forces and coalition assets as well. 
 
A capable surface combatant also has the potential to be extremely useful in 
provision of theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD). Defence Update 2003 
highlighted, as did Defence 2000 to a lesser extent, the threat posed to Australia by 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which include ballistic missiles. Surface 
combatants equipped with a three dimensional long-range phased array radar, air 
                                                 
2 SM-2 is USN missile which provides long range air warfare capability. 
3 CEC is a USN system which fuses the actual track based video from a number of units and uses the 
combined picture to produce a single real-time track which can then be tracked and engaged at ranges 
beyond that capable by a single unit. 
4 Link-16 is a new generation tactical digital information link (TADIL) which provides near real-time 
tactical information to disparate units, surface, air and land, and provides a single digital force picture 
via a time-division multiple access net. 
warfare missile and weapon control system could have a growth path to integrate any 
future options to intercept ballistic missiles.5 Certainly surface combatants by virtue 
of their mobility and access can offer a degree of defence to Australia and also to 
deployed ADF and coalition forces.  
 
In general terms the operational role of the AWD in executing the 
requirements of maritime air warfare is to control the air environment.  This would 
deny an adversary the information and freedom to target surface combatants, ADF air 
assets and escorted shipping. Escorted shipping could be maritime trade vessels or 
strategic sealift vessels. The AWD would nullify or reduce the threat to an acceptable 
level for effective joint task group operations by permitting ADF forces to engage 
surveillance and strike aircraft at extended ranges, thereby denying them freedom to 
use the air environment. The AWD would also deny an adversary the tactical 
information on which they could base attack plans; deny targeting information on 
which efficient use of adversary anti-ship missiles (ASMs) would be reliant; engage 
ASMs attacking other ships in company; engage aircraft attacking other ships in 
company; protect other ADF assets such as AEW&C, P3C and land units from enemy 
aircraft; and control fighter aircraft effectively at long range. This would impact on 
adversary freedom of use of the air environment in general, and project power in the 
airspace over land. The ability to engage surveillance, targeting and strike aircraft 
before weapon release is an integral part of providing an air warfare capability.   
 
From the perspective of surface combatants, Project Sea 4000 can be a 
significant force multiplier for Australia if it is equipped properly. A great proportion 
of precision guided munitions used by the United States for power projection ashore 
are launched from USN destroyers, it would seem odd if this was not also investigated 
for the ADF. Indeed, there is space and weight already in the Anzac frigate for a 
second strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system, which could be utilised in a 
similar role. This is already a possible addition to the strategic strike capability of the 
F-111 aircraft as it would provide another dimension to Australia’s maritime strategy. 
It is after all the effect that matters and precision guided munitions from air, surface or 
                                                 
5 See Mueller, T. The Royal Australian Navy & Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, Working Paper No 
12, Sea Power Centre Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 2003. 
sub-surface platforms could all be utilised accordingly to provide a balanced range of 
responses. 
Conclusion 
 
Australia is a maritime nation.  The fact that Australia has no land border is a 
strategic bonus that makes Australia the envy of many less fortunate nations. To date 
Australia has not maximised this bonus, has essentially marginalised maritime forces 
and shown little real understanding of maritime strategy. There is much in Australian 
military history that has led to the development of a continental outlook and a bush 
mythology. Doctrine, especially maritime doctrine has not been well understood and 
utilised fully as the basis for defence white papers.  
 
Australia’s need for a credible maritime strategy is greater than the 
requirement to obtain maritime air power and capable surface combatants. Maritime 
strategy requires logistic capability, both sea and air, amphibious platforms, an 
effective mobile army, long range maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, industrial 
maritime repair, maintenance and construction infrastructure and a credible merchant 
marine. Given the reality of Australia’s economic capability, with the exception of a 
credible merchant capability, Australia possesses a reasonable capacity to be a 
maritime nation in these areas.  
 
The exception is in the ability to conduct sea control operations that enable 
power projection and defence of the sea lines of communications that are so vital to 
the Australian economy.  Sea control is a multi-dimensional concept as it 
encompasses control of the air; control of the surface of the sea; control of the 
undersea water column; control of the littoral (if operating in that environment); and 
control of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Each of these multi-dimensional aspects is 
important in each warfare discipline. Without sea control there is no maritime power 
projection and forces cannot be operated ashore. Maritime organic air power and air 
warfare capable surface combatants are two vital elements that are required in order 
for Australia to be credible, not only in sea control but more broadly in a maritime 
strategic sense.  
 
 Despite statements in Defence 2000 that Australia has a predominantly 
maritime strategy, this is not so from a historical, strategic or doctrinal basis. 
Maritime doctrine does not feature within Defence 2000. As a result the force 
structure development that is built from that paper does not reflect the realities of 
maritime strategy. Defence Update 2003 goes some way towards a conclusion that 
expeditionary warfare will play a pivotal role in defending Australia and its interests. 
However, it concentrates predominantly on niche capabilities, weapons of mass 
destruction and land global terrorism. The maritime reality for Australia continues to 
be marginalised. 
 
To rectify this strategic force structure development and the drafting of 
national documents such as Defence White papers should be built on a rigorous 
doctrinal base. A good understanding of doctrine, of military history and strategy 
should form the basis of strategic planning. Current strategic circumstances require 
that Australia’s maritime environment and likely future requirements should drive 
force structure decisions, rather than the current ‘top down’ strategic thinking, which 
appears to shape those decisions. Any tendency towards ‘orthodoxy’, of imposing a 
single vision on defence debate needs to be vigorously avoided if Australia is to have 
a defence strategy, posture and capability which is best able to counter to a world 
which is vigorous and characterised by uncertainty. The study of international 
maritime doctrine and of history indicates that sea control is vital. Defeating Australia 
does not predominantly involve countering the elements of DA and the ‘inner arc.’ 
 
Inter-service rivalry between the RAN and RAAF from the 1960s to the 1980s 
meant that the debate on the true value of maritime air power to Australia was argued 
in a ‘propagandist’ not strategically sound manner.  Since the early 1980s there has 
been no new debate on this subject in Australia and certainly not at a serious level in 
the ADF. With the JSF, the looming block obsolescence of the F/A-18 and F-111 and 
the convergence of technology there is a chance to make the claims of Australia 
having a maritime centric strategy, as stated in Defence 2000, a reality.  
 
To achieve this phase 1 of Project Air 6000 should be re-scoped in the first 
instance to study the viability of including air power delivered via the sea as part of 
Australia’s aerospace future. Any such study should take full account of Australia’s 
maritime environment and strategic requirements over the next 50 years. A 
cost/capability comparison, highlighting issues such as the net personnel operating 
costs of land bases, including the bare bases should be considered when comparing 
the costs of at least a single aircraft carrier and associated RAAF air wing based either 
out of RAAF Williamtown or RAAF Pearce. All of the Bare Bases or one or two may 
well be retained. The cost, capability issues and strategic requirement for providing 
long range AAR as currently envisaged should also be compared noting the reduced 
requirement should sea based air power be available in the area of operations. 
 
Building on this the ADF should then consider a maritime air wing component 
for AIR 6000 via the JSF. If around 100 aircraft are purchased for the RAAF, between 
30 and 40 of them could be a variant capable of operations from maritime platforms – 
that is aircraft carriers. Subsequent phases of Project Air 6000 could then maintain 
their focus on unmanned aerial vehicles and space based systems while noting the 
utility of UAVs from sea platforms. Regardless of any decision on maritime air power 
the pressing strategic requirement for Project Sea 4000 must be maintained if any 
level of maritime strategic capability is to be regained for Australia. 
 
The challenge is to prove that the modern ADF is a seamless force. The 
military strategic priority of defence of Australia and its approaches and force 
projection requires air power as its very basis. This is axiomatic to operations in the 
region.  The RAAF are the professionals who should and do execute fixed wing air 
power for Australia. The proposal in this paper is an attempt to rekindle meaningful 
debate in a field that has been off limits for too long.  The ADF prides itself on being 
an innovative force.  Therefore it should be encouraged to think ‘outside the box,’ use 
innovative approaches and leverage technological developments and take the air 
power with its forces to where it is needed. The ideals of Force 2020 support this 
concept. 
 
Fixed-wing aircraft depend fundamentally on air bases. In Australia, the use of 
bare-bases is fundamental to the application of aerospace power. The physical 
security of an air base will usually require a substantial number of personnel. 
Furthermore the high value of air bases makes them a focus of enemy intelligence and 
a focal point for attack. Base dependency and vulnerability can be reduced by; 
creating redundancy, establishing forward operating bases, use of air-to-air refuelling, 
hardening bases infrastructure and employing air defence measures. Whether or not 
these will prove effective in a future high intensity conflict remains to be seen.  
However, an additional characteristic, that of mobility which an aircraft carrier 
provides, reduces vulnerability to precision weapons, reduces the requirement for a 
forward operating base by being one, reduces the need for air-to-air refuelling and 
eases forward re-supply issues which can only be of benefit in the Australian geo-
strategic environment. 
 
There is the opportunity under Project Air 6000 to shape the future of air 
power in support of Australia’s maritime strategy.  Not to investigate seriously the 
viability of maritime air power would be a mistake. It is time to relegate the vitriolic 
single-service oriented debate, the ‘creative tension’ and ‘illegitimate isolationism’ 
that led to the 1983 carrier decision to that era and to move on and engage in a new 
study that rigorously reviews the technology, operational concepts and strategic 
realities of 2003 to 2040 with respect to Australia’s maritime strategic circumstances. 
 
Aircraft carriers, operating much as mobile bare bases, with the aircraft flown 
and operated by the RAAF and the ship crewed and operated by the RAN would 
provide a true example of the joint nature of the ADF. Sea based air power in the 
Australian environment is a basic requirement before Australia can robustly state that 
its maritime strategy is in reality maritime. The ADF has the opportunity to gain a 
capability to provide control of the air that is truly organic and integral to the force.  
This is necessary to achieve the sea control and power projection necessary to 
influence events ashore and also to protect Australia’s sea lines of communications. A 
portion of this capability could be independent of the limitations of land bases and 
capable of utilisation where and whenever it is needed.   
 
From the perspective of Project Sea 4000, the modern surface combatant 
retains a vital, indeed fundamental, role to play in the future maritime force structure. 
Their mobility and endurance allows the flexibility to maintain a continuous presence 
in moving scenes of action. Their sensors and weapons work throughout the maritime 
battlespace and span operations against aircraft, ships and submarines, and against 
forces and assets ashore. Moreover, mobile naval platforms have the ability to poise 
and persist in theatre, often for months at a time. The surface combatant thus remains 
a potent and flexible capability to execute the sea control requirement, particularly 
when they lever off other assets and advanced intelligence, surveillance fusion and 
dissemination systems. Indeed, the flexible response options and sustained presence 
of surface combatants in periods short of open hostilities may help to control or 
prevent escalation, particularly in complex or ambiguous circumstances where 
submarines and aircraft are not free to make full use of their primarily offensive 
potential. 
 
The mission requirement is to provide a sea control capability for the ADF. In 
this way the role and mission of the AWD could perhaps better be understood in 
terms of a sea control combatant. 
 
Flexibility is the answer to uncertainty, and the danger in the Post-Cold War 
era is that the central role of sea control for Australia’s strategic security, and the 
countering of any potential threats to it, is forgotten. Australia needs an adequate 
surface capability in the context of a balanced, integrated and synergistic, 
interoperable fleet. Such a fleet would have the ability to deter and respond in a range 
of high and low threat environments that are regionally representative. It is a rare 
luxury to get the war you expect, and the ADF should provide a wide range of 
strategic and operational options in any given situation. These are the priorities that 
should drive force structure thinking, with particular emphasis on gaps in present 
capability, namely maritime air power, air warfare, strike and command and control. 
Historically navies have acted as force multipliers for small nations, and maritime 
communications are vital for survival.  
 
The RAN must remain a regional asset for Australia as well as a link with 
major allies such as the United States. Past principles of Australian naval strategy 
coincide with present and likely future needs: sea control and versatility, 
interoperability, and balance between littoral and blue water and regional and out of 
area capabilities. In the absence of maritime air power and credible air warfare 
capable surface combatants, there is a real danger that the capability of the ADF will 
be reduced to a sea denial one, or at best a capability for very limited sea control 
tasks. This does not reflect the maritime nature of Australia’s geo-strategic 
environment nor does it reflect the realities of the new century. 
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Appendix 1 
SEA 4000 – Maritime Air Warfare Capability 
 
SEA 4000 seeks to provide the Australian Defence Force with an affordable maritime 
air warfare capability as a complementary part of a comprehensive, layered air 
defence capability.  This capability will be conceptualised, acquired, tested, accepted, 
operated and supported, modified, enhanced, and disposed of within a whole-of-life 
management philosophy.  The proposal seeks the acquisition of at least three air 
defence capable ships. SEA 4000 is a multi-stage proposal to acquire this capability.  
The estimated cost of SEA 4000 is $3500m-$4500m, with the first vessel to be in-
service by 2013. 
 
Background 
 
In October 2001, the Royal Australian Navy decommissioned the last of its Perth 
Class air warfare destroyers.  Accordingly, Defence has been working for several 
years to determine the best option to maintain its ability to conduct maritime air 
warfare and effect task group Command and Control from major surface combatants. 
 
In preparation for the Defence White Paper 2000, significant work was undertaken 
too identify and quantify the maritime capability developments required to meet 
Government’s expectations.  This included the development of a Maritime Capability 
Options Study and the use of a joint Defence and Industry integrated project team to 
collate and analyse information on air warfare platforms currently in build.  This work 
informed Government during its deliberations for future capability direction and 
resulted in the initiation of SEA 4000 to acquire a maritime air warfare capability.  
 
Phase 1 involves Study and Preliminary Design that will examine the details of the 
ADF’s future maritime air warfare capability requirements and the options that are 
available to meet them.  This will include analysis of issues such as acquisition 
strategies, capability options, emergent technologies, environmental issues, logistic 
cost reduction, crewing issues and interoperability with other platforms and allies.  
Risk reduction work will also be undertaken in the areas of combat system 
integration, platform propulsion and sensor systems in relation to proposed platforms.  
The estimated cost of Phase 1 is $30-50m. 
 
Phase 2 involves a detailed concept design and costing study and analysis based on 
options identified in Phase 1. 
 
Phase 3 involves a preliminary and detailed design stage to define the capability 
design to be acquired and built. 
 
Phase 4 involves the acquisition and build of the vessels, to commence in 2005/06.  
The exact number and timing of each build will be determined in the earlier study and 
design stages. 
 
Appendix 2 
AIR 6000 – New Aerospace Combat Capability 
 
 
The AIR 6000 project was implemented to provide the ADF with replacement air 
dominance and strike capabilities currently provided by the F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft 
fleets. Current planned withdrawal dates for the F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft are 2012-
15 and 2015-20 respectively.  The project was to provide up to 100 multi-role aircraft 
to replace the current F/A-18 and F-111 fleets. The overall cost of the project was 
estimated at $12b. It has risen to around $16b. AIR 6000 was a multi-stage project, 
which was still in the first definition stage when it was overtaken by events. 
 
On 29 October 2002 the Government decided to become the eighth partner in the 
Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, joining the System Development 
and Demonstration (SDD) phase at a cost of $300m. The Joint Strike Fighter is being 
developed as a next-generation multi-role fighter for the US Air Force, US Navy and 
US Marine Corps. The aircraft is characterised by a low observability design, internal 
weapons carriage, an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, advanced 
electro-optical and infrared sensors and the ability to employ a wide range of air-to-
surface and air-to-air weapons. There were a range of reasons underlying this 
decision, including 5th generation advanced stealth and combat characteristics, early 
delivery, interoperability, development cost reduction, Australian industry 
involvement, and the option to lease interim combat aircraft if delays in the program 
impacted on withdrawal of the F/A-18 and F-111 fleets. 
 
The Government decided at that time that the JSF is the aircraft most likely to satisfy 
Australia's needs and, while no formal commitment was made for the purchase of the 
F-35, effectively eliminated the other contenders from the AIR 6000 project - the 
French Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Northrop-Grumman F/A-E/F Super 
Hornet, F-22 Raptor, SAAB Gripen and Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker. A commitment to 
buy the F-35 is not expected until 2005 when the SDD is more advanced.  Should a 
commitment be made it is currently anticipated that the conventional version designed 
for the USAF will be selected, although the STOVL variant designed for the USMC 
and RAF and carrier variant designed for the USN have not been ruled out.  
Additionally, the possibility that a mix of F-35 variants, or mix of F-35 with other 
aircraft such as the F/A-22 or FB-22 Raptor, may be purchased has not been ruled 
out. 
 
The AIR 6000 project has been replaced by the New Air Combat Capability (NACC) 
Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is currently managing Australian involvement 
in the SDD phase and conducting capability needs analysis to help inform the 
Government prior to any decision to be made in the 2005 timeframe.  Should the F-35 
be procured the first delivery is currently anticipated in 2012. 
Appendix 3 
Aircraft Carriers in the Royal Australian Navy 
 
The following paper is submitted in accordance with a minute from the 
Secretary, Defence Committee, dated 7th January, 1944 –  
 
‘3.  The Minister wishes the Defence Committee as the advisory body on 
Defence Policy, to keep constantly in mind the question of Post-War Defence 
Policy from the following angles:- 
 
(i) The experience of this war in relation to the principles of Australia and Empire 
Defence, and to the nature, strength, and organization of the Australian Forces 
… 
 
4. The Minister desires this minute to be viewed as a standing instruction to the 
Defence Committee so that, when a firm basis for the expression of its views has 
been established under either 3(i) or (ii), the Committee will submit them for his 
consideration.’ 
 
The Naval Board considers that a firm basis for the expression of its views in 
relation to the value of Carriers to the Royal Australian Navy has been established, 
and therefore submit the following memorandum on the subject for consideration. 
 
The Aircraft Carrier has proved itself a necessary part of any Task Force not 
only to provide fighter protection for the remainder of the force and itself, but also to 
provide a powerful striking force for offensive purposes.  Such striking forces have 
been used in this war with great effect against land targets, Naval targets in harbour, 
and Naval targets at sea. 
 
 The importance of the Carrier striking force has proved so great that now in 
meetings between Task Forces, each of which contains Carriers, the result of the 
battle may well be decided by the Carrier striking forces before the surface forces can 
get into gun range. 
 
 Nevertheless Carriers cannot afford to take the sea unaccompanied by Cruisers 
and/or Capital Ships and Destroyers, which are necessary to provide protection 
against attack from the other surface vessels or submarines, and to provide additional 
anti-aircraft gun support. 
 
 It is not too much to say that the future Fleet will be moulded round the 
Carrier. 
 
 The most notable examples in this war of the offensive and defensive use of 
Carrier-borne aircraft have been as follows:- 
 
(a) AGAINST NAVAL TARGETS AT SEA: 
 
(i) The sinking of the ‘BISMARCK’ – This ship was attacked and 
torpedoed by aircraft from the ‘VICTORIOUS’. Later aircraft from the 
‘ARK ROYAL’ torpedoed her and slowed her down so that the surface 
ships were able to close and finally destroy her. 
 
(ii) The Coral Sea and Midway Island Battles – These were fought almost 
entirely between opposing Carrier forces.  The Japanese losses were 
heavy and included – 5 Carriers, 3 Cruisers and 5 Destroyers sunk; 1 
Carrier, 3 Battleships and 6 Cruisers damaged: whilst the United States 
Navy lost 2 Carriers and 2 Destroyers. 
 
(b) AGAINST NAVAL TARGETS IN HARBOUR: 
 
(i) Taranto – A striking force from one Carrier (‘ILLUSTRIOUS’) carried 
out a night attack on the Italian Fleet and was able to sink one Italian 
Battleship and severely cripple two others for the loss of one 
Swordfish aircraft. 
 
(ii) Pearl Harbour – A Japanese force of carrier-borne aircraft inflicted 
heavy damage on the United States Fleet for the loss of 48 aircraft.  
The American losses included 6 Battleships sunk or very severely 
damaged, 3 Cruisers damaged, 3 Destroyers sunk, 1 Floating Dock 
destroyed, etc., etc. 
 
(iii) Kaa Fjiord – ‘TIRPITZ’ was attacked on April 3, 1944, by Barracudas 
from Carriers, escorted by fighters – 3 hits by 1600 lb. and 5 hits by 
500 lb. bombs and 5 probable hits.  Damaged caused will take at least 
five months to repair.  Only 2 Barracudas lost by enemy action plus 1 
crashed taking off. 
 
(c) AGAINST LAND TARGETS: 
 
(i) Tokyo – An attack on the Japanese mainland was carried out by 
Carrier-borne aircraft in April, 1942. 
 
(ii) The Carolines and Marshalls – In two months, i.e., from 1st February 
to 1st April, 1944, a force of Battleships and Carriers was able to 
neutralise the whole of the mandated Islands causing considerable 
damage and loss to Japanese aircraft and shipping, with practically no 
loss to themselves. 
 
(iii) The Marianas – Powerful Carrier Task Forces completely neutralised 
Japanese air resistance in this area and successfully covered the 
landings of troops. 
 
(d) ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS: 
 
Since the introduction of the Escort Carrier for anti-submarine protection of 
convoys early in 1943 until the end of 1943, aircraft from these escorts sank 14 and 
probably sank 9 German U-boats in the Atlantic alone.  In the famous ‘500 mile gap’ 
where air cover could not be provided by shore-based aircraft, the Escort Carrier has 
solved the problem by providing convoys with A/S Air protection. 
 
(e) ANTI-LONG RANGE BOMBER AIRCRAFT: 
 
(i) Russian Convoys – The only fighter cover against shore-based air 
attack on the Russian convoy route was provided by Aircraft Carrier 
escorts.  No Aircraft Carrier escort has been lost on this route. 
 
(ii) Malta Convoys – In the days when Malta was of vital importance, the 
only air escort that could be provided for the desperately need convoys 
was given by Aircraft Carriers.  Reinforcing Spitfires were flown in 
from the decks of Carriers – the only method (except as cargo) that 
could be used to bring them within flying range. 
 
(f) COVERING LANDINGS: 
 
(i) North Africa – In these landings complete fighter cover was provided 
over the landing areas by the 12 Aircraft Carriers employed; the 
beachheads were beyond fighter range from the airfields under Allied 
control.  The Aircraft Carriers also supplied attack aircraft during the 
operations. 
 
(ii) Salerno – When the Allied air situation was critical in this area 
(September, 1943) 4 Aircraft Carriers were used as mobile airfields to 
provide fighter cover until shore bases were available. 
 
(iii) Hollandia – The fighter cover for this operation was provided entirely 
by the Carrier-borne aircraft of the Task Forces.  The ‘attack force’ 
aircraft during daylight hours was also provided by the Aircraft 
Carriers, 750 aircraft in all being provided.  No losses were suffered by 
our forces. 
 
The above examples are sufficient to show the important and varied uses to 
which Carriers can be put.  They show that they can be used with equal success 
against both land and sea targets.  They show their value in the covering of troop 
landings and in the protection of trade from submarine and aircraft attack.  It can be 
shown that they are equally useful for attack on enemy trade although the 
opportunities for this have been scarce as our command of the sea has virtually closed 
the oceans to the enemy. 
 
The strategical ubiquity of the Carrier is one of its most important assets.  It 
corresponds to a completely mobile Air station of three to five squadrons of Aircraft 
complete with fuel, maintenance facilities, bombs and torpedoes which can shift its 
position 600 miles a day, and thus in one month it may strike without warning in the 
Atlantic and in the next off the coast of Australia.  A few Torpedo Bomber Squadrons 
in a Carrier thus constitute a greater threat than a similar number of Squadrons in a 
shore base where their activities are circumscribed by a definite operational radius. 
 
Great Britain and America have realised the value of sea-based air power and 
each is building up a great fleet of Carriers.  Great Britain will have at the end of 
1944, a total of 53, U.S.A. will have a total of 108, whilst Canada recently have taken 
over 2 from the Royal Navy. 
 
The Naval Board therefore recommends that favourable consideration be 
given by the Government to the provision of Aircraft Carriers for the Royal 
Australian Navy.  In this connection it is observed that the Naval Board have been 
asked in War Cabinet Agendum No. 342/1944 of 5th July, to report on the number of 
personnel required to man a Light Fleet Carrier in December 1944 or as soon 
thereafter as possible. 
 
Secretary, Naval Board. 
 
 
Navy Office, 
Melbourne, 
17th July, 1944 
 
Australian Archives Accession 
MP 1049/5 File 2026/2/925 
 
(Note:  The argument set out in this memorandum was accepted by the Defence 
Committee, and was the basis for the Chifley Government’s decision to establish an 
RAN Fleet Air Arm in May 1947) 
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